Story v. Story

• Decision Date: 05 January 1944
• Docket Number: No. 8182.,8182.
• Parties: STORY v. STORY et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

176 S.W.2d 925

STORY v. STORY et al.

No. 8182.

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 5, 1944.

Rehearing Denied February 2, 1944.

Error from Court of Civil Appeals of Fifth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by Isaac B. Story, administrator of the estate of Shelton A. Story, deceased, and others, against Ella C. Story surviving widow of the deceased for damages and for injunctive relief. To review a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, 172 S.W. 2d 753, which modified and, as modified, affirmed a judgment which granted a temporary injunction, the defendant brings error.

Reversed, and temporary injunction dissolved.

Ross M. Scott and E. P. Bryan, both of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.

Biggers, Baker & Lloyd, of Dallas, for defendants in error.

SLATTON, Commissioner.

This action was filed in the district court of Dallas County to recover damages and to enjoin the petitioner, Ella C. Story, as follows: "From making any sort of claims * * * against the named plaintiffs and the estate of Shelton A. Story, deceased, and from molesting, harassing and interfering with the handling of said estate and from employing any counsel, etc., of any kind to file or prosecute a claim * * * against said estate and from coming about any property belonging to said estate."

The trial court, after hearing, granted a temporary injunction in accordance with the relief sought. Ella C. Story appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas. That court, by a majority opinion, the Chief Justice dissenting, modified the injunction, "by mandatorily requiring appellant (Ella C. Story) to vacate and restore the premises in Glen Rose to the administrator and pending final disposition of the case to desist from intruding onto any other property belonging to the estate or from taking possession of same and to refrain from interfering with the possession and management of said properties by the administrator."

It is our opinion that the temporary injunction was improperly granted. According to the sworn averments of the trial pleadings, the right of possession of the Glen Rose property is in issue in a suit brought by the administrator of the estate of Shelton A. Story, deceased, against petitioner, in the justice court of Somervell County, and that the administrator of the estate of Shelton A. Story, deceased, had procured an order from the probate court of Dallas County requiring the petitioner to vacate the Glen Rose property, which order had been appealed by the petitioner herein. The pleadings further show that the estate of Shelton A. Story is in the process of administration in the probate court.

The temporary injunction granted by the trial court will in effect prevent the petitioner from appealing the probate court order and from defending the forcible entry and detainer action. It therefore affirmatively appears that the present action is one in equity to restrain the petitioner from defending actions at law instituted by the administrator of the estate of Shelton A. Story, deceased, against the petitioner herein.

The rule is generally recognized in this state that the extraordinary writ of injunction will not be granted where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law. Hill et ux. v. Brown, Tex.Com.App., 237 S.W. 252. This general rule is not rigidly enforced in this state. Nagy v. Bennett, Tex.Civ.App., 24 S.W.2d 778, writ refused. Many cases recognize the rule that the relief at law must be "plain and adequate", or "as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration" as the equitable remedy of injunction. Sumner v. Crawford, 91 Tex. 129, 41 S.W. 994, 995; Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation District v. Allen, Tex.Sup., 171 S.W.2d 847.

The action of forcible entry and detainer is statutory and well defined. It provides an efficient and speedy remedy at law which has for its purpose the determination of the right of possession of real property (House v. Reavis, 89 Tex. 626, 35 S.W. 1063), without the necessity of an action on the title. Clark v. Snow, 24 Tex. 242.

It...