Stonham v. Widiastuti
| Decision Date | 04 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-246.,02-246. |
| Citation | 2003 WY 157,79 P.3d 1188 |
| Parties | David H. STONHAM, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Erni WIDIASTUTI, a/k/a Sara Stonham, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Bert T. Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Mary Elizabeth Galvan, Laramie, Wyoming; and Donald J. Keenan, Riverton, Wyoming.
Guardian ad Litem: Carol Serelson, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.
[¶ 1] David H. Stonham (Father) appeals the district court's decision awarding Erni Widiastuti, a/k/a Sara Stonham (Mother),1 an Indonesian woman, sole custody of their two children, ordering that visitation occur in the community where the children reside, and requiring that Father post a $50,000.00 bond as a condition to exercising visitation. Father claims that the district court's decision was an abuse of discretion and/or arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.
[¶ 2] The issues raised in this appeal are as follows:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded sole custody to Mother, who intended to take the children and return to Indonesia?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it required that Father's visitation occur in the community where the children reside until the younger child reaches the age of ten?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by requiring, as a condition to exercising visitation, that Father post a $50,000.00 bond as security against attorney's fees Mother may incur in enforcing her custody rights?
4. Is Mother entitled to sanctions against Father?
[¶ 3] Father, a citizen of the United States, and Mother, a native and citizen of Indonesia, became acquainted after Father responded to an advertisement Mother had placed in a dating magazine. After they corresponded for a number of months, Mother traveled to California and stayed with Father for about six months. She then returned to Indonesia, and approximately four months later, Father went to Indonesia where they were married. After a honeymoon in Bali, the couple returned to the United States. Mother was only able to secure a tourist visa, which visa expired after six months, thereafter rendering her an illegal alien.2
[¶ 4] After approximately ten months of marriage, Mother gave birth to their first child in California. In October 2000, they moved to Lander, where Father had taken a position with Fremont Motor Company. After eight months in Lander, Mother left the marital home with their son and went to a safehouse. Upon arriving home that evening, and finding Mother and son gone, Father telephoned local law enforcement and reported that his wife and child had been kidnapped. He also called the Indonesian Embassy and reported that his wife had kidnapped their son. Two days later, Father filed for divorce.
[¶ 5] A guardian ad litem for the children3 was appointed and, on the parties' stipulation, the district court ordered that Dr. Martha Schilling, Ph.D., conduct a custody evaluation. Dr. Schilling's report was completed in November of 2001. The next month, at a temporary custody hearing, Father's counsel attempted to present, for the district court's ratification, a "Custody & Separation Agreement," which had been prepared by Father and signed by Father and Mother. Pursuant to this agreement, the parties hoped to accomplish a "legal separation" with no time limit, and to establish the terms of that separation. However, the district court declined to ratify the proposed agreement. Although the parties represented that they were attempting to reconcile, the district court entered a temporary custody, support, and visitation order.
[¶ 6] The parties' attempted reconciliation was unsuccessful and a divorce trial was set for August 1 and 2, 2002. At trial, Father testified and called three lay witnesses to testify on his behalf. All three testified regarding their perceptions of the parties' relationship and respective parenting styles and abilities. Mother also testified, and called Malcolm Stonham (Father's father) and Maura Strong (Father's sister) as witnesses. Both stated that they thought Mother should be awarded custody. Malcolm Stonham reasoned that although he did not think that Father would intentionally harm the children, he worried that he was not "in control," that he might "snap," or "that something might happen." Maura Strong explained how Father had asked her to testify falsely on his behalf, that she felt he was capable of hurting the children, and that he had made threats to members of their family.
[¶ 7] Both parties also relied on the opinions of experts. Father called Mark Russler, a licensed counselor with a master's degree in social work. Mr. Russler had met with Father approximately sixteen times, and Mother ten times, over an eleven-month period. Father's one-hour sessions focused mainly on helping him cope with the difficult life changes he was confronting. Mr. Russler testified that, in his opinion, Mother's desire to return to Indonesia was "completely selfish." Nonetheless, he concluded that both Father and Mother were capable and caring parents, and recommended a custody arrangement where both parents would have "frequent, regular contact [with the children] in their environment here."4
[¶ 8] Although she was not called as a witness, Dr. Schilling's custody evaluation was offered and received into evidence without objection.5 Dr. Schilling has a Ph.D. in psychology and is a Wyoming licensed psychologist. In preparing her custody evaluation, Dr. Schilling met with Mother for seven and one-half hours and Father for ten hours, during which time she performed a clinical interview and administered a series of tests. Dr. Schilling also made a number of collateral contacts and reviewed relevant documents. She made very specific clinical findings with respect to both parents, and her report will be examined in more detail later in this opinion; however, with respect to custody and visitation, she concluded:
It is my opinion, at this time, the mother is better equipped to make reasonable decisions about the child's welfare, provide a stable nurturing home environment, and presents no risk of verbal or emotional abuse to the child, and should therefore have primary custody. I recommend liberal visitation with the father.
[¶ 9] The district court took the matter under advisement, and approximately one month later issued a Judgment and Decree granting the divorce and awarding Mother primary custody and control of the two children. The district court stated that in reaching this conclusion, it had considered the applicable custody factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 (LexisNexis 2001), and made the following findings: Mother has been the primary caretaker of the children; Mother is better emotionally equipped to care for the children and to make reasonable decisions about the welfare of the children; Father's father and sister both testified that Mother would be a better parent; Father is unable to maintain stable, long-term relationships; Father's behavior indicated that he had little or no respect for Mother; and there was substantial evidence that Father was not truthful in his testimony or his responses to discovery. The district court granted Father two weeks of visitation in the fall, two weeks in the spring, and four weeks in the summer and ordered that the visitation be restricted to the community where the children reside until the younger child reaches her tenth birthday. Finally, the district court ordered that Father post a $50,000.00 bond as security against any attorney's fees that Mother may incur in enforcing her custody rights under the Decree of Divorce.
[¶ 10] On September 6, 2002, Father filed a Notice of Appeal.
[¶ 11] This Court has clearly articulated the standard for reviewing a district court's decision regarding custody and visitation:
In re MS, 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998)
). We have further stated that "`[j]udicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.'" Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 579 (Wyo.2000) ().
[¶ 12] Father begins his argument by referencing a number of cases regarding the "best interests of the child" standard and citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a), which states the factors a district court shall consider in determining the best interests of the child. He then summarily concludes...
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