Storms v. Tuck

• Decision Date: 21 March 1979
• Docket Number: No. B-7672,B-7672
• Citation: 579 S.W.2d 447
• Parties: H. H. STORMS et ux., Petitioners, v. Grady TUCK, Jr. et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 447

579 S.W.2d 447

H. H. STORMS et ux., Petitioners, v. Grady TUCK, Jr. et al., Respondents.

No. B-7672.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 21, 1979.

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1979.

Joe Mike Egan, Jr., Kerrville, for petitioners.

Joe Grady Tuck, Kerrville, for respondents.

SAM D. JOHNSON, Justice.

This case involves the construction of an easement. Mr. and Mrs. Storms, plaintiffs below and petitioners here, filed this suit seeking injunctive relief and cancellation of a cloud on title to land owned by them, the asserted cloud being an easement owned jointly by Tuck, Smith, Walters, and Graham, defendants below and respondents here. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that Tuck, et al. owned a valid easement by virtue of both a written grant and the doctrine of estoppel in pais. The court of civil appeals affirmed on the ground of estoppel. 566 S.W.2d 16. We reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals in part, affirm in part, and remand the cause to the trial court for rendition of a proper judgment.

The diagram reproduced below will be useful in understanding the facts of this case.

Mr. and Mrs. Storms owned 848 acres of land in Kerr County. The land lies about one-half mile east of the state highway that runs between Bandera and Kerrville. In 1971 the Stormses built a house in the northeast corner of their land. In order to reach the Bandera highway from the house, they constructed a fifty-foot-wide private road on their property. The road ran along the northern border of their and their neighbor's land for nearly one and one-half miles, to the point where it intersected the highway.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

On December 21, 1976 the Stormses sold the house that they had constructed, which was their home, and ten acres of land surrounding it to Mrs. Mills. As part of the transaction, they granted Mrs. Mills an easement over the one-and-one-half-mile-long road in the following terms:

"THAT WE, H. H. STORMS and wife, JULIA STORMS, . . . have GRANTED, CONVEYED, and by these presents do GRANT and CONVEY unto the said RUTH MILLS, . . . her heirs and assigns, the free and uninterrupted use, liberty, privilege and easement of passing in, on, upon and along a certain way (describing the bounds of the easement) . . . together with free ingress, egress and regress to and for the said RUTH MILLS, her heirs and assigns, and her tenants, by foot, with carts, wagons carriages, automobiles and other vehicles, horses, mules or livestock, as by her shall be necessary or convenient at all times and seasons forever, in, along, upon and out of said way; TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the rights and privileges aforesaid unto her, the said RUTH MILLS, her heirs and assigns, to her proper use and behoof, in common, however, with Grantors herein, the said H. H. STORMS and wife, JULIA STORMS, their heirs and assigns."

The easement as described in the conveyance covered Not only the one-and-one-half-mile-long existing road, but Also included a fifty-foot-wide strip of land running down the western border of the ten acres. At the time of the conveyance, however, this additional fifty-foot-wide strip of land was not a roadway. It was nothing more than a part of the pasture on which were located several cattle pens owned by the Stormses. This additional fifty-foot-wide strip of land will be referred to as the unimproved portion of the easement since it was not part of the one-and-one-half-mile-long roadway.

Less than two months after her purchase, Mrs. Mills sold her ten acres to two separate parties on February 16, 1977. She sold the house and 9.24 acres to the Teals, together with "all her right, title and interest in and to that one certain easement," that being the easement granted by the Stormses to her. ¹ On the same day, Mrs. Mills sold the remaining 0.76 acres to the defendants Tuck, et al. This remaining tract of land was fifty feet wide and six hundred sixty feet long, running along the southern boundary of the ten acres. The conveyance included "an undivided interest in and to that one certain easement" from the Stormses.

The importance of this second conveyance lay in the fact that Tuck, et al. owned 1,100 acres of land adjoining the Stormses' and Mrs. Mills' land. The record does not indicate the date on which Tuck, et al. purchased or obtained title to the 1,100 acres. Sometime after the purchase of the 0.76 acres, Tuck, et al. brought in road building equipment and turned the 0.76-acre tract into a road, fifty feet wide and six hundred sixty feet long. In addition, Tuck, et al. built a road over the fifty-foot-wide unimproved portion of the easement running down the western border of the ten acres. The total cost of this roadway was nearly $6,000.

