Stonega Coke & Coal Co v. Louisville & N. R. Co
| Citation | 106 Va. 223,55 S.E. 551 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
| Decision Date | 22 November 1906 |
| Parties | STONEGA COKE & COAL CO. v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. |
Contracts — Continuance — Certainty — Termination.
Plaintiff's assignor, being the owner of extensive coal lands some 12 miles from defendant's railroad, defendant, to induce the development of the land, agreed that if plaintiff's as signor would develop the land, and would build and maintain a connecting line between its plant and a station on defendant's road, and give defendant running rights over the same, defendant would transport coal and coke destined to points on its main line and empties over such connecting line free of charge. Held that, in the absence of a provision in the contract as to the time it was to run, it was unenforceable and subject to termination by the railroad company at its election.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 11, Contracts, § 996.]
Error to Circuit Court, Wise County.
Action by Stonega Coke & Coal Company against Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
R. T. Irvine, Bullitt & Kelly, and R. A. Ayers, for plaintiff in error.
Helm Bruce, E. M. Fulton, and C. T. Duncan, for defendant in error.
This is an action of assumpsit, based upon a contract between the Virginia Coal & Iron Company (of which the plaintiff, the Stonega Coke & Coal Company, is the assignee) and the defendant, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company.
The case made by the last-amended declaration, briefly stated, is that the Virginia Coal & Iron Company was the owner of very large and valuable coal mining lands in Wise county, which extended from Big Stone Gap to Norton, a distance of about 12 miles; that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company had extended its line of road through the said property with the hope and expectation of transporting coal and coke which it expected would be mined and manufactured on the land; that the Virginia Coal & Iron Company had purchased the property, which was wholly undeveloped, as an investment, and was entirely indifferent about commencing its speedy development; that after the railroad company had built its road it frequently Importuned the coal and iron company to commence the development of its property and made divers propositions as to freight rates, etc., which it would give in case the coal and iron company did speedily develop Its property; the result of which was that in the spring of 1895 the railroad company and the coal and iron company entered into a contract (whether in writing or not does not appear) which is set out in the declaration as follows: "* * * whereby the said defendant company agreed that If the said Virginia Company would commence the development of the said property by opening coal mines and building coking plants thereon (and would continue to mine coal thereon and manufacture coke therefrom, either directly or by and through its lessees or assignees, and would build and maintain, or cause to be built and maintained a connecting line, or lines, of railroad up Callahan creek from the yards of the said defendant company on its main line at Appalachia, to such mines and coking plants, and wouldgive or cause to be given to the defendant running rights over the same, free of charge to the defendant), it, the said defendant company, would transport free of charge to the said Virginia Company, and to any of its assignees or lessees, all such empty cars as might be needed for shipment of coal or coke from such mines or ovens over its said road or any part thereof, from its main line of railroad, to wit, its Cumberland Valley division, to any and all coal mines, and to any and all coke ovens which might be erected or constructed upon the said property on Callahan creek and the waters thereof, and would likewise transport the loaded cars of coal and coke destined to points on and over its said main line, free of charge to the said Virginia Company, and free of charge to any and air assignees or lessees of the said Virginia Company, from any and all such coal mines and coking plants which might be erected upon the said property on Callahan creek or its waters back to the main line at Appalachia."
The declaration further avers that acting upon the said agreement, the coal and iron company did, on its lands on the waters of Callahan creek which do not exceed (10, 000 acres), open coal mines, erect coke ovens and build a connecting line of road from the same to the railroad company's main line at Appalachia, a distance of about four miles; that the coal and iron company afterwards, in the year 1902, built a branch line to another coking plant also located on the waters of Callahan creek; that from the time the said agreement was made, in the year 1895, until May 1, 1902, coal was mined and coke manufactured which was hauled free of charge by the railroad company to its main line from the coal mines and coking plants of the coal and iron company, as provided for by the said agreement; that in May, 1902, tl-3 coal and iron company leased to the plaintiff, the Stonega Coke & Coal Company, the properties on which the said mines and coking plants were located and assigned to it all the rights which the coal and iron company had under its contract with the railroad company; that on December 0, 1902, the railroad company notified the plaintiff that on and after February 15, 1908, it would cease to furnish empty cars or haul loaded cars between the plaintiff's mines and coking plants to Appalachia free of charge; and that after the last-named date the railroad company failed and refused to keep and perform its part of said contract.
To recover damages for this alleged breach of the contract, this action was instituted. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the said amended declaration, and rendered a final judgment in favor of the railroad company. From that judgment this writ of error was awarded.
The first question to be considered is whether, under the contract between the parties, the defendant had the riht to termi nate the arrangement Into which they had entered, upon reasonable notice. It it had, there can be no recovery in this case, and the demurrer was properly sustained.
The contract sued on was one for the rendition of services on the part of the railroad company. There is nothing said in the agreement as to the time during which it should...
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