S.G. v. State

• Decision Date: 24 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 49A05–1011–JV–736.,49A05–1011–JV–736.
• Citation: 956 N.E.2d 668
• Parties: S.G., Appellant–Respondent,v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Petitioner.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

956 N.E.2d 668

S.G., Appellant–Respondent,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Petitioner.

No. 49A05–1011–JV–736.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Aug. 24, 2011.

Mary E. Spears, Gilroy Kammen Hertzel & Moudy, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

S.G. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for committing an act that would be considered Class D felony receiving stolen property ¹ if committed by an adult. On appeal he raises numerous issues, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when, over S.G.'s objection, it admitted into evidence S.G.'s incriminating statements, which he alleges were involuntary and were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination;

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to adjudge S.G. a delinquent child for receiving stolen property; and

III. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it imposed a restitution order in an amount S.G. alleges is greater than the victim's actual loss.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.²

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY³

On February 19, 2010, Susan Sparks (“Sparks”), a teacher with the Indianapolis Public School System (“IPS”), was using the staff restroom of the Coleman Alternative Education Center (“Coleman”) when her iPhone was stolen from her handbag, which she had left on the restroom counter. Sparks informed Coleman's principal, Linda Gagyi (“the Principal”), that her iPhone had been stolen. In turn, the Principal notified IPS Police Department Officer Steven Anthony Guynn, Jr. (“Officer Guynn”), who worked on school premises, about the stolen iPhone. During the fact-finding hearing, Officer Guynn described his duties at Coleman as follows: “[Responsible for] the safety and security of the students and staff. Also, dealing with any type of law enforcement issues that could arise from within the school or on the property from outside.” Tr. at 4.

Officer Guynn's review of a school surveillance tape revealed that only one person had been in the restroom at the same time as Sparks—a female student, T.C. Id. at 15. This prompted the Principal to speak with T.C. The next day, S.G. appeared on the “radar” as someone who might have involvement in the disappearance of Sparks's iPhone.⁴ Appellant's Br. at 3.

At the Principal's request, Officer Guynn found S.G. and directed him to come to the Principal's office. The Principal and Officer Guynn sat with S.G. during a meeting in the Principal's office (the “meeting”), but only the Principal asked S.G. questions about the stolen cell phone. Prior to being questioned, S.G. was not given Miranda warnings nor provided with an opportunity to speak with his parent or guardian. In response to the Principal's question, S.G. stated that T.C. had given him the cell phone and that he got rid of it after he learned from other students that it had been stolen from Sparks. Tr. at 10–21. Based on these statements, the Principal suspended him. Tr. at 17. The State filed a petition of delinquency on May 27, 2010, alleging that S.G. was a delinquent child because he had committed receiving stolen property, a Class D felony if committed by an adult.

During the fact-finding hearing, the State asked Officer Guynn and the Principal what S.G. had told them during the meeting about Sparks's missing cell phone. Tr. at 5, 16. Defense counsel objected to the State's line of questioning, contending that S.G.'s statements were inadmissible because they were made during a custodial interrogation, prior to which S.G. had not been informed of his rights under Miranda nor given an opportunity to consult with his parent or guardian. Id. at 9. Over defense counsel's continuing objection, the juvenile court allowed Officer Guynn and the Principal to testify regarding incriminating statements S.G. had made concerning his having possessed and disposed of the stolen cell phone. Id. at 9–10, 16.

Regarding her restitution claim, Sparks described her iPhone as being a “32 gig” when her iPhone “was a 16.” Id. at 33. Additionally, Sparks replaced her stolen iPhone 3G with an iPhone 4G—a newer model. When Sparks was questioned as to whether the replacement iPhone was comparable to the stolen iPhone, she answered, “It's comparable to the phone that I had when I bought that phone. When I bought the 3G it was like the best thing they had to offer.” Id. at 26. During cross-examination, and in response to the State's objection on relevance grounds, the juvenile court responded by noting, “She just—testified as to what she did.... She got a better phone.” Id. at 33–34.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court issued a true finding that S.G. was a delinquent child because he had knowingly received, possessed, or disposed of Sparks's stolen cell phone. See Ind.Code § 35–43–4–2(b). In addition and without inquiring into S.G.'s ability to pay, the juvenile court ordered as a condition of probation that S.G. pay restitution for the cell phone in the amount of $501.00, “authorize[d S.G.] to participate in the restitution work program,” and set April 1, 2011 as the “end date” of probation. Tr. at 43–44. The juvenile court also instructed S.G.'s parents to “do whatever is necessary to ensure that [S.G.] completes these probation programs, which is really the restitution work program.” Id. at 44. S.G. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Admission of Incriminating Statements

S.G. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence, over his continuing objection, the incriminating statements he made during the meeting with the Principal and Officer Guynn. On appeal, he argues that these statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of his rights under Miranda⁵ and without waiving his rights under Indiana Code section 31–32–5–1 (the “juvenile waiver statute”).⁶ Additionally, S.G. contends that his statements were involuntarily made in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution.⁷

A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse such a ruling only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Bentley v. State, 846 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. In making this determination, this court does not reweigh evidence and considers conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Regarding the “abuse of discretion” standard generally, our Supreme Court has observed, “to the extent a ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence it is reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.” Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 104 (Ind.2005).

“A juvenile charged with delinquency is entitled to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles [that] experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial.” In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind.2004) (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). “Without question, these include ... the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination....” Id. “In protection of the right against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, established that ‘the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.’ ” P.M. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). Such procedural safeguards include an advisement to the accused that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him. Id.

As this court recently reiterated, “[t]he special status accorded juveniles in other areas of the law is fully applicable in the area of criminal procedure.” S.D. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied (2011). “To give effect to that status in the context of waiving intricate, important, and long established Fifth ... Amendment rights, we require that a juvenile be afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with a parent or guardian before the solicitation of any statement.” Id. That is, in cases where a juvenile is subject to custodial interrogation, such child must be read his rights under Miranda, and the State must obtain the waiver of such rights pursuant to the juvenile waiver statute.

Both parties concede that S.G. was neither read Miranda rights nor given the opportunity to have a meaningful consultation with a parent or guardian. As a general rule, however, Miranda warnings and the juvenile waiver statute attach only where a subject is both in custody and subject to interrogation. See S.D., 937 N.E.2d at 430 (evidence was clear that S.D. was interrogated by police officer; issue was whether he was in custody); P.M., 861 N.E.2d at 713 (State conceded that P.M. was in custody; issue was whether he was interrogated). Therefore, the threshold questions are whether S.G. was in custody, and if so, whether the questioning by the Principal constituted interrogation as recognized under the federal and state constitutions.

A. Custodial Interrogation

S.G. contends he was in custody because no reasonable juvenile in S.G.'s situation would have felt free to leave when being questioned under ...