Stover v. Washington County

• Decision Date: 15 October 1941
• Docket Number: 6769
• Citation: 63 Idaho 145,118 P.2d 63
• Parties: CLARA H. STOVER, Widow, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

118 P.2d 63

63 Idaho 145

CLARA H. STOVER, Widow, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents

No. 6769

Supreme Court of Idaho

October 15, 1941

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COMPENSABLE INJURY-INJURY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DUTIES OF.

1. The word "residence," in statute defining actual and necessary expenses which county is required to pay county commissioner as traveling and hotel expenses necessarily incurred by commissioner when absent from his residence in performance of official duties, means the house, building, or place where one dwells. (Sess. Laws, 1937, c. 91.)

2. The statute, defining actual and necessary expenses which county is required to pay county commissioner as traveling and hotel expenses necessarily incurred by commissioner when absent from his residence in the performance of official duties reveals a legislative intent that commissioner would have to travel in discharge of his official duties and that all his duties would not be transacted at county seat. (Sess. Laws, 1937, c. 91.)

3. Individuals or private corporations in purely proprietary business are not liable for accident and resultant injury to employee, where accident occurred while employee was traveling to or from his place of work on the public highway or elsewhere not on premises of employer.

4. A county commissioner is required to look after and supervise the government and business affairs of county, in collaboration with his associates on board of county commissioners. (I. C. A. secs. 30-705 to 30-707, 30-751, 30-803, 30-2901.)

5. The business of a county, as a governmental arm of the state, is not confined exclusively to the courthouse, but is conterminous with county boundaries.

6. The administration of Workmen's Compensation Law and benefits accruing thereunder to workmen and employees is a fixed principle of public policy of Idaho. (I. C. A. sec. 43-902.)

7. The Workmen's Compensation Law should be liberally construed in favor of employees. (I. C. A. sec. 43-901 et seq.)

8. A county commissioner who was killed when his automobile was struck by train, while on his way from his home to county seat to attend meeting of board of county commissioners at court house, was pursuing the "course of his employment," and therefore his death was compensable, in view of statute which defined actual and necessary expenses which county is required to pay commissioner, as traveling and hotel expenses incurred by commissioner when absent from his residence in performance of official duties, thereby indicating legislative recognition of fact that commissioner would have to travel in discharge of his official duties. (Sess. Laws, 1937, c. 91.)

APPEAL from the Industrial Accident Board.

From order of board, denying claim for compensation and dismissing application, plaintiff has appealed. Reversed and cause remanded with instructions.

Reversed and remanded with directions. Costs to appellant.

George Donart and E. B. Smith, for Appellant.

An injury arises out of or in the course of employment when the injury occurs under any of the following conditions: When the employee is paid the expense of transportation; when he is traveling in the discharge of his duties; when he is using a means of transportation furnished or paid for by the employer; when the injury occurs on the part of the premises of the employer where the employee was required to perform his labor; or while going from one place of work to another. (Burchett v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 48 Idaho 528; Zeier v. Boise Transfer Co., 43 Idaho 549; In re Christy, 59 Idaho 58; Harland v. Industrial Accident Commission (Cal.) 228 P. 654; Rader v. Keeler (Cal.) 18 P.2d 360; Racine County v. Industrial Commission (Wis.) 246 N.W. 303.)

Clarence L. Hillman, for Respondents.

Where as in the case at bar, an employee meets with an accident while operating a vehicle over which the employer has no direction or control, and on premises not belonging to or under the domination of the employer, such accident does not arise out of and in the course of the employment, and consequently, a personal injury by such accident is not compensable. (I. C. A. sec. 43-1001; Stewart v. St. Joseph Lead Co. et al., 49 Idaho 171, 286 P. 927; State ex rel. Gallett, State Auditor v. Clearwater Timber Company et al., 47 Idaho 295, 305, 274 P. 802, 805; Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P. 1104; Neale v. Weaver, 60 Idaho 41, 88 P.2d 522.)

