Storrs v. Holcomb

• Decision Date: 25 June 1996
• Citation: 168 Misc.2d 898,645 N.Y.S.2d 286
• Parties: Phillip STORRS et al., Petitioners, v. Julie HOLCOMB, as Ithaca City Clerk, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 286

645 N.Y.S.2d 286

168 Misc.2d 898

Phillip STORRS et al., Petitioners, v. Julie HOLCOMB, as Ithaca City Clerk, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Tompkins County.

June 25, 1996.

Phillip Storrs, petitioner, pro se.

Toshav Storrs, petitioner, pro se.

Mariette Geldenhuys, City Attorney of Ithaca, for respondent.

WALTER J. RELIHAN, Jr., Justice.

Two men, proceeding pro se, seek to compel the City Clerk to issue a marriage license to them. The application, while inexact, approximates an action for a declaratory judgment (CPLR sect. 3001) or a special proceeding under Article 78, in the nature of mandamus. Whatever the niceties of pleading, the defendant/respondent has been given adequate notice of the issues and, accordingly we turn to the merits (Siegel on New York Practice, 2d ed., sect. 563 at p. 884).

The right to marry, by opposite sex couples, is protected under the 14th Amendment as a matter of substantive due process of law (Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618). Same sex marriage, by contrast, is not presently recognized under the laws of any state of the Union. However, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held, under equal protection provisions of the Hawaii Constitution, that the refusal of same sex marriage can only be justified by a compelling state interest (Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 645, 852 P.2d 44). The nature of that interest is now under examination by a lower court. A final resolution of the issue in Hawaii awaits that review and, possibly, a further appeal to the state's highest court.

The question has not reached the New York Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Division in the Second Department has concluded that only a rational relation need be shown between a similar classification and a legitimate state purpose (Matter of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, app. dsm. 82 N.Y.2d 801, 604 N.Y.S.2d 558, 624 N.E.2d 696). Concededly, the precise point at issue was whether the term "surviving spouse", as used in the EPTL, extends to the survivor of a homosexual life partnership. It is clear, nevertheless, that the ratio decidendi forged by the court includes holdings that marriage, in this state, is limited to opposite sex couples and that the gender classification serves a valid public purpose.

Further, the court held that neither the due process nor the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment is offended by New York's gender classification of persons authorized to marry, citing with approval Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185, app. dsmd. 409 U.S. 810, 93 S.Ct. 37, 34 L.Ed.2d 65. Needless to add, we are bound by the ruling of the Second Department in the absence of any contrary holding by the Appellate Division in this Department (Mountain View Coach v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 664, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918).

The plaintiff-petitioners also assert a privacy right (cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1682, 14 L.Ed.2d 510) to be free of governmental interference in a domestic relationship which, they contend, has no significant adverse effect upon the public at large. Matter of Cooper, supra, did not expressly consider that question. Arguably, the sovereign has no legitimate purpose in prohibiting a mere exchange of personal commitments (not involving the conduct issue present in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140) between members of the same sex.

The argument is not without merit. Nevertheless, it would be a very long inferential leap, from this narrow premise, to the conclusion that a denial of a marriage license to a same sex couple destroys a fundamental right so implicit in...