Stoup v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 26 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 933 S.W.2d 935 |
| Parties | Arthur H. STOUP, Appellant, v. Karim ROBINSON and Tunisia Robinson, Respondents. 52116. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Stephen Nichols, Kansas City, for appellant.
Gardiner Davis, Kansas City, for respondents.
Arthur Stoup appeals from the circuit court's judgment in this landlord-tenant action for waste, breach of lease, and fraud which Stoup filed after an apartment he owned was damaged by fire. We affirm.
On November 16, 1993, Karim Robinson was at his apartment with his girlfriend, LaTonya Walker, and her infant nephew. At Walker's request, Robinson went into the kitchen, turned off a burner on the electric stove, moved a skillet of grease to a back burner, and then left the kitchen. About 15 to 20 minutes later, Walker noticed fire coming from the kitchen and alerted Robinson who found the skillet on fire. Walker called the fire department. Robinson began searching in the building's hallway for a fire extinguisher but could not find one.
Although fire fighters extinguished the blaze, the apartment sustained considerable damage. The apartment's owner, Arthur Stoup, sued Karim Robinson, his sister, Tunisia Robinson, and LaTonya Walker, 1 alleging waste, breach of lease, and fraud. He also requested attorney fees and expenses.
The circuit court heard the case in October 1995. The circuit court issued its judgment for the Robinsons on all counts. Stoup appeals.
In his first point, Stoup claims that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence. He contends that substantial evidence did not support the judgment.
Count I of Stoup's second amended petition alleged that Karim and Tunisia Robinson 2 "by their own acts or omissions, gross negligence, and willful and malicious conduct ... caused waste to the property of the plaintiff by causing a grease fire to start in the kitchen of [their] apartment ... resulting in damages in excess of $15,000 to plaintiff's property." The trial court did not make any specific findings in this case; therefore, we deem the facts to be in accord with the result reached. We must affirm the judgment under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence. Siragusa v. Park, 913 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo.App.1996).
We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences and disregarding any contrary evidence. Marro v. Daniels, 914 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Mo.App.1995). We do not weigh the evidence, and we defer to the circuit court's superior ability to judge the witnesses' credibility. Id.
Under Missouri law, for an action for waste by a lessee to prevail, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either actively caused direct injury to the property or failed to exercise ordinary care in using the leased premises. Lustig v. U.M.C. Industries, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo.App.1982); Brown v. Midwest Petroleum Company, 828 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Mo.App.1992). A tenant is liable for damages which he or she--either through negligence or willful misconduct--caused to the leased premises. Enchanted Hills, Inc. v. Medlin, 892 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo.App.1994).
Stoup did not establish that the Robinsons intentionally started the fire or that it resulted from negligence. "The mere occurrence of a fire does not raise a presumption of negligence[.]" Sparks v. Platte-Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Mo.App.1993). The circuit court had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the grease fire ignited from the Robinsons' ordinary use of the stove for cooking.
In challenging the circuit court's decision as contrary to the weight of the evidence, Stoup asserts that Karim Robinson made statements after the fire which contradicted his trial testimony. He also points to a field report completed by fire officials which contained statements inconsistent with Karim Robinson's trial testimony. We do not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Any conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court to resolve. Kansas City Hill Restaurant Corporation v. Dean's Fairmount Company, 847 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo.App.1992). After hearing all of the evidence, the circuit court obviously believed Karim Robinson's testimony and concluded that the fire was not the result of willful misconduct or negligence.
Count II of Stoup's petition alleged that the Robinsons breached Paragraphs 2, 14 and 17 of their lease. Those provisions said:
2. PREMISES. Owner does hereby rent to Resident and Resident does hereby rent from Owner the apartment listed above. No other person except those herein stated may occupy premises, without prior written approval of Owner.
....
14. REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE, DAMAGE TO PREMISES, ETC. Owner shall make required repairs and maintenance to heating and air conditioning equipment and to appliances furnished for Resident's use.... Resident, throughout the term, will maintain all other fixtures, equipment, and property furnished by Owner for Resident's use, and also the Leased premises and its appurtenances, in good condition and repair, and will allow no waste, and Resident shall be liable for any and all injury or damage to the same and/or to the apartment building, common areas, facilities, grounds and other buildings and property of Owner, and to property of other Residents, occasioned by the acts or omissions of Resident, his immediate family, visitors, invitees or other persons whom Resident permits to be in or about the Leased premises, apartment building or other areas. Repairs and replacements required hereunder, shall be determined such by Owner who shall cause the same to be made and performed at Resident's cost, and Resident shall pay the cost thereof as additional rent[.]
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17. ASSIGNMENT OR SUB-LEASING. Resident agrees not to assign or sublet the premises or allow other persons to occupy the premises without the prior written consent of Owner.
Stoup claims the Robinsons breached these provisions by allowing LaTonya Walker to reside in the...
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