Stone v. Stone, 42121
| Decision Date | 01 July 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 42121,42121 |
| Citation | 330 S.E.2d 887,254 Ga. 519 |
| Parties | STONE v. STONE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Thomas H. Pittman, Walters, Davis, Smith & Meeks, P.C., Ocilla, for Ann V. Stone.
Donald Starling, Douglas, for James H. Stone.
The parties to this case, formerly husband and wife, entered into a settlement agreement, the stated purpose being that of "settling all questions of alimony, support, and property division." A part of that agreement, which is the matter here in controversy, provided:
The agreement was incorporated in a final decree, and the parties were divorced. Thereafter, the former husband filed an application to revise the decree under OCGA § 19-6-19(b).
Among other defenses, the former wife contended that this obligation is not "periodic payments of permanent alimony but a division of property, and, therefore, is not subject to revision or modification."
The trial court thereafter entered the following order: "The Court having determined that the payments on the indebtedness owed to the Coffee County Bank for one 1982 Oldsmobile Toronado automobile titled in the name of the [former wife] which the [former husband] was required to make pursuant to the Contract of Settlement are periodic payments of permanent alimony and are therefore subject to revision." Upon the issuance by the trial judge of the required certificate, we granted the former wife's application to appeal.
1. To the single issue now before us, both parties filed in the trial court memoranda of law citing authorities on either side of the question. Admittedly, the cases are not without ambiguity, and, rather than attempting to reconcile their possible contradictions, we will try to resolve this issue on a basis of substance, rather than of labels.
In this connection, attention is invited to the concurring opinion in Rooks v. Rooks, 252 Ga. 11, 13, 311 S.E.2d 169 (1984). That effort undertook just such a substantive analysis, and it need not be repeated in full here. Rather, we agree with this portion of that analysis, which resolves the issue before us: 252 Ga. at 15-16, 311 S.E.2d 169.
It is plain that the obligation to pay the installment loan on the automobile does not, as a matter of law, terminate upon the death of the paying spouse or of the surviving spouse, or upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse. That established, it is equally clear that this obligation is not subject to modification--upon any basis.
2. Attention is also invited to that portion of the concurring opinion in Rooks, supra, as follows: ...
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In re Ackley, Bankruptcy No. G92-20423-REB. Adv. No. 93-2035.
...substance of the allocation in issue rather than the label affixed to it, i.e. alimony or property settlement. See also Stone v. Stone, 254 Ga. 519, 330 S.E.2d 887 (1985); accord Estlund v. Estlund, 260 Ga. 225, 391 S.E.2d 763 (1990) (Weltner, J., concurring). It remains to be seen whether ......
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Holler v. Holler, 44221
...benefits, being already vested, might be considered a fixed allocation, hence not subject to modification. See also Stone v. Stone, 254 Ga. 519, 330 S.E.2d 887 (1985). We also note that evidence of military retirement benefits already being collected by the husband, can be considered as to ......
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Rivera v. Rivera
...v. Whitaker, 265 Ga. 76(1), 453 S.E.2d 735 (1995). See also Sapp v. Sapp, 259 Ga. 238, 240(3), 378 S.E.2d 674 (1989); Stone v. Stone, 254 Ga. 519(1), 330 S.E.2d 887 (1985); Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749(1), 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979) (applying a formula from previous cases rather than relying on the ......
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Coursey v. Coursey, S16A0263
...on the death of the paying spouse, the death of the surviving spouse, or the remarriage of the receiving spouse. Stone v. Stone , 254 Ga. 519, 330 S.E.2d 887 (1985). This Court has defined marital property, on the other hand, as “assets acquired from the labor and investments of the parties......