Stone v. Stone (In re Marriage of Stone)

• Decision Date: 24 January 2022
• Docket Number: B297778
• Parties: In re the Marriage of MICHAEL and SHARON STONE. v. SHARON STONE, Appellant. MICHAEL STONE, Appellant,
• Court: California Court of Appeals

In re the Marriage of MICHAEL and SHARON STONE.

MICHAEL STONE, Appellant, v. SHARON STONE, Appellant.

B297778

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Second Division

January 24, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD514763, Christine W. Byrd, Judge. Affirmed.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting mistrial, Carl H. Moor, Judge. Affirmed.

Trabolsi Levy Gabbard, Nathan W. Gabbard and Avi Levy for Appellant Michael Stone.

Gary J. Cohen for Appellant Sharon Stone.

LUI P. J.

Michael (Michael) and Sharon (Shari) Stone litigated the dissolution of their marriage for 10 years and at considerable expense as a result of two trials. Judge Kenneth Black presided over the first trial, which ended in a mistrial when he died before entering a statement of decision. Shari's motion to enter judgment on the notice of intended decision was denied, and a second trial ensued. Judge Christine Byrd presided over the second trial. For both trials, a sizeable estate and complicated characterization and tracing issues were involved. The parties' forensic accountants presented opposing analyses. Judge Black favored Shari's valuations; Judge Byrd favored Michael's valuations.

At the conclusion of the second trial, Judge Byrd entered judgment on March 21, 2019, dissolving the marriage, identifying and dividing community property, confirming separate property and ordering certain reimbursements and equalizing payments.

The parties each appeal from the judgment, raising numerous issues. Shari's appeal challenges the order granting a mistrial. Shari also disputes Judge Byrd's findings that Shari failed to rebut the community property presumption should not be reimbursed for her separate property contributions, and did not merit Michael's contribution to her attorney fees. Shari further challenges Judge Byrd's finding that Michael did not breach his fiduciary duties.

Michael's appeal contests Judge Byrd's failure to find Shari breached her fiduciary duties and violated the automatic temporary restraining orders (ATROs). Michael also contests the award of an IRA account to him at cash value and the denial of one or more of his motions in limine made during the second trial.

In affirming the judgment, ^[1] we first address the issues Shari raises in her appeal from the order granting a mistrial following the first trial before Judge Black. We then address the substantive issues both parties raise involving the second trial before Judge Byrd.

THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE JUDGE BLACK

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Michael and Shari were married in 1993 and separated on November 3, 2009. Michael petitioned for dissolution of marriage the following day. In January 2015, Michael and Shari stipulated that retired Judge Black would preside over a bifurcated trial: The first phase was to resolve custody, support, and property issues; the second phase was to address attorney fees and sanctions. Pursuant to the stipulation, the superior court appointed Judge Black, ordering that he" 'shall hear and determine all disputed issues in the case . . . and shall continue to act in said capacity until the conclusion of all matters which may be determined within the trial jurisdiction of the Superior Court related thereto.' "

When the first phase concluded on September 24, 2015, Judge Black issued an oral tentative decision, which Shari's counsel agreed to prepare in writing. At the time, Judge Black advised the parties that his intended rulings" 'can change. Until after I actually sign a ruling, they are just tentative.'" Judge Black added he "intended 'to make rulings as we go, and the ruling will be in essence a notice of intended decision.'" Between September 30, 2015, and November 11, 2015, at Judge Black's request, the parties filed proposed statements of decision on specific issues litigated in the first phase and later filed objections to each other's proposed statements.

On January 15, 2016, Judge Black held a hearing to discuss: (1) settling the language of his proposed notice of intended decision; (2) the language of counsels' proposed statements of decision concerning tracing, Watts charges^[2] and disposition of the family residence; and (3) already litigated support and support arrearages issues for which no tentative decision had been announced. However, the entire hearing was devoted to settling the language of Judge Black's notice of intended decision.