On two or three occasions during the building of this roadway, Mr. Storms came out and watched the construction. During this time, at the request of one of the co-defendants, Graham, Storms agreed to move his cattle pens, which were on the unimproved portion of the easement on the west side of the ten-acre tract. On another occasion, Storms pointed out to the construction crew the boundaries of the unimproved portion of the easement in order to keep them from building the road on land not contained in the easement grant. Since the roadbed on the southwestern end of the easement was built up some five feet off the ground, Tuck, et al. built a ramp and gate there to allow Storms access to his southern pastures, and did this at Storms' request. After the roadwork was done, the bulldozer operator removed a tree stump from the one-and-one-half-mile-long road, again at Storms' request. ² Mrs. Storms did not go on the land until after the roadwork was completed. The only contacts between the Stormses and Tuck, et al., therefore, were the two or three times described.

At no time prior to the filing of this lawsuit did the Stormses protest the building of the road either across the 0.76 acres or upon the unimproved portion of the easement. The Stormses filed suit on March 10, 1977, three weeks after Tuck, et al. had bought the 0.76 acres. They prayed for alternative forms of relief. First, they sought cancellation of cloud on title to their property through the extinguishment of the easement to reach the 0.76 acres. In the alternative, should the court decide that the easement gave Tuck, et al. the right to reach the 0.76 acres, the Stormses prayed for an injunction prohibiting Tuck, et al. from using the easement to go beyond the 0.76 acres and onto Tuck, et al.'s 1,100 acres. The trial court and the court of civil appeals ruled against the Stormses on both points, holding instead that the easement gave Tuck, et al. the right not only to reach their 0.76 acres, but also to go beyond it to their 1,100 acres. We are in agreement with the trial court and the court of civil appeals only to the extent that the easement will allow Tuck, et al. to reach the 0.76 acres.

In their first point, the Stormses argue that Tuck, et al. have no right even to reach the 0.76-acre tract, whether by the written easement grant or the doctrine of estoppel in pais. We look first to the words of the written grant to discover what restrictions, if any, are placed on the use of the easement. Those terms, set forth above, reveal the grant of an easement in very broad and general language, with no restrictions on its use other than it be used for "ingress, egress and regress." We agree with the conclusion of the court of civil appeals on this point: "(T)he easement appurtenant was for the entire 10 acres And for any portion thereof." 566 S.W.2d 16 at 18. (Emphasis added.)

Having concluded that Tuck, et al. have the right to utilize the easement to reach their 0.76-acre tract, we must now consider whether the easement may be further utilized for access to the 1,100 acres. On this point, we hold that Tuck, et al. may not utilize the easement for the benefit of the adjoining 1,100 acres.

With regard to the terms of the written easement grant, the decision of Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.1966), is dispositive.

" 'Where, in connection with a transfer of property, an easement is granted for the benefit of that property over lands of the grantor, the easement is presumed to be appurtenant to the granted premises, and in the absence of words creating a more extended right the grantee or his successor in interest is not entitled to use the easement for the benefit of other premises owned by himself or another.' " 403 S.W.2d 354 at 359.

Indeed, Tuck, et al. do not seriously dispute this point. It appears to be conceded that they will win, if at all, by the doctrine of estoppel in pais.

The doctrine of estoppel in pais as it relates to easements is a legal theory the exact nature and extent of which has not been clearly defined. While it is frequently applied in a few definite categories of suits involving land, the authority for its application outside those categories is "rare and nebulous." Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex.1962). ³ As generally stated, the doctrine holds that the owner of land may be estopped to deny the Existence of an easement by making representations that have been acted upon by a purchaser to his detriment. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., supra. The doctrine generally is resorted to as an exception to the statutes requiring a writing. Note, 13 Baylor L.Rev. 180 (1961). Being a creature of equity, it seeks to prevent injustice and to protect innocent parties from fraud. ⁴

At the outset, we would note that this case differs in two significant aspects from the traditional case asserting an easement by estoppel. First, in the traditional case, there generally is no written grant of an easement; instead, there is a parol grant or a representation that an easement already exists. In the instant case, however, we are faced with an express written grant of an easement....