Stone v. Stone

Decision Date20 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. COA06-648.,COA06-648.
Citation640 S.E.2d 826
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesNancy L. STONE, Plaintiff, v. Edmond Scott STONE, Defendant.

W. Michael Spivey, Rocky Mount, for plaintiff-appellee.

Narron & Holdford, P.A., by I. Joe Ivey, Wilson, for defendant-appellant.

TYSON, Judge.

Edmond Scott Stone ("defendant") appeals from judgment entered directing a distribution of the parties' marital and divisible property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. Background

On 16 February 1991, Nancy L. Stone ("plaintiff") and defendant married. Two children were born of the marriage. On 22 June 2002, plaintiff and defendant separated. Defendant provided the primary residence for the two children and the parties shared custody of both children.

On 25 July 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for child custody, child support, divorce from bed and board, and for equitable distribution. On 24 November 2003, the trial court entered an order, which granted the parties a divorce. On 18 January 2006, the trial court entered an order after finding an equal distribution of the marital assets was equitable. The trial court's order contained the following relevant findings: (1) an equal distribution of marital property was equitable; (2) the marital home in Macclesfield was marital property titled in tenants by the entirety; (3) Lot 1, Whispering Woods ("Lot 1"), a separate and distinct lot from the marital home, was marital property valued at $35,000.00; (4) plaintiff invested $20,000.00 of her separate funds into the purchase of the marital home; and (5) plaintiff's mother had given the parties $15,000.00 during the course of the marriage for improvements to the marital home.

The trial court equally divided all marital property except Lot 1 valued at $35,000.00. The trial court concluded plaintiff should retain ownership of Lot 1 as compensation for her and her mother's $35,000.00 separate investments. Defendant appeals.

II. Issues

Defendant argues the trial court erred because: (1) no competent evidence supports findings of fact numbered 9, 25, and 26; (2) the trial court awarded plaintiff Lot 1 as compensation for her and her mother's separate $35,000.00 investment; and (3) the findings of fact and conclusions of law which distributed marital property resulted in an unequal division and distribution of marital property to plaintiff and violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c).

III. Standard of Review

In White v. White, our Supreme Court set forth "the proper standard of review of equitable distribution awards" as follows:

Historically our trial courts have been granted wide discretionary powers concerning domestic law cases. The legislature also clearly intended to vest trial courts with discretion in distributing marital property under N.C.G.S. 50-20, but guided always by the public policy expressed therein favoring an equal division. The legislative intent to vest our trial courts with such broad discretion is emphasized by the inclusion of the catch-all factor codified in N.C.G.S. 50-20(c)(12).

It is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion. A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason. A ruling committed to a trial court's discretion is to be accorded great deference and will be upset only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.

312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

IV. Findings of Fact

Defendant argues no competent evidence supports findings of fact numbered 9, 25, and 26, which state:

9. Plaintiff further testified that her Mother gave the parties $15,000.00, during the course of the marriage, to pay for improvements made to a shop located behind the marital home.

25. The only remaining marital asset which has not been distributed consists of Lot 1 Whispering Woods with a value of $35,000.00 as designated on Exhibit A (Lot (still owned)). The Plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for her $20,000.00 investment of separate funds in the purchase of the marital home as well as the $15,000.00 gift from her Mother used to improve the marital real property.

26. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, title and ownership interest in Lot 1 Whispering Woods to compensate her for the $35,000.00 investment referenced above in paragraph 25.

(Emphasis supplied). Defendant failed to include a transcript of the hearing with the record.

When "`[t]he record does not contain [a transcript of] the oral testimony, . . . the court's findings of fact are presumed to be supported by competent evidence.'" Davis v. Durham Mental Health/Development Disabilities/Substance Abuse Area Auth., 165 N.C.App. 100, 111, 598 S.E.2d 237, 245 (2004) (quoting Fellows v. Fellows, 27 N.C.App. 407, 408, 219 S.E.2d 285, 286 (1975)). Past cases have reviewed the impact of failing to include a transcript in the record on appeal. Our review of appellate arguments is "hampered . . . [when] defendants have included no transcript or narration of the evidence upon which this Court can fully review this assignment of error." Dolbow v. Holland Industrial, 64 N.C.App. 695, 696, 308 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1983), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 651 (1984).

