Stoner v. Chi. G. W. Ry. Co.

Decision Date25 October 1899
Citation109 Iowa 551,80 N.W. 569
PartiesSTONER v. CHICAGO G. W. RY. CO.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Butler county; J. F. Clyde, Judge.

Action at law to recover for damages alleged to have been caused by breach of contract for the shipment of freight. When the evidence had been fully submitted, a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant was sustained, and judgment was rendered in its favor for costs. The plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.M. F. Edwards and J. H. Scales, for appellant.

O. C. Miller, for appellee.

ROBINSON, C. J.

In September, 1896, the plaintiff was the owner of a merry-goround, which was in the town of Allison. He desired to have it transported to Webster City by the 22d day of the month, for the purpose of operating it there during the annual fair, which commenced on the 23d, and continued three days. He claims that the agent of the defendant at Allison verbally agreed in behalf of the defendant to transport the merry-go-round from Allison to Webster City by way of Waterloo, to make connection with and deliver to the regular local freight train over the Illinois Central Railroad at Waterloo on or before the afternoon of September 20th, thence to be transported to Webster City in the afternoon of Tuesday, September 22d; that the merry-go-round was delivered to the defendant for carriage under that agreement, but that the defendant failed to transport it over the route agreed upon; that there were unnecessary and unreasonable delays in the transportation of the merry-go-round, and on the last day of the fair it was at Waterloo, and did not reach Webster City in time for use. The defendant denies that it received the merry-go-round for shipment to Waterloo, to be there delivered to connecting lines for transportation to Webster City, but avers that it was to be delivered to connecting lines at Waverly for transportation to Webster City. The defendant denies that a verbal agreement for the transportation of the property was made, and avers that the agreement was in writing, and fully performed on its part, and that by the terms of the agreement it was not liable for any delay in the transportation of the property by connecting lines. The district court, in sustaining the motion to direct a verdict, said: “I think on the record of this whole case, as it stands, the court would not be warranted in sustaining a verdict here on the admitted facts in the case. It seems now to be clearly shown that the property in question was not received by this company in time for any train before the train by which it was actually shipped, and that it was immediately shipped and transferred to the other line of road. If there was any damage, it wasn't through the fault or neglect of this defendant. I think that affirmatively appears now from the evidence that is uncontradicted. With that condition of the record, this motion should be sustained.”

1. There was evidence which tended to show the following: On Friday, September 18th, the plaintiff applied to the agent of the defendant at Allison for information in regard to the shipment of the merry-go-round to Webster City, telling him that, unless it could be shipped by rail so as to reach Waterloo in time for the west-bound way freight train of the next Monday morning, he would haul it across the country to Aplington, at the same time stating that he had a contract with the fair association at Webster City to run the merry-go-round at that place during the fair. The agent assured the plaintiff that he could furnish a car, and have it at Waterloo by Sunday afternoon. In answer to a suggestion of the plaintiff that it would be nearer to ship by Hampton, the agent said that it would be “just as quick the other way, and that it would go over their line of road to Waterloo.” Nothing was said in regard to shipping by way of Waverly. The agent also said that the car should be loaded and ready to go out Saturday, and the merry-go-round was loaded in a car of the defendant under the arrangement thus made with its agent. The car was hauled to Waverly, and there delivered to the Illinois Central Railway Company in the morning of Monday, September 21st. There were no trains south on the road of that company until the next day, when the car was hauled to Waterloo. Had it been sent out from Waterloo on the first west-bound freight train, it would have arrived at Webster City at 6 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. It was within the apparent power of the agent of the defendant to contract with the plaintiff for the delivery of the car to the connecting line at Waterloo within a specified...

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5 cases
  • Waltham Mfg. Co. v. New York & T.S.s. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1910
    ... ... Rep. 238; Bostwick v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 45 N.Y. 712; Guillaume v. General ... Transportation Co., 100 N.Y. 491-498, 3 N.E. 489; ... Stoner v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 109 Iowa, 551, 80 ... N.W. 569; Rudell v. Ogdensburg Transit Co., 117 ... Mich. 568, 76 N.W. 380, 44 L. R. A. 415. [90 ... ...
  • Cameron v. Fellows
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1899
  • Cameron v. Fellows
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1899
  • Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Swanson
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1908
    ...of goods has apparent authority to contract for the delivery of goods at a specified time and a specified place, citing, Stoner v. Railroad Co., 109 Iowa 551; Rudell v. Transit Co., 117 Mich. 568; Gann Railroad Co., 72 Mo. App., 34. OPINION WHITFIELD, C. J. This case was begun before a just......
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