Biggs v. Hilton Hotel Corp.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 131470
• Citation: 194 Mich.App. 239,486 N.W.2d 61
• Parties: , 7 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1242 Raymond BIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HILTON HOTEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 61

486 N.W.2d 61

194 Mich.App. 239, 7 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas.

1242

Raymond BIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HILTON HOTEL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 131470.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 3, 1991, at Detroit.

Decided Feb. 20, 1992.

Approved for Publication May 14, 1992, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication Aug. 3, 1992.

Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. by Joseph A. Golden and Lionel J. Postic, Southfield, for plaintiff-appellant.

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson by John W. Powers, Kathleen M. Paravola and Jeffrey C. Kauffman, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before SAWYER, P.J., and GILLIS and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court granting summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. Summary disposition was granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as the director of housekeeping of the Novi Hilton. Plaintiff began his employment on February 19, 1988, and was discharged approximately eight months later, apparently because of poor work performance. Plaintiff contends that the terms of his employment with defendant provided for termination only for "just cause" and that, pursuant to the provisions of an employee policy manual issued by defendant, the appropriate level of discipline would have been a verbal or written warning concerning plaintiff's deficiencies in performance rather than termination. Defendant maintains that plaintiff was an at-will employee. We agree with the trial court that there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was other than an at-will employee.

This case may be resolved by considering the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc., 437 Mich. 627, 473 N.W.2d 268 (1991). As the Court explained in Rowe, contracts for permanent employment are for an indefinite period of time and are presumptively construed to provide for employment at will. Id. at 636, 473 N.W.2d 268. The employee may overcome this presumption by proof of an express contract for a definite term or a provision forbidding discharge in the absence of just cause, or by proof that there was a promise implied in fact of employment security, such as employment for a particular period of time or to terminate only for just cause. Id. Plaintiff's reliance in this case on the disciplinary scheme established in the employment manual does not establish a promise of termination for just cause only. Nothing in the employment manual states that an employee would not be terminated except for one of the reasons listed in the disciplinary section. This is similar to the facts in Rowe, where the employment manual listed prohibited conduct that would result in dismissal but did not suggest that the enumerated conduct was the only basis for dismissal. The Court concluded that this was not evidence that would form a reasonable basis for finding a promise of job security. Id. at 645, 473 N.W.2d 268.

Furthermore, the employment manual at issue explicitly stated that it was not an employment contract, but only a guideline of the policies and benefits provided by defendant. We do not find it to be of any moment that the manual may not have explicitly stated that employment was at-will and that termination was not limited to those instances where just cause is shown. As stated above, the presumption is that employment is at-will, and the proper inquiry is whether the employer, through its employment manual or otherwise, made representations or promises that termination would be only for just cause. No such representations were contained in this employment manual, and the manual did, in fact, explicitly state that it was not a contract but merely a guideline.

The fact that defendant had established a disciplinary system for its employees and, apparently, obligated plaintiff to abide by that disciplinary system in dealing with his subordinates does not establish unequivocally plaintiff's position that he was a just-cause employee rather than an at-will em...