Story v. State
| Citation | 53 So.2d 920 |
| Parties | STORY v. STATE. |
| Decision Date | 31 July 1951 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Sam B. Wilson, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen. and Murray Sams, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
On the 30th day of September, 1949, the Grand Jury of Duval County, Florida, returned an indictment which charged the appellant with the crime of murder in the first degree. It was alleged in the indictment that the appellant 'on the twenty-second day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine, in the County and State aforesaid, unlawfully and from a premeditated design to effect the death of one Thomas W. St. John, did then and there kill the said Thomas W. St. John by shooting him to death with a pistol.' It appears from the record that the appellant also shot and killed his former wife, Mrs. Lucile St. John, almost simultaneously with the slaying of her husband, Thomas W. St. John. An indictment was also returned charging the appellant with having murdered Mrs. Lucile St. John.
On October 25, 1949, the appellant was duly arraigned. On November 28, 1949, he came on for trial in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida. On November 30, 1949, the jury brought in its verdict finding the appellant guilty of murder in the first degree without recommendation for mercy.
On the 13th day of December, 1949, motion for new trial was filed and on the 21st day of December, 1949, an order denying new trial was entered. Thereupon appellant was given the death sentence by the Judge of said Court. Notice of appeal was entered on March 13th, 1950.
The appellant poses three questions. The first question is stated as follows: 'Where, in a murder trial the state, at the close of defendant's case, introduced in evidence a confession of the defendant, over his objection, ostensibly for the purpose of rebutting certain prior inconsistent statements of the defendant, was it legally permissible for such confession to be admitted in evidence on rebuttal?'
The foregoing question was answered affirmatively by the trial court and we do not find that his ruling was erroneous. We had occasion to pass upon this question in the case of Browne v. State, 92 Fla. 699, 109 So. 811. In that case and also in the cases of Maloy v. State, 52 Fla. 101, 41 So. 791, and Dedge v. State, 68 Fla. 240, 67 So. 43, we held that a defendant in a criminal prosecution who takes the stand voluntarily as a witness may be impeached as any other witness. The situation depicted in the case of Browne v. State, supra, with reference to the question now under consideration is so closely analogous to that of the instant case as to make it unnecessary for us further to labor the point. The ruling of the trial judge on the first question presented by appellant is sustained upon the authority of the cited cases.
The second question raised by appellant is stated by him as follows: 'Where a juror who sat in the trial of a first degree murder case denied under oath on his voir dire examination conducted by the judge of the court, touching his competency and qualification as a juror, that he had ever been convicted of bribery, forgery, larceny, perjury or any other felony, whereas, in fact he had been previously convicted of a felony, and that fact and the falsity of the juror's oath were at that time and during the trial unknown to the defendant and his attorney, did this false oath constitute such misconduct by the juror as to deprive the defendant of the right of trial by a legal, fair and impartial jury as guaranteed to him under the laws and Constitution of the State of Florida?'
This question, as it is posed, does not disclose the fact that although the juror had been convicted in the U.S. District Court of South Carolina of forging signatures to, and passing, offering and publishing government checks and on October 10, 1922, was sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a day in the U. S. Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, and to pay a fine of $500, that thereafter the said juror had been granted a Presidential pardon which had the effect of restoring his civil rights.
Appellant takes the position that the false answer made by Speigler constituted a fraud and deception upon the Court and all persons interested in the case and that by reason of such fact appellant was deprived of a trial by a legal, fair and impartial jury.
The question which was asked juror Speigler and to which he obviously made a false answer, was as follows: 'Have you ever been convicted of bribery, forgery, larceny, perjury or any other felony?' It will be observed that this question does not plumb our statute, 40.07(1) Fla. Statutes 1941, F.S.A., which reads as follows: 'No person who is under prosecution for any crime, or has been convicted of bribery, forgery, perjury or larceny, unless such person shall have been restored to civil rights, shall be qualified to be a juror.' (Italics supplied) See also Sec. 40.01(2) Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A.
We do not hold that the Trial Judge committed reversible error in asking the above quoted question, but only that, as posed, the query was not material. We do, however, believe that the Judge, when examining jurors on their voir dire, should track the statute and ask in one question: 'Have you ever been convicted of bribery, forgery, perjury, larceny or any felony and not restored to civil rights?' We make this observation for two reasons. In the first place, the question as framed by the Trial Judge in this case is not sufficient to test the qualification of a prospective juror under Section...
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Peri v. State
...materiality and propriety of voir dire questions are to be decided by the judge. Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla.1959); Story v. State, 53 So.2d 920 (Fla.1951); Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1922); Saulsberry v. State, 398 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Gibbs v. State, 193 So.2......
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NICHOLAS v. State of Fla.
...candid during jury selection in this case precluded the State from inquiring into his rationalization. See generally Story v. State, 53 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla.1951) (affirming denial of new trial where juror gave an incomplete answer during voir dire because, in that case, the juror's answer d......
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DeLaine v. State
...to pass upon questions touching his qualifications to serve in a particular case. That prerogative rests with the court. See Story v. State, 53 So.2d 920 (Fla.1951).' We do not believe that the aforesaid statement made by the prosecuting attorney in the case sub judice can be considered ana......
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Nicholas v. State Of Fla.
...candid during jury selection in this case precluded the State from inquiring into his rationalization. See generally Story v. State, 53 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. 1951) (affirming denial of new trial where juror gave an incomplete answer during voir dire because, in that case, the juror's answer......