Stopczynski v. Ford Motor Co., Docket No. 132931

• Decision Date: 17 June 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 132931
• Citation: 200 Mich.App. 190,503 N.W.2d 912
• Parties: Edward STOPCZYNSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 912

503 N.W.2d 912

200 Mich.App. 190

Edward STOPCZYNSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 132931.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 9, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided March 24, 1993.

Approved for Publication

June 17, 1993, at 9:10 a.m.

Roberta Kyselka Sarkis, Mt. Clemens, for plaintiff-appellant.

James C. Curtiss and John M. Thomas, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, for defendant-appellee.

Before MARK J. CAVANAGH, P.J., and MacKENZIE and GRIFFIN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is a wrongful discharge case. Plaintiff alleges that he was fired from his job with defendant in violation of an alleged contract of employment prohibiting his discharge absent just cause. The circuit court entered summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and plaintiff now appeals as of right. We affirm.

Plaintiff worked for defendant for twenty-three years before he was fired in March of 1988. Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1965 in an hourly and union-represented position. In 1968, plaintiff was offered a transfer to a salaried position as a nonunion supervisor. Before accepting the transfer, plaintiff inquired whether he would be afforded the same job protection that he had received in his union position. Plaintiff claims that defendant promised him that he would receive the same type of protection and that he could only be discharged for just cause and only after progressive disciplinary measures were followed. However, upon accepting the transfer, plaintiff signed an employment agreement containing the following provisions:

I understand that my employment is not for any definite term, and may be terminated at any time, without advance notice, by either myself or Ford Motor Company; that my employment is subject to such rules, regulations, and personnel practices and policies, and changes therein, as Ford Motor Company may from time to time adopt; and that my employment shall be subject to such layoffs, and my compensation to such adjustments, as Ford Motor Company may from time to time determine.

* * * * * *

I acknowledge that the terms contained herein are the entire terms of my employment agreement, that there are no other arrangements, agreements, or understandings, verbal or in writing, regarding my present or future employment with Ford Motor Company and that any purported arrangements, agreements or understanding made in the future shall not be valid unless evidenced by a writing signed by a properly authorized representative of Ford Motor Company.

In granting summary disposition, the circuit court ruled as a matter of law that the contract provided for employment at will. The court further ruled that none of the additional documentation offered by plaintiff was sufficient to create an implied agreement to terminate only for cause. On appeal, plaintiff contends that this ruling was erroneous because genuine issues of material fact exist. After thorough review, we find no merit to any of plaintiff's arguments.

At the outset, we reject plaintiff's argument that the provisions of the employment agreement were not fully disclosed. Although the document plaintiff signed contains additional provisions regarding medical insurance, withholding allowances, and the like, the section captioned "Employment Agreement" is plainly disclosed and appears directly above plaintiff's signature on the back side of the form. The trial court correctly observed that one who signs a contract cannot seek to avoid it on the bases that he did not read it or that he supposed that it was different in its terms. Paterek v. 6600 Limited, 186 Mich.App. 445, 450, 465 N.W.2d 342 (1990); Moffit v. Sederlund, 145 Mich.App. 1, 8, 378 N.W.2d 491 (1985).

The express terms of the contract also serve to negate plaintiff's claim that a just-cause contract exists on the basis of oral representations made before his acceptance of the transfer. This Court has expressly observed that the language at issue provides for employment terminable at will. See Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich.App. 606, 610-611, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981). Thus, by signing the contract, plaintiff assented to employment at will, and he cannot maintain an action based on prior oral assurances. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 437 Mich. 83, 92-93, 468 N.W.2d 845 (1991).

We turn now to what appears to be the crux of plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. As noted above, the contract language providing for termination "at any time, without advance notice," creates employment at will. However, the contract further states that plaintiff's employment "is subject to such rules, regulations, and personnel practices and policies, and changes therein, as Ford Motor Company may from time to time adopt." Plaintiff submits that this language incorporates by reference numerous other documents that "qualify" the at-will relationship and give rise to the inference that plaintiff had a legitimate expectation that he could be terminated only for just cause. We disagree with plaintiff's argument.

In his brief, plaintiff relies on several employment manuals that he claims imply the existence of job security. Significantly, however, plaintiff has not pointed out statements within these documents specifically relating to termination only for just cause. Instead, plaintiff relies primarily on a document entitled "Industrial Relations Administration Manual." This document is approximately twenty-five pages in length and contains extensive and detailed procedures governing employee discipline. Many of these procedures contain mandatory language that the procedures must be employed before an employee can be discharged.

Recently in Biggs v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 194 Mich.App. 239, 486 N.W.2d 61 (1992), this Court squarely addressed the issue whether an employer's adoption of disciplinary guidelines transforms an at-will employment relationship into one prohibiting discharge absent just cause. Applying the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 437 Mich. 627, 473 N.W.2d 268 (1991), this Court held that an employer could promulgate disciplinary procedures without altering the at-will status of its employees. In pertinent part, the panel in Biggs explained 194 Mich.App. at 241-242, 486 N.W.2d 61:

The fact that defendant had established a disciplinary system for its employees and, apparently, obligated plaintiff to abide by that disciplinary system in dealing with his subordinates does not establish...