Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

• Citation: 808 NE 2d 205,441 Mass. 549
• Parties: STONEHILL COLLEGE v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another. WILFERT BROTHERS REALTY CO. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another. KEYLAND CORPORATION & another v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.
• Decision Date: 03 February 2004
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

441 Mass. 549

808 NE 2d 205

STONEHILL COLLEGE v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.¹

WILFERT BROTHERS REALTY CO. v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.²

KEYLAND CORPORATION & another³ v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.⁴

MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.⁵

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol, Middlesex, Dukes, Suffolk.

February 3, 2004

May 6, 2004.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

M. Robert Dushman for Stonehill College.

Robert L. Quinan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, & Beverly I. Ward & Steven S. Locke (Wendy A. Cassidy, J. Lynn Milinazzo-Gaudet, & Simone R. Liebman with them) for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

Nancy S. Shilepsky (Patricia A. Washienko with her) for Soo Tang Tan.

Robert S. Mantell for David Keeling & another.

Albert F. Cullen, Jr., for Wilfert Brothers Realty Company.

Amy L. Hanson (James F. Rogers, II, with her) for Brenda Raffurty.

Bernard J. Hamill (David A. Robinson with him) for Keyland Corporation & another.

Walter M. Foster (Sarah E. Lent with him) for Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Christine Hughes, Arthur G. Telegen, Anjali Parekh Prakash, Richard L. Alfred, Sally L. Adams, & James M. Paulson for New England Legal Foundation & others.

Joel P. Suttenberg for Jewish Alliance for Law and Social Action.

James S. Weliky, Laura M. Unflat, & Robert S. Mantell for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. Anne L. Josephson, Sarah Wunsch, Ellen J. Zucker, Nadine Cohen, & James S. Weliky for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others.

Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, & John E. Bowman, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.

David A. Robinson for town of Agawam.

Martin J. Rooney for Acushnet Housing Authority & others.

GREANEY, J.

These cases arise under G. L. c. 151B. In each case, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD or commission) entered decisions finding the respondents liable for employment discrimination and awarded relief including damages for emotional distress. The respondents have sought judicial review of the MCAD's decision pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 6, in accordance with standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and also have sought jury trials in the Superior Court, pursuant to this court's decision in Lavelle v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 426 Mass. 332 (1997) (Lavelle). In three of the cases, a judge in the Superior Court reported a question or questions, seeking clarification of various procedural and evidentiary issues relating to the respondents' requests for jury trials. In the fourth case (Stonehill College vs. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination), the respondent appeals from an order by a judge in the Superior Court directing it to elect either judicial review under G. L. c. 30A of the MCAD decision or a jury trial pursuant to Lavelle, thus denying the respondent's right to have both. We granted applications for direct appellate review and invited interested parties to submit briefs concerning an issue not raised by the parties below, the correctness of this court's holding in Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, Inc., 418 Mass. 220, 223 (1994) (Dalis,) that art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution entitles plaintiffs with sex discrimination claims filed in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 9, to a trial by jury. Necessarily contained in that request was a corollary issue calling for the parties and interested parties also to express views on the subsequent extension of the Dalis holding, in Lavelle, supra, to respondents in administrative proceedings before the MCAD pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 5 (§ 5 proceedings). We conclude that Dalis was correctly decided. We further conclude that the Dalis decision does not require, as matter of State constitutional law, the result reached by this court in Lavelle. That result is problematic, and for reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude that Lavelle must be overruled in part. Accordingly, as of the date of this opinion, respondents who have been determined by the commission in § 5 proceedings to have committed discriminatory acts in employment in violation of G. L. c. 151B are entitled to administrative review, under G. L. c. 30A, of that decision only. We also conclude that emotional distress damages should continue to be awarded by the MCAD in appropriate cases and comment on various factors that govern such awards.