As a result of the hearing, counsel for each party agreed to the language of Judge Black's notice of intended decision, which he signed on March 10 and filed on March 14, 2016. Judge Black included in the intended decision a suggested method for calculating child support without resolving any outstanding child support issues. Instead, he ordered a schedule for the parties' forensic accountants to meet and confer" 'to determine support arrearages for 2014 and 2015 and for support moving forward.'" Judge Black reserved jurisdiction over any disputes and set a hearing to resolve support issues.

Judge Black's final ruling before his death was an oral order concerning attorney fees and sanctions made during a telephonic hearing on March 23, 2016. He passed away on May 11, 2016, without issuing any further rulings.

In June 2016, Michael requested an order declaring a mistrial and scheduling a long cause trial. Shari moved for entry of judgment of dissolution based on the March 14, 2016 intended decision. Following a hearing, Judge Carl H. Moor denied Shari's request, declared a mistrial, and scheduled a trial setting conference.

II. Discussion

Shari contends Judge Black's March 14, 2016 notice of intended decision constituted a statement of decision and Judge Moor erred by declining to enter judgment and granting a mistrial.

A. Standard of Review

"Though the standard of review from a mistrial order is abuse of discretion, our Supreme Court has a 'substantive preference against them' that restricts the deferential abuse standard to orders denying mistrials." (Petrosyan v. Prince Corp. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 587, 593.) Thus, where a mistrial has been granted, the standard of review is "abuse of discretion with elevated scrutiny." (Blumenthal v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 672, 682.)

B. Judge Black's Notice of Intended Decision

Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a presiding judge to sign a judgment in specific situations: "In all cases where the decision of the court has been entered in its minutes, and when the judge who heard or tried the case is unavailable, the formal judgment or order conforming to the minutes may be signed by the presiding judge of the court or by a judge designated by the presiding judge." Indeed, the statute "authorizes the signing of a formal judgment by the presiding judge only where (1) no statement of decision has been requested or (2) the judge who has heard the evidence has already provided the parties with a statement of decision upon their request for it. The statute does not . . . authorize the presiding judge to enter a formal judgment whenever the judge who has heard the evidence has orally entered a tentative decision, or tentative findings . . . in the minutes." (Armstrong v. Picquelle (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 122, 127.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 635 must be read together with section 632, which requires the trial court to "issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial." (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(a).) Rule 3.1590(b) of the California Rules of Court states the "tentative decision does not constitute a judgment and is not binding on the court."

Shari argues Judge Moor's finding that Judge Black's signed notice of intended decision did not amount to a statement of decision was erroneous for four reasons: First, according to Shari, under People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509 (Casa Blanca) (disapproved on another ground in Cal-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 184-185), the notice of intended decision "clearly qualified as a statement of decision" because "[i]t listed all of the ultimate facts and discussed all the material issues raised at trial." However, that case is distinguishable on its facts. In Casa Blanca, the trial court issued a statement of decision. The question in dispute was whether it was sufficient in the absence of findings concerning detailed evidentiary facts or individual items of evidence. (Casa Blanca, at p. 523.) The appellate court held the statement of decision was sufficient in that it listed all the ultimate facts necessary to decide the issues in controversy; nothing more was required. (Id. at p. 525.) Our case is entirely different.

Second, relying principally on Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892, Shari maintains the substance of the notice of intended decision, rather than its label, makes it the functional equivalent of a statement of decision or final judgment. In Estate of Lock the trial court's memorandum of intended decision was considered a final and appealable order when it was signed and filed, reflected the determination of the merits, and contemplated no further judicial action. (Id. at pp. 896-897.) That is not the case here; the intended decision did not dispose of all issues between the parties. As Judge Moor found, the parties' child support issues were not yet entirely resolved and there was no proposed ruling on them in Judge Black's notice of intended decision.

Third Shari quotes various comments by Judge Black...