Stoneseifer v. Sheble

• Decision Date: 31 October 1860
• Citation: 31 Mo. 243
• Parties: STONESEIFER, Respondent, v. SHEBLE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

31 Mo. 243

STONESEIFER, Respondent,

v.SHEBLE, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1860.

1. Plaintiff went on board a steamboat on the Mississippi river at one of her intermediate landings, and while transacting business with the boat was taken off to a landing below, against his remonstrance. Held, that the plaintiff is entitled to damages amounting to the reasonable value of the time lost and expense incurred in being taken to and returning from the place at which he was landed; and that if the master of the boat could have caused him to be landed at any point easy of access between the place he was taken off and when he was finally landed, but maliciously or wantonly and wrongfully refused so to do, plaintiff is entitled to such further damages as would be reasonable punishment for such malicious conduct.

Appeal from Ralls Circuit Court.

The facts upon which this action is based will appear from the opinion of the court.

The court below, on its own motion, gave the jury these instructions: “1. If the jury find the issue for the plaintiff they should assess his damages at the reasonable value of the time lost by plaintiff and expenses incurred by reason of his removal to and return from Clarksville. 2. If the jury find the issue for the plaintiff, they should assess his damages at the reasonable value of the time lost and expenses incurred by plaintiff in being taken to and returning from the town of Clarksville; and if the jury further find from the evidence that defendant could have caused plaintiff to be landed at any point easy of access between Louisiana and Clarksville, and that defendant maliciously or wantonly and wrongfully refused so to do, but took plaintiff on to the town of Clarksville, they may assess such further damages as the jury may think under all the circumstances would be reasonable punishment for such malicious conduct.”

The following instructions were asked by the defendant below, all of which were refused except the last: “1. The defendant is liable only for his own acts or neglects in the premises and not for those of any other officer or officers of said steamer. There can be no liability on the defendant as captain of the said boat, except for any act or omission he may have committed or been guilty of after he was notified of plaintiff having been taken off on said boat. 2. If the jury believes from the evidence in the cause that the usual signals for the steamer ‘Sam Gaty's' leaving the landing, according to the regulations established by the proprietors of said boat on the occasion in question were given and thereupon said boat left the landing and continued on her trip to Clarksville, taking off said plaintiff, then the defendant is in no default, and the verdict should be for the defendant. 3. If the jury believes from the evidence in the cause that the plaintiff went aboard of the steamboat ‘Sam Gaty’ on business, as stated in his petition, and that one of the regulations of that boat was that those coming on board of said boat to do business and then go off without going as passengers on said boat, should leave said boat on or before the signal of the second ringing of the bell being given by the proper officer of said boat; that said signal was so given and then the said boat left the wharf with the said plaintiff aboard, the commander or officer of said boat was not bound to return to shore in order to land the plaintiff, and they should find a verdict for the defendant. 4. If one of the regulations established for said boat's management by the proprietors or their agents, the officers of said boat, existing at the time in question, was, that two bells should be rung before said boat should leave the landing, and that it should leave so soon as said two bells should be rung, and not be bound to return to shore, or put off passengers (who being aboard failed to get off on or before the ringing of said two bells,) and if the jury believes further from the evidence in the cause that said two bells on the occasion in question were rung and plaintiff still failed to leave said boat and was taken off contrary to his wishes expressed, or remonstrance addressed to defendant, the jury should find a verdict for the defendant. 5. If it has been proved by the evidence in the cause that the plaintiff went aboard of the steamer ‘Sam Gaty’ as admitted in the pleadings, and one of the regulations of said boat was, that on landing there or at any place on the river the signal to leave said boat, to be given for those coming on board on business and not intending to go as passengers on the trip she was then making, was the ringing of the bell of said boat at two different times, and that said signal was given on the occasion in question and plaintiff had time thereafter to leave said boat, and plaintiff did not leave said boat as he might have done, and was taken off by said boat, the verdict should be for the defendant. 6. If the jury believes from the evidence in the cause that plaintiff had sufficient time to transact the business he had on board said steamboat ‘Sam Gaty,’ on the occasion in question and leave when the usual signals for persons to leave were given and he did not leave, and was taken off on said boat, they should find for the defendant. 7. Unless it appears from the evidence in the cause that the defendant was, on the occasion in question, owner or part owner of said steamboat, ‘Sam Gaty,’ they should find for the defendant. 8. The defendant in this suit is liable for an injury done by himself, or by his directions, but is not liable for any act done by the clerk or any other officer of said boat unless directed by him; and though the jury may find that he was captain of the boat, this fact does not make him liable for any wrongful act of any officer of said boat without his direction.”

G. Porter, for appellant.

I. The petition of the respondent does not, on its face, state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the court below should have arrested the judgment for the following reasons: 1. The petition states that respondent, on the day specified, went on board said boat, “Sam Gaty,” while lying at the wharf at Louisiana, &c., in discharge of duties connected with the business of said boat as a common carrier, and while on said boat, and before he could discharge his said duties, appellant wrongfully, &c., caused said boat to be backed out, &c., and does not state the nature of those “duties,” or of respondent's business on board said boat, and non constat that the acts of appellant complained of prevented his discharging those duties or transacting that business, or otherwise damaged or injured respondent. 2. Said petition does not state or show that respondent went aboard said boat at Louisiana with the intention of transacting business thereon, and then going off said boat before she left Louisiana; nor does it state that he was residing or doing business in Louisiana, so as to justify an inference even that his business required him to get off said boat before she was moved off from said town, so as to show the court that he was or could be injured any more by being taken to Clarksville than by being left or landed at Louisiana. 3. The petition does not show how the taking of respondent to Clarksville and failing to find means to bring him back thence, or how the sickness of respondent's family (whose whereabouts at the time in question is not stated--whether it was at Louisiana or Clarksville or elsewhere,) or either of these things injured or affected respondent. The nature or character of respondent's ill-treatment by appellant on the way from Clarksville to Louisiana is not stated. (Sedg. Meas. Dam. 576.)

II. The court below erred in excluding the evidence of the usage of the trade (the custom of the river) sought to be proved by the witness Buchanan, and the regulations of the trade in case a person on board of a boat at any landing and intending to get off, by inattention to the signals, fails to get off and is taken off on said boat; that such usage is admissible and such regulations are allowed and sanctioned by the law applicable to carriers and other bailees, ...