AILSHIE, J. Budge, C.J., and Givens and Holden, JJ., and Buckner, District Judge, concur. Morgan, J., did not sit at the hearing nor participate in the opinion.

OPINION

AILSHIE, J.

January 11, 1939, Joseph M. Stover, a Washington county commissioner, aged 70, died at Weiser, as the result of a personal injury by accident. Notice of his death, filed with the Industrial Accident Board, stated that Stover was "on way to meeting of Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, Idaho, and while crossing the railroad track, was struck by a train which he failed to see on account of a heavy fog." The accident happened "approximately 20 minutes of nine" in the morning. Stover sustained a "fractured skull and other broken bones, and small cut on left hand, and internal injuries." He was driving his car across the railroad track, which ran between his house and the highway; he had to cross the track to get to the highway.

Application for hearing was made by deceased's widow, appellant herein, February 20, 1939; answer was filed by defendants (respondents), denying the material allegations of the application and praying that the claim be dismissed. The matter was heard before two members of the Board October 10, 1939. The testimony disclosed that the board of county commissioners, of which Mr. Stover was a member from the first district of Washington county, was in session January 9th and 10th, 1939; that the minutes for the meeting of January 10th contained the following statement: "On motion, the Board takes a recess until January 11, 1939"; that on the latter date, "Upon receiving notice of the Accidental death of Joseph M. Stover, of the First District, the Board takes a recess until January 12, 1939, no business being transacted." The commissioners usually met at "nine A. M."

It was stipulated between counsel that Stover was, "January 11th, 1939, and continuously immediately prior thereto had been for about eight (8) years the duly elected, qualified and acting Commissioner of the First District of Washington County, Idaho: . . . . That no agreement in this matter regarding compensation has been reached; . . . . That over Two hundred ($ 200.00) dollars was expended as burial expenses of the deceased, . . . .

"That Joseph M. Stover earned and was paid at the rate of Seven hundred ($ 700.00) dollars per year as Commissioner of the First District, . . . and that his average weekly wage earned for the year immediately preceding January 11, 1939, was Thirteen and 46/100 ($ 13.46) dollars a week; . . . .

"That the only issue by this proceeding is whether Joseph M. Stover suffered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Washington County, Idaho, on January 11th, 1939, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law."

The Board entered its findings of fact, and rulings of law and ordered that the claim for compensation be denied and the application be dismissed, from which claimant has appealed to this court.

Washington county is a county of the third class (chap. 186, p. 309, 1937 Sess. Laws) and is required to pay its commissioners an annual salary of $ 700.00 "and actual and necessary expenses." The statute defines "actual and necessary expenses" as follows:

"The term 'actual and necessary expenses' shall be deemed to include all traveling expenses and hotel expenses necessarily incurred by any county commissioner when absent from his residence in the performance of the duties of his office." (1937 Sess. Laws, chap. 91, p. 124.)

It appears, from the foregoing definition of "actual and necessary expenses," that the legislature had in mind that a county commissioner would have to travel, in the discharge of his official duties, and that he should be paid his necessary traveling expenses in going "from his residence." "Residence" is the house, building or place where one dwells. (See 54 C. J., p. 708, sec. 5.)

Had the legislature understood and intended that all duties of a commissioner would be transacted at the county seat; and that a commissioner would not be on duty until he reached the county seat, there would have been no reason whatever for allowing his necessary "traveling expenses. . . . from his residence." Under such a construction of the statute, the only expense that could be allowed a commissioner would be his hotel bills, while in actual session at the county seat. Such was clearly not the thought or intent of the legislature in enacting this statute.

Respondents in support of their contention, that the order of the Board, denying compensation in this case, should be sustained, cite many cases from this court, holding that the employer is not liable for an accident and resultant injury to an employee, in a case where the accident occurred while the employee was traveling to or from his place of work on the public highway, or elsewhere not on the premises of the employer. (Stewart v. St. Joseph Lead Co. 49 Idaho 171, 286 P. 927; Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 631, 253 P. 1104; Neale v. Weaver, 60 Idaho 41, 48, 88 P.2d 522.) The rule contended for by respondents is well...