Stone v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 75S03-9006-CR-419,75S03-9006-CR-419 |
| Citation | 555 N.E.2d 475 |
| Parties | Terry STONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
David A. Brooks, Knox, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Richard C. Webster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
ON CRIMINAL PETITION FOR TRANSFER
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction of appellant for Receiving Stolen Property, a Class D felony, and Conversion, a Class A misdemeanor 547 N.E.2d 1131. We grant transfer, set aside the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the trial court.
The facts are: Through investigation, the Starke County Sheriff's Department had probable cause to believe that appellant's brother, Robert Stone, had committed several burglaries in the community and had been seen at appellant's home with a U-Haul truck. Police obtained search warrants to search appellant's home and surrounding premises. In their attempt to carry out the search warrant, Sheriff's Deputies met with verbal abuse and physical interference from appellant and his wife. However, notwithstanding such interference, they were able to recover and identify various items which had been taken in burglaries including Christmas tree decorations taken from the property of Fred Langer. It was this count of receiving stolen property of which appellant eventually was convicted. This property was found under a tarp in the yard. Appellant had specifically tried to keep the officers from looking under this tarp.
Appellant claims there is insufficient evidence to show that he had knowledge that the items on his premises had been stolen. However, as pointed out by Judge Garrard in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, the harassment of the officers by appellant and his wife, the fact that the items were concealed, and the nature of the items was ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could determine that appellant in fact did have knowledge the items were stolen.
It is true that in order to sustain a conviction the State must prove that the defendant knew the property was stolen. Johnson v. State (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 1015; Mattingly v. State (1981), Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 18. Knowledge that property is stolen may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the possession. Marshall v. State (1987), Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 853. Attempts to conceal evidence may be considered by the jury as revealing consciousness of guilt. See Gambill v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 523. There is sufficient evidence in this record to support the verdict of the jury.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his Proposed Instruction No. 2, which stated that possession of stolen property by the defendant is not sufficient to establish guilt. However, the substance of this instruction was covered by the court's Instruction No. 4; thus it was not error to refuse to give appellant's instruction on the same subject. Bowling v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 783.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion for judgment on the evidence. As pointed out above, the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury.
Appellant contends he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. He argues that counsel should have objected when the prosecuting attorney referred to items recovered on appellant's premises. These items were included...
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Fortson v. State
...conduct."). And knowledge that property is stolen may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the possession. Stone v. State, 555 N.E.2d 475, 477 (Ind.1990); Marshall v. State, 505 N.E.2d 853, 856 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). However it has long been the accepted law in this state that the "su......
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S.G. v. State
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Gibson v. State
......403). In addition to proving the explicit elements of the crime as set out in the statute, the State had also to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gibson knew that the property had been the subject of theft. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(d) (Burns 1985); 7 Stone v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 475, 477. . There was no evidence that anyone told Gibson that the wallet and its contents had been stolen. Indeed, the unrefuted testimony of Gibson's mother at trial was that she had driven Gibson to the Eagles Lounge on the evening of April ......
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Shultz v. State, 25A03-0003-CR-106.
......In order to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the State must prove that the defendant knew the property was stolen. Stone v. State, 555 N.E.2d 475, 476 (Ind.1990). Knowledge that property is stolen may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the possession, and attempts to conceal evidence may be considered by the factfinder as revealing consciousness of guilt. Id. "Possession of recently stolen property when ......