Story v. Sunshine Foliage World, Inc.
Decision Date | 31 October 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 8:99-CV-1614-T-17A.,8:99-CV-1614-T-17A. |
Citation | 120 F.Supp.2d 1027 |
Parties | Paulette B. STORY, Plaintiff, v. SUNSHINE FOLIAGE WORLD, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Stanley Edward Marable, Law Office of Stanley E. Marable, Sarasota, FL, for Paulette B. Story, plaintiff.
Mark E. Levitt, Shannon D. Bream, Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Sunshine Foliage World, Inc., defendant.
ORDER ON MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT AND ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff, Paulette B. Story's, Motion to Strike Affidavit, (Dkt.17), Defendant, Sunshine Foliage World, Inc.'s, response thereto, (Dkt.22), Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkts.11-12), and Plaintiff's response thereto, (Dkts.18-21).
This case arises under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (ADA). Plaintiff brings this cause of action under the ADA, alleging discrimination based on an alleged disability with regard to her termination from employment at Defendant's business. A recitation of Plaintiff's employment history is relevant in determining whether to grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Where there are conflicts in the evidence, they are resolved, for purposes of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, in favor of Plaintiff, as the nonmoving party.
It is imperative to note that Sunshine Foliage World, Ltd., is Defendant's proper name, even though the name of Defendant on the case file is listed as Sunshine Foliage World, Inc. (Dkt.4). Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in January of 1986, and continued to work for Defendant as an office manager until the date of Plaintiff's termination on November 21, 1998. (Dkts.16, 20). Plaintiff claims that Defendant terminated her on the basis of her alleged disability, and, therefore, violated the ADA. (Dkt.16). Defendant is a Florida limited partnership, which may be named as an entity under Chapter 620 of the Florida Statutes, that maintains a place of business in Wachula, Florida. (Dkt.16). Defendant employs more than fifteen (15) employees, and is a covered entity under the ADA. (Dkt.16).
Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff fully, adequately, and completely performed all of her job duties while she was employed by Defendant. (Dkt.16). Plaintiff claims that, at all times material hereto, she suffered from Alpha-1, Antitrypsin deficiency, a congenital condition which causes severe respiratory problems. (Dkts.16, 20). Plaintiff also claims that she is an individual with a "disability," as that term is defined in § 3(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2). (Dkt.16). Plaintiff states that she informed Defendant of her condition and disability in June of 1997, but continued to perform her job duties, despite being required to take intravenous (IV) antibiotics everyday after work for a period of two (2) weeks. (Dkt.16).
Plaintiff states that Defendant was concerned about her condition and that Bill Lambert, an agent of Defendant, had a meeting with Plaintiff on November 11, 1998, to discuss whether other employees of Defendant could handle Plaintiff's duties if she became ill and unable to work for a period of two (2) weeks or more. (Dkt.16). Plaintiff alleges that, shortly thereafter, she received a letter from Defendant, dated November 21, 1998, stating that she was terminated from her employment with Defendant, because her services were no longer needed. (Dkt.16).
Plaintiff further alleges that her disability was the sole or substantial motivating factor for Defendant's decision to terminate her employment. (Dkt.16). Plaintiff further contends that Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of Plaintiff, and that Defendant's termination of her employment, due to her alleged disability, constitutes discrimination in violation of the ADA. (Dkt.16). Plaintiff claims that as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's termination of her employment, Plaintiff has suffered lost wages and benefits, lost employment opportunities, substantial damages from pecuniary losses, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. (Dkt.16).
On December 2, 1998, Plaintiff timely filed a written charge of employment discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). (Dkts.1, 16). In the EEOC complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated her because of her alleged disability. (Dkts.1, 16). On April 22, 1999, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a "Notice of Right to Sue." (Dkts.1, 16). Thereafter, Plaintiff timely filed a Complaint with this Court on July 12, 1999. (Dkt.1). On June 30, 2000, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint with this Court correcting allegations made with respect to the type of business that Defendant operated. (Dkt.16).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that upon motion by a party or upon the court's initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." A motion to strike will "usually be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties." Seibel v. Society Lease, Inc., 969 F.Supp. 713, 715 (M.D.Fla. 1997); see also Poston v. American President Lines, Ltd., 452 F.Supp. 568, 570 (S.D.Fla.1978) (citing Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction, 306 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1962)). An affidavit submitted in connection with a summary judgment motion is subject to a motion to strike if it does not measure up to the standards of Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Barnebey v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 715 F.Supp. 1512 (M.D.Fla.1989).
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that an affidavit "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to matters stated therein." Because affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, an affidavit based on nothing more than "information and belief" is not sufficient as a matter of law. See Givhan v. Electronic Engineers, Inc., 4 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1334 (M.D.Ala.1998). According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), an affidavit must be stricken when it is a conclusory argument rather than a statement of fact, or when the affidavit is not based on personal knowledge. See Interfase Marketing, Inc. v. Pioneer Technologies Group, Inc., No. 91-572-CIV-T-17A, 1993 WL 229601, at *2 (M.D.Fla. June 23 1993); see also Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir.1985). The court may only consider evidence that would be admissible in trial. See id. Therefore, the court may not consider inadmissible hearsay when deciding a motion for summary judgment. See Bush v. Barnett Bank of Pinellas County, 916 F.Supp. 1244, 1256 (M.D.Fla.1996). When an affidavit submitted in support of, or opposition to, a motion for summary judgment contains inadmissible evidence, the court may strike the inadmissible portions of the affidavit and consider the rest. See Lee v. National Life Assurance Co., 632 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir.1980).
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." There are two elements which must be present before an out of court utterance may be rendered inadmissible as hearsay: (1) the out of court utterance must be a "statement," i.e., a verbal assertion or conduct intended as an assertion; and (2) the statement must be offered to prove the truth of the matter that it asserts. See United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1477-78 (11th Cir.1986) (citations omitted).
Therefore, "verbal or nonverbal conduct, when it is offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted," is excluded from the hearsay rule. Id. (citations omitted). Id. (citations omitted); see also Givhan, 4 F.Supp.2d at 1335 ( ); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir.1996) ( ); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.1981) ( ); United States v. Jennings, 527 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir.1976) ( ).
The Court first turns to the issue of whether Defendant's submission of a corrected affidavit of Beverly Cleland is to be accepted by the Court in support of Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff alleges that the initial affidavit of Beverly Cleland, (Dkt.12),...
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