Stonegap Colliery Co v. Vicars

• Decision Date: 11 September 1913
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STONEGAP COLLIERY CO. v. KELLY & VICARS.

79 S.E. 335

(115 Va. 390)

STONEGAP COLLIERY CO.

v.KELLY & VICARS.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 11, 1913.

^†

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wise County.

Suit by Kelly & Vicars against the Stone-gap Colliery Company. Decree for the plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill.

Bond & Bruce, of Wise, Bullitt & Chalkley, of Big Stone Gap, and White & Case, of New York City, for appellant. Geo. C. Peery and E. M. Fulton, both of Wise, for appellees.

HARRISON, J. This controversy involves the construction and proper interpretation of a certain mining lease entered into between the parties thereto on the 17th of July, 1902. The bill was filed by the appellees seeking to enjoin the appellant from using any of the leased premises for any purpose other than that of mining coal, making coke, and selling the same, and that the appellant be especially enjoined from collecting rents from the Currier Lumber Corporation, such rents being claimed by the appellees, and that the appellant be compelled to account to the appellees for all rents, issues, and profits that it had theretofore received from the leased premises by uses foreign to the purpose of the lease.

In the progress of the voluminous proceedings which followed, the prayer of the bill was granted, perpetually enjoining the appellant from making the uses of the leased premises complained of, and a final decree was entered awarding a money recovery against the appellant for rents it had collected from the occupants of certain houses on the leased premises.

In the view we take of the case, we will not stop to consider the demurrer to the bill, which was overruled, but will proceed at once to consider the merits of the controversy.

It appears that in July, 1902, the appellant leased from the appellees a contiguous boundary of land, containing approximately 5, 700 acres, for the purpose of mining coal, making coke, and selling the same. This body of land is made up of numerous smaller tracts acquired by the lessors at different times, and much of it has no mineral value, but is only valuable for its uses in connection with that part where the mining operations are carried on. It further appears that, in order to provide in an economical way against the increasing demand for tenement houses expected to result from the development of the mines, appellant in November. 1905, entered into an agreement with R. D Benson, trustee, who had large timber tnd stave mills on an adjacent tract of land, by which it leased to him 5.84 acres of the leased premises and permitted him to erect thereon a number of houses, to occupy the same for a period of ten years, paying a nominal rent therefor of $25 per year, and at the end of said period the land and houses to revert to the appellant. In September, 1908, the Cur-rier Lumber Corporation, successor to R. D. Henson, trustee, leased from appellant a number of these houses for a period of eight months at $10 each per month. The right of appellant to make these contracts and derive the benefit flowing from them is the question involved in this litigation.

The deed of lease is to be regarded in the light of the following well-known rules of construction: (1) The language of the contract is to be construed most strongly against the grantor; and (2) the intention of the parties must be ascertained by reference to the entire instrument and not to disjointed parts of it. 2 Min. Inst. 1056, 1058.

In Chamberlain v. Brown, 141 Iowa, 549, 120 N. W. 338, the court says: "There is another familiar rule applicable to cases of this kind that, if the meaning and effect of the lease be fairly capable of two constructions, that will be adopted which is most favorable to the lessee."

"Those things which are appurtenant to a mine will pass under a lease of the mine as a necessary part thereof, although not mentioned in' the lease." 27 Cyc. 700. See, also, Devlin on Deeds, § 863.

In City of New York v. Interborough R. T. Co., 125 App. Div. 437, 109 N. Y. Supp. 885, the court says: "This is a recognition of the right of the lessee to use the demised premises for such collateral purposes as such property might be customarily used. A lessee of real property is entitled to the exclusive use of demised premises for any purpose not prohibited by the lease, not amounting to waste or destruction of the subject-matter. This is the general rule."

"The grant of a thing passes the incident as well as the principal, though the latter only is mentioned; and this effect cannot be avoided without an express reservation. * * * A grant of a thing will include whatever the grantor had power to convey, which is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted." Riddle v. Little-field, 53 N. H. 503, 16 Am. Rep. 388.

The first clause of the lease provides as follows: "The lessors hereby lease to the lessee, its successors and assigns, for the purpose of mining coal and manufacturing coke thereon and therefrom, and selling said coke and coal, the following tracts or boundaries of coal lands or coal rights and surface rights owned by the lessors near the town of Wise, Wise county, Virginia." Then follows the description of 86 different tracts or parcels of land, some of which were owned in entirety by the lessors and as to others they only owned the coal and other minerals, together with certain mining rights and privileges, and as to others they only owned the surface. This description of the several properties is followed by the following clause: "All of the rights and privileges which have been granted by the various grantors hereinbefore named to either the said Kelly or said Vicars, or by any other grantor or...