Stonefield v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 26 April 1940 |
| Citation | 282 Ky. 692 |
| Parties | Stonefield v. Commonwealth. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
2. Criminal Law. — Where bill of exceptions was not before the Court of Appeals, it was unable to review the evidence and determine whether there were prejudicial errors in the admission of incompetent or rejection of competent testimony.
3. Criminal Law. — Attorney General's motion to dismiss appeal because no bill of exceptions was filed would have been granted except for the fact that the Court of Appeals could under its procedure look to the question whether the indictment was sufficient to support the judgment.
4. Criminal Law. — In absence of bill of exceptions, the Court of Appeals could not consider argument on the merits.
5. Statutes. — If there are any ambiguities in statutes, a court may consider the headnotes in the construction of the statutes, where the headnotes are part of the statutes.
6. Robbery. — In enacting the statute entitled "Robbery of bank or safe; penalty," it was the Legislature's intention to make the punishment for robbery, where the act was accomplished by use of deadly weapons, more severe than formerly (Ky. Stats., sec. 1159a).
7. Robbery. — Increased punishment under statute entitled "Robbery of bank or safe; penalty," where the act was accomplished by use of deadly weapons, is not limited to the punishment for robbery of a bank by the use of deadly weapons but includes the offense of robbery of persons, dwellings, or other places (Ky. Stats., secs. 1159, 1159a).
8. Criminal Law. — If judge in criminal prosecution arbitrarily refuses to consider or settle a correct bill of exceptions, offered within time, the matter may be brought before the Court of Appeals by writ of mandamus under that section of the Constitution dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of Appeals (Constitution, sec. 110).
9. Criminal Law. — In absence of a showing to the contrary, Court of Appeals must assume that trial court's instructions followed the applicable statute and gave the whole law.
Appeal from Campbell Circuit Court.
Thomas W. Hardesty, Geo. J. Slaline and Cedric Vogel for appellant.
Hubert Meredith, Attorney General, and Wm. Hayes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before A.M. Caldwell, Judge.
Affirming.
On February 17, 1938, a grand jury by true bill charged appellant and others with having robbed one Lawrence E. St. John, by and with the use of a deadly weapon. An offense denounced by Sections 1159 and 1159a, Kentucky Statutes.
On the same day appellant was arraigned, and plead not guilty; thereafter his trial was set down for March 31, when the case was redocketed for April 1, 1938, and on this date parties announced ready for trial. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, fixing punishment at imprisonment for life.
In due time appellant filed motion for a new trial, supported by six or more grounds, which due to the incomplete state of the record, it becomes unnecessary to detail. On April 16, the motion was overruled, and judgment entered in accord with the verdict.
There was no bill of exceptions filed, nor was there motion for extension of time for the filing of such bill, until the 6th of June, when an extension of 60 days was allowed from the "expiration of the original 60 days."
On July 27, 1938, it was agreed by the commonwealth's attorney that appellant, because of reasons advanced, should have "additional time in which to prepare and file said bill of exceptions with the clerk of this court," meaning the trial court. This is the last recorded order appearing in the transcript.
The transcript was filed in the clerk's office on July 29, 1938, and the appeal has been in suspension until now. The delay in disposing of the appeal has been due to numerous motions filed by appellant since the filing of the transcript, but apparently not made for purpose of delay.
On December 17, 1938, appellant moved this court for extension of time for the preparation and filing of his bill of exceptions, it being stated that the official stenographer who had reported the trial, had thereafter become fatally ill. The time asked was to April 11, 1939. On this motion the court extended the time until March 10, 1939, but the extension was not to obviate the necessity of filing the bill in the trial court for approval.
Again on May 9, 1939, motion was filed in this court to require the Judge of the trial court to sign a tendered bill of exceptions, which the trial court had refused to approve. The motion set out the fact that the stenographer who had reported the proceedings and had been paid for her services, became ill on June 30, 1938, and was unable by reason of such illness to transcribe her notes. She later died, and a search failed to disclose her notes.
This motion was properly overruled, since it was apparent that the only method by which this court is enabled to control an inferior court is by writ allowed by Section 110 of the Constitution. This motion did not undertake to manifest to this court the contents of the bill of exceptions, nor are they shown in the record before us, hence we are unable, even if under repeated rulings we were authorized so to do,...
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Ex parte Stonefield
...the Court was unable to review the evidence or to consider the instructions of the trial Judge. The case is reported in Stonefield v. Com., 282 Ky. 692, 139 S.W. 2d 752. The petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction is void and that he is being illegally confined by reason thereof......