Stonehill College vs. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

On April 27, 1995, Soo Tang Tan, a professor of mathematics at Stonehill College (Stonehill) filed a complaint with the MCAD charging Stonehill with unlawful discrimination based on his race and color in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1). After a public hearing, an MCAD hearing officer determined that Stonehill had discriminated against Soo Tang Tan in violation of G. L. c. 151B, and awarded him back pay, front pay, and $150,000 in damages for emotional distress. The commission affirmed the hearing officer's decision in all respects. Stonehill then filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking judicial review of the MCAD decision and, should its administrative appeal be unsuccessful, a jury trial de novo on the discrimination complaint. A Superior Court judge denied Soo Tang Tan's motion to dismiss the latter but ordered Stonehill to file an election within thirty days as to its chosen avenue of relief. The judge reasoned that a respondent appealing from an unfavorable MCAD decision is entitled to an administrative appeal or a jury trial de novo, but not both. A single justice of the Appeals Court granted Stonehill leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the judge's order, and this court allowed Stonehill's application for direct appellate review. Wilfert Brothers Realty Co. vs. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

On January 20, 1993, David Keeling filed a complaint with the MCAD alleging that he was unlawfully terminated by Wilfert Brothers Realty Co. (Wilfert Brothers) after incurring a knee injury during the course of his employment. After a public hearing, an MCAD hearing commissioner entered a decision finding Wilfert Brothers liable for handicap discrimination in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4. The commission ordered Wilfert Brothers to pay Keeling lost wages and $35,000 in emotional distress damages.⁶ Wilfert Brothers filed a petition for review of the MCAD decision by the full commission and, at the same time, served notice to the MCAD and to Keeling of its intention to seek a jury trial. The MCAD decision was affirmed by the full commission.⁷ Wilfert Brothers then filed a complaint in the Superior Court, requesting judicial review of the final decision and order of the MCAD or, alternatively, requesting a jury trial on Keeling's claims of discrimination. A judge in the Superior Court denied motions filed by the commission and Keeling to dismiss (or strike) the claim for a jury trial and reported to the Appeals Court the question set forth below.⁸ This court allowed Keeling's application for direct appellate review.

Keyland Corporation vs. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

On November 29, 1994, Brenda Raffurty filed a claim with the MCAD asserting that Keyland Corporation and John Kheary (together, Keyland) subjected her to sexual harassment in the workplace in violation of G. L. c. 151B. After a public hearing, an MCAD hearing commissioner entered a decision in favor of Raffurty. Orders entered against Keyland included an order to pay Raffurty $100,000 in emotional distress damages. Keyland filed a petition for review by the full commission and notified the commission and Raffurty of its intention to seek a jury trial. The full commission affirmed the hearing commissioner's decision. Keyland then filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking both judicial review and a jury trial de novo on Raffurty's discrimination claims. At a hearing on the MCAD's motion that Keyland must elect either judicial review or a jury trial, Keyland assented to the dismissal of its claim for judicial review. Subsequent motions and hearings followed on issues relating to MCAD's standing to participate in the case as a party defendant. In a memorandum of decision and order, the motion judge addressed numerous procedural issues raised in the case and ordered that the trial would be conducted de novo, with the burden on Raffurty to establish discriminatory conduct on the part of Keyland and Kheary. The judge further ruled that the decision of the MCAD would be inadmissible as prima facie evidence of discrimination in the proceedings before the jury and that the MCAD would not be allowed to intervene as a party in the case. The judge then reported the correctness of his decision to the Appeals Court,⁹ and we granted Raffurty and the commission's application for direct appellate review.

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority vs. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

On May 2, 1994, Geraldine Ross filed a claim with the MCAD alleging discrimination on the part of her employer, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16) (handicap).¹⁰ After a public hearing, a MCAD hearing officer entered a decision finding that the MBTA had failed reasonably to accommodate Ross and, moreover, that the MBTA's policy of "denying part-time injured surface line employees the right to ever become full-time employees" arbitrarily discriminated against an entire category of disabled employees. The decision was affirmed by the full commission, and the MBTA was ordered to pay Ross lost wages and emotional distress damages in the amount of $50,000....