Storey Mountain, LLC v. George
| Decision Date | 15 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4D22-1408 |
| Parties | STOREY MOUNTAIN, LLC a/a/o IBERIABANK, Appellant, v. JOHN P. GEORGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm Beach County; Jaimie R. Goodman, Judge; L.T. Case No 502010CA003256XXXXMB.
Paul A. Humbert of Law Offices of Paul A. Humbert, P.L., Miami for appellant.
Kate E. Watson of The Watson Law Firm, P.A., Jupiter, for appellee.
This case requires us to determine whether the Legislature's adoption by statutory amendment in 2008, of what was previously only a common law presumption in favor of joint spousal bank accounts being tenancy by the entireties property, allows married couples to disclaim entireties ownership designation for such accounts in any written document specifically incorporated by reference into the signature card signed by the depositors upon the opening of the account. We hold that it does and that the joint spousal bank account at issue in this case therefore was not exempt from garnishment by a judgment creditor of only one of the account's depositors.
In 2011, the trial court entered a judgment against John P George (George). Years later, Storey Mountain LLC (Storey Mountain) sought and obtained issuance of a writ of garnishment directed to PNC Bank, N.A. (the bank), to satisfy the judgment with money which George and his wife held in a joint spousal checking account. The trial court dissolved the writ on motion filed by George, concluding that certain language appearing only in the bank's standard checking account agreement, but not on the face of the signature card which George and his wife signed upon opening the account, was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption created by section 655.79(1), Florida Statutes (2011), in favor of the account being entireties property.
Although the signature card which George and his wife signed did not contain any language designating what type of account was opened, it included language indicating that, by signing the document, they agreed to be bound by the terms of the bank's standard checking account agreement (the agreement). Page 9 of the agreement provided:
FOR ACCOUNTS IN FLORIDA: If an Account is in the names of spouses, you understand, intend and agree that such an Account is NOT owned as tenants by the entireties unless otherwise expressly designated on the Account records. We reserve the right to refuse to allow you to hold the Account as tenants by the entireties, in our discretion.
(emphasis added).
Notably, this language appeared in a section of the agreement entitled "Joint Accounts," which also expressly advised all joint account owners that their accounts would be held "as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as tenants in common."
In dissolving the writ of garnishment, the trial court reasoned that the agreement's language disclaiming entireties ownership for all joint spousal accounts in Florida was akin to the "Welcome Brochure," interpreted in Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand &Associates, 780 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2001), that was insufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of a joint spousal bank account being held as entireties property by the married couple in that case. Thus, because the signature card which George and his wife signed did not expressly disclaim on its face that the account would not be held as entireties property, the trial court concluded that Storey Mountain could not reach the money in the account by garnishment given the binding precedent of Beal Bank.
The trial court rejected Storey Mountain's reliance on section 655.79(1), which was amended after the decision in Beal Bank to include the following language: "Any deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing." § 655.79(1), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added); see also ch. 2008-75, § 8, Laws of Fla. (effective Oct. 1, 2008). The trial court reasoned that nothing in the amended statute in any way impacted the precedent in Beal Bank as it relates to joint account holders and judgment creditors in garnishment proceedings. We disagree.
Married couples may own property in various ways, including as tenants by the entireties. See Beal Bank, 780 So.2d at 52-53 (). However, only property held by a married couple as a tenancy by the entireties is exempt from garnishment by the individual creditors of either spouse. See id. at 53 (); see also Versace v. Uruven, LLC, 348 So.3d 610, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) ().
In Beal Bank, the supreme court explained that "if the signature card of the account does not expressly disclaim the tenancy by the entireties form of ownership," then a joint spousal bank account would be presumed a tenancy by the entireties so long as the account was established in accordance with the six "unities" required at common law for this form of joint property ownership. Id. at 58.[1]
Beal Bank held that "an express designation on [a] signature card that the account is held as a tenancy by the entireties ends the inquiry as to the form of ownership." Id. at 60.
Beal Bank also held that "if a signature card does not expressly disclaim a tenancy by the entireties form of ownership," then "a rebuttable presumption arises that a tenancy by the entireties exists provided that all the other unities necessary for a tenancy by the entireties are established." Id. "However, if a signature card expressly states that the account is not held as a tenancy by the entireties and another form of legal ownership is expressly designated, no presumption of a tenancy by the entireties arises." Id. at 60-61. Beal Bank explained that such an "express disclaimer would end the inquiry as to whether a tenancy by the entireties was intended." Id. at 61.
The supreme court in Beal Bank determined that the accounts at issue were entitled to the benefit of the presumption that they were held by the depositors as entireties property. Id. at 62. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court rejected the argument, with respect to one of the accounts at issue, that the financial institution at which it was held "attempted through its rules and regulations" contained in a "Welcome Brochure" to preclude its depositors "from establishing a tenancy by the entireties." Id. at 61. The supreme court determined that the "Welcome Brochure" governed only the relationship between the depositors and the financial institution, and concluded that, "because the signature card did not contain an express disclaimer that the account was not held as a tenancy by the entireties," the brochure's attempt to preclude such an ownership designation on all accounts was not "sufficient to eliminate the presumption in favor of tenancy by the entireties as between the depositor and a third party creditor." Id.
While the supreme court made clear in Beal Bank that it "hope[d] to bring greater predictability and uniformity to the common law" by its holding, it also "urge[d] the Legislature" to amend section 655.79(1) to codify in Florida's statutory law the common law presumption recognized in the case in favor of joint spousal accounts being entireties property. Id. at 62 n.24; see also Versace, 348 So.3d at 613 ().
In 2008, several years after Beal Bank was issued, the Legislature added the last sentence to section 655.79(1), quoted above, thereby codifying in Florida's statutory law the presumption in favor of joint spousal bank accounts being tenancy by the entireties property. See Versace, 348 So.3d at 613 (). However, the Legislature did more in its 2008 amendment than simply codify the holding in Beal Bank. Id. Instead, as this court recognized in Versace, which was decided after the trial court ruled in this case, the Legislature went a step further and codified that all joint spousal accounts are now tenancies by the entireties "as a matter of statutory law, regardless of the presence or absence of the common law requirements of unities" and in the absence of "an express designation" otherwise. Id.
That is, the plain language of the 2008 amendment to section 655.79(1) eliminated the requirement, previously set forth in Beal Bank as an aspect of the common law presumption, that the "unities in the formation of the account" be present. Id. at 613-14. Now, "all spousal bank accounts are considered as held by tenan[ts] by the entireties unless otherwise specified in writing" and "[n]o one need establish all the common law unities" in those instances where a third-party creditor seeks to garnish such an account. Id. at 614.
The dispositive question in this appeal is what type of "writing" is required by section 655.79(1) to negate the presumptive tenancy by the entireties ownership designation created by the statute for joint spousal bank accounts. George argues that the Legislature intended its 2008 amendment to section 655.79(1) to codify...
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