Stoudymire v. Rights

• Decision Date: 25 July 2012
• Citation: 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 22210,36 Misc.3d 919,949 N.Y.S.2d 611
• Parties: Anita STOUDYMIRE, Complainant–Petitioner, v. N.Y.S. DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and Honorable Michael F. McKeon, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

36 Misc.3d 919

949 N.Y.S.2d 611

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 22210

Anita STOUDYMIRE, Complainant–Petitioner,

v.N.Y.S. DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and Honorable Michael F. McKeon, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Cayuga County, New York.

July 25, 2012.

Bousquet Holstein PLLC, John L. Valentino, Esq., Syracuse, for petitioner.

John W. McConnell, Counsel's Office, Unified Court System, Shawn Kerby, Esq., New York, attorney for respondent McKeon.

Caroline J. Downey, General Counsel, State Division of Human Rights, Toni Ann Hollifield, Esq., New York, attorney for respondent SDHR.

JOSEPH D. VALENTINO, J.

By notice of petition and petition filed March 9, 2012, petitioner seeks judicial review of respondent State Division of Human Rights' determination and order dated January 12, 2012 dismissing petitioner's complaint of unlawful discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner's September 19, 2011 complaint to SDHR alleged that respondent McKeon engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices of illegal blacklisting based on petitioner's race and based on the criminal conviction record of her live-in boyfriend.

The basis of the complaint was McKeon's official letter as presiding judge of the Auburn Drug and Alcohol Court and the Cayuga County Felony Drug Court dated October 19, 2010, sent to petitioner notifying her that such courts will no longer utilize Recovery Counseling, an alcohol and drug treatment business owned by petitioner. McKeon's letter referenced events at petitioner's residence without specific details as the basis for the decision. Additionally, McKeon notified petitioner that such court participants were being required to leave Recovery Counseling and transfer their treatment to another provider. Significantly, McKeon noted that the “integrity and viability of these courts can not be compromised [and that] these recent events [at petitioner's residence] have done just that.”

It is undisputed that the “recent events” were in reference to the arrest of petitioner's live-in boyfriend for drug possession and sale and the publicity it received. According to McKeon's answer but absent from the petition, the police also executed a search warrant at petitioner's home that resulted in the recovery of drug paraphernalia and a large amount of cash.

According to its dismissal order, SDHR determined that it did not have any authority over an order, ruling, or decision by a court or judge, under any of the jurisdictional areas specified under the State Human Rights Law. Petitioner now seeks a judgment annulling the SDHR determination and order, and remanding the matter to SDHR for a determination on the merits. Respondents seek dismissal of the petition. The certified transcript of the record of all prior proceedings at the SDHR has been submitted.

DISCUSSION

In cases where SDHR issues an order prior to holding a hearing, dismissing a complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the standard of review is whether the determination was arbitrary or capricious ( see Scopelliti v. Town of New Castle, 210 A.D.2d 339, 620 N.Y.S.2d 407 [2d Dept. 1994] ) or affected by an error of law ( see Baust v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 70 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 894 N.Y.S.2d 562 [3d Dept.], lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 710, 2010 WL 4008313 [2010] ). For the reasons that follow, this Court concludes that the SDHR's determination that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissal of the complaint was neither arbitrary, capricious, or affected by an error of law, and the petition must be dismissed.

I. Jurisdiction of SDHR

Although the jurisdiction of the SDHR is broad, it is not limitless. Recently, the Court of Appeals clarified that the jurisdiction of the SDHR does not extend to public school students' complaints of discrimination (Matter of N. Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 19 N.Y.3d 481, 950 N.Y.S.2d 67, 973 N.E.2d 162 [2012] ). In its 4–3 decision, the majority held that a public school is not an educational corporation or association” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), and thus, the SDHR lacked jurisdiction to entertain public school students complaints ( id.). Instructively, the Court noted that although the SDHR lacked jurisdiction of such complaints, public school students were not without a remedy and could seek redress pursuant to Education Law § 310 or federal law ( id.). More importantly, despite the general purpose provision of the Human Rights Law to eliminate and prevent discrimination, the majority declined to liberally construe the statute in the absence of an underlying directive in the Human Rights Law to apply such a construction ( id.)

II. Judicial Immunity

The State's absolute immunity has been regarded as akin to subject matter jurisdiction ( see Lublin v. State of New York, 135 Misc.2d 419, 420–421, 515 N.Y.S.2d 385 [Ct. of Claims], affd.135 A.D.2d 1155, 523 N.Y.S.2d 21 [1st Dept. 1987], lv. denied71 N.Y.2d 802, 527 N.Y.S.2d 768, 522 N.E.2d 1066 [1988] ). Judicial immunity is an absolute defense to liability for harm resulting from official judicial acts, regardless of the bad faith of the judge or lack of any reasonable basis for the action, except when the acts are unconstitutional, unlawful, made in the absence of jurisdiction, or made outside the scope of authority of the office (28 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Courts and Judges § 330). Judicial immunity is designed to ensure judges' absolute independence in the exercise of their judicial functions, free of the fear of intimidation and harassment from vexatious lawsuits ( see Mosher–Simons v. County of Allegany, 99 N.Y.2d 214, 753 N.Y.S.2d 444, 783 N.E.2d 509 [2002] )....