"The burden is on an appealing party to show, by presenting a full and complete record, that the record is lacking in evidence to support the [trial court's] findings of fact." Id. When an appellant "fail[s] to include a narration of the evidence or a transcript with the record, we presume the findings at bar are supported by competent evidence." Davis, 165 N.C.App. at 112, 598 S.E.2d at 245. Due to defendant's failure to include a transcript of the testimony before the trial court in the record on appeal, all findings of fact, including 9, 25, and 26, are presumed to be supported by competent evidence. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.

V. Lot 1

Defendant argues the trial court's conclusions of law numbered 4, 5, and 6, awarding plaintiff Lot 1 are not supported by findings of fact numbered 8, 9, 25, and 26. Defendant asserts plaintiff was not entitled to be reimbursed $35,000.00 allegedly paid from plaintiff and her mother's separate funds as a matter of law. We agree.

The trial court found Lot 1 to be marital property and entered the following findings of fact:

8. Plaintiff testified on September 20, 2004 that she paid a $20,000.00 down payment toward the purchase of the parties' marital home using her separate funds.

9. Plaintiff further testified that her Mother gave the parties $15,000.00, during the course of the marriage, to pay for improvements made to a shop located behind the marital home.

25. The only remaining marital asset which has not been distributed consists of Lot 1 Whispering Woods with a value of $35,000.00 as designated on Exhibit A (Lot (still owned)). The Plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for her $20,000.00 investment of separate funds in the purchase of the marital home as well as the $15,000.00 gift from her Mother used to improve the marital real property.

26. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded all right, title and ownership interest in Lot 1 Whispering Woods to compensate her for the $35,000.00 investment referenced above in paragraph 25.

(Emphasis supplied). The trial court entered the following conclusion of law:

6. The Plaintiff shall retain all right, title and ownership interest in Lot 1 Whispering Woods valued at $35,000.00 for the purpose of compensating Plaintiff for the separate investment of $35,000.00 by Plaintiff and her Mother toward the purchase and/or improvement of marital property.

"[A] presumption of a gift of separate property to the marital estate arises" when "a spouse uses separate funds to furnish consideration for property conveyed to the marital estate, as demonstrated by titling property as a tenancy by the entirety." McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543, 546, 374 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1988). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-20(b)(2) (2005) provides that "property acquired by gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be considered separate property" as a matter of law "if such an intention is stated in the conveyance." The contributing spouse may rebut this presumption by presenting clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the investment was intended to remain separate property. McLean, 323 N.C. at 552, 374 S.E.2d at 382.

A. Equitable Distribution Analysis

"A trial judge is required to conduct a three-step analysis when making an equitable distribution of the marital assets." Beightol v. Beightol, 90 N.C.App. 58, 63, 367 S.E.2d 347, 350, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373 S.E.2d 104 (1988). "These steps are: (1) to determine which property is marital property, (2) to calculate the net value of the property, fair market value less encumbrances, and (3) to distribute the property in an equitable manner." Id. (citing Cable v. Cable, 76 N.C.App. 134, 331 S.E.2d 765, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 182, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985)). "The initial obligation of the trial court in any equitable distribution action is to identify the marital property in accordance with G.S. 50-20 and the appropriate case law." Cornelius v. Cornelius, 87 N.C.App. 269, 271, 360 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1987) (citing Mauser v. Mauser, 75 N.C.App. 115, 330 S.E.2d 63 (1985) (the trial court's order failed to list or determine the status of two bank accounts)). "A distribution order failing to list all the marital property is fatally defective, and, further, marital property may not be identified by implication." Id. (citation omitted).

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