Stony's Trucking Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 72-103

• Decision Date: 13 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72-103,72-103
• Citation: 32 Ohio St.2d 139,290 N.E.2d 565,61 O.O.2d 388
• Parties: , 61 O.O.2d 388 STONY'S TRUCKING CO., Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of Ohio, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 139

32 Ohio St.2d 139

290 N.E.2d 565, 61 O.O.2d 388

STONY'S TRUCKING CO., Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of Ohio, Appellee.

No. 72-103.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 13, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

Where the language of a certificate of public convenience and necessity is ambiguous, the Public Utilities Commission when interpreting such certificate may properly consider its history.

Appellant, Stony's Trucking Company, is the holder of an irregular certificate of public convenience and necessity No. 784-I which, in pertinent part, authorizes the transportation of property:

'* * * from and to Springfield, Ohio, and also to transport property limited to extra heavy or special property requiring special loading equipment or special equipment adapted to moving such property, to and from any point within the state of Ohio.

'Restricted against service to and from any locality where like equipment is now operated by a certificated operator, except when the point of origin or destination is Springfield, Ohio.'

On January 14, 1971, appellant filed a new tariff under this certificate. Item 1185 of this tariff set forth specific rates for the hauling of certain iron and steel articles from Warren, Ohio, to Shelby, Ohio.

On January 26, 1971, the intervening appellees filed a petition requesting suspension of Item 1185 of said tariff and further requesting a finding that appellant lacked authority under Certificate No. 784-I to transport iron and steel articles from Warren to any point in the state of Ohio.

On February 12, 1971, the Public Utilities Commission ordered the suspension of Item 1185 and further ordered a public hearing to determine 'whether a violation of Chapter 4921 has occurred and particularly Sections 4921.14 and 4921.32, Ohio Revised Code, and Section 3.30 of the commission's Code of Rules and Regulations.' It was further ordered that 'at said hearing evidence be presented relevant to the scope of authority encompassed by Certificate No. 784-I.'

On October 22, 1971, the commission issued its opinion and order, in which it made the following order:

'Ordered, that Stony's Trucking Company immediately cease and desist from furnishing or offering to furnish any transportation service in the transportation of those commodities commonly referred to as iron and steel articles, and furnished only the transportation service authorized. It is, further

'Ordered, that Item 1185 be, and the same hereby is, stricken from the files of this commission * * *.'

From that order this appeal was taken.

Sanborn, Brandon & Duvall and James Duvall, Columbus, for appellant.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., Walter E. Carson, and Thomas P. Michael, Columbus, for appellee.

Burneson, Krier, Clark & Asher and Taylor C. Burneson, Columbus, for intervenors-appellees.

LEACH, Justice.

Appellant asserts that the Public Utilities Commission acted unlawfully and unreasonably in interpreting appellant's Certificate No. 784-I and in ordering appellant to cease and desist from transporting iron and steel articles. It argues that Certificate No. 784-I, issued to its predecessor in interest in 1939, authorizes '* * * the transportation of certain iron and steel articles,' thus authorizing the tariff filed by it on January 14, 1971.

In reaching its decision, the commission examined the history of Certificate No. 784-I. It concluded that the hauling of iron and steel articles was not contemplated, either by the commission or the applicant, when the certificate was issued in 1939, nor was such service ever attempted under the certificate prior to the present tariff filing.

Appellant urges that the commission, in delineating the extent of the authority conveyed by the certificate, should not have examined that history, but rather should have made a determination solely from the language of the certificate. This reasoning is derived from Sims Motor Transport Lines Inc., Revocation of Certificate (1956), 66 M.C.C. 553, 11 F.C.C. 577, which contained the following language:

'In construing motor carrier authority consideration may properly be given to the record upon which such authority was granted and other extraneous matters only if the authority is itself indefinite or ambiguous. If not patently indefinite or ambiguous it must be construed according to its terms regardless of what may have been intended.'

While it is true that the commission is not bound by the rules of interpretation applied by the Interstate Commerce Commission (see Toledo Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1954), 161 Ohio St. 221, 118 N.E.2d 531), the failure of appellant's argument lies primarily with the language used in Certificate No. 784-I. Far from being plain and unambiguous, the language in the certificate is so broad and vague as to require reference outside the instrument in order to comprehend its meaning. The phrase 'extra-heavy or special property requiring special loading equipment' cannot possibly be defined from examination of the certificate alone. Definition can only be achieved through examination of the factors leading to the granting of the certificate by the Public Utilities Commission.

In a broad sense, the goal of interpretation of legal documents is to determine the intent of the parties. If this goal can be achieved through examination of the document alone, parol evidence is unnecessary....