Johnson v. Falen, 7167

• Decision Date: 02 May 1944
• Docket Number: 7167
• Citation: 149 P.2d 228,65 Idaho 542
• Parties: LEE JOHNSON, Appellant, v. ERNEST FALEN, Employer, and IDAHO COMPENSATION COMPANY, Surety, Respondents
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

149 P.2d 228

65 Idaho 542

LEE JOHNSON, Appellant, v. ERNEST FALEN, Employer, and IDAHO COMPENSATION COMPANY, Surety, Respondents

No. 7167

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 2, 1944

Rehearing denied June 14, 1944.

1. Workmen's compensation

Where question whether compensation claimant was only a casual employee was not an issue in a previous compensation case any recitals in that judgment indicating that claimant was a regular employee were not conclusive in subsequent proceeding.

2. Evidence

In the absence of contrary pleading and proof, the statute of a foreign state will be presumed to be the same as that of the forum.

3. Workmen's compensation

Although the Industrial Accident Board is a tribunal of limited scope it has general and exclusive original jurisdiction in the state field of industrial accidents. (I.C.A., secs. 43-902, 43-1003.)

4. Workmen's compensation

The Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed.

5. Workmen's compensation

The statute providing that where workman hired outside Idaho is injured and is entitled to compensation under the law of state where hired he shall be entitled to enforce against his employer his rights in Idaho did not limit Industrial Accident Board's jurisdiction to accidents occurring within the state if the employment be so connected with employer's business within the state as to be an integral part thereof. (I.C.A., sec. 43-1415.)

6. Workmen's compensation

Where employee hired outside Idaho was injured outside the state but his employment was inseparably incidental to employer's business of buying, shipping, and selling fruit, the situs of which was in Idaho, the Industrial Accident Board of Idaho had jurisdiction of employee's claim for compensation. (I.C.A., sec. 43-1415.)

Rehearing Denied June 14, 1944.

Appeal from the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Idaho.

Reversed.

Anderson and Leguineche for appellant.

When the industry of the emcr is localized and centered in the State of Idaho, an injured employee will be entitled to enforce the Idaho compensation law. (Fay v. Industrial Commission, et al (Utah) 114 P.2d 508; Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines Inc., et al, 105 F.2d 622; State ex rel Chambers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N.W. 185.)

Even though the compensation law of the State of Idaho be not applicable, the Idaho law empowers the Industrial Accident Board to enforce appellant's rights under Montana statute. (I. C. A., Sec. 43-1415; Fay v. Industrial Commission (Utah) 114 P.2d 508; Ocean Accident and Guaranty Corp. v. Industrial Commsision, 32 Ariz. 275, 257 P. 644; Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Warren, (Tenn.) 112 S.W.2d 837; Davis v. Swift & Co. (Tenn.) 133 S.W.2d 483.)

In the absence of pleading and proof the statute law of a sister state will be presumed to be the same as the law of the State of Idaho. (Maloney v. Winston Bros. Co ., 18 Ida. 740, 757 (on rehearing), 111 P. 1080, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.), 634; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Ida. 336, 125 P. 796; Mechanics and Metals Nat. Bank v. Pingree, 40 Ida. 118, 232 P. 5; Cummings v. Lowe, 52 Ida. 1, 10 P.2d 1059; Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Ida. 10, 59 P.2d 1087, certiorari denied Pelkes v. Mason, 299 U.S. 615; Owen v. Taylor, 62 Ida. 408, 114 P.2d 258.)

Spencer Nelson for respondents.

The Idaho Industrial Accident Board does not have jurisdiction over injuries when the employee is residing in Montana, is hired in Montana, employed solely in Montana, and injured in Montana. (Workmen's Compensation Text, Schneider, 462; Calkins v. Service Springs Co., 7 N.E.2d 54 (1037); Schneider Supra 494; Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Text, 523-524; Schneider Supra, 535; Shurtliff v. Oregon Short Line Railway Co., (Utah) 241 P. 1058; Pac. Employers Insurance Co., Supra, 504; I. C. A. Sec. 43-1404; Knight v. Younkin, 105 P.2d 456; Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 115 Minn. 1, 183 N.W. 977.)

Claimant did not come under the Idaho Compensation Act by reason of the fact that he was engaged in casual employment. (Lamont, 48 Wyo. 56, 41 P.2d 497 (1935); Schneider, Vol. 3, 108; Bigley v. Smith, 129 P.2d 658.)

Givens, J. Holden, C. J., and Ailshie, J., concur. Budge, J., did not participate in the decision of this case because of illness in his family. Dunlap, J., deemed himself disqualified and did not sit or participate in this case.

OPINION

Givens, J.

Appellant is the Lee Johnson referred to in Mulanix v. Falen, 64 Ida. 293, 130 P.2d 866, which see for the primary facts. Appellant was severely injured in the accident there recounted and hospitalized and seeks compensation and reimbursement therefor herein as respondent Falen's employee. The board held it did not have jurisdiction because Johnson worked and was residing, hired, and injured in Montana.

Respondents also urged that the employment, if any, was casual. The board did not pass upon the latter issue and relied upon Mulanix v. Falen, supra, for its conclusion that appellant was an employee. In that case the court did not hold that Johnson was an employee, merely by way of recital in detailing the circumstances of the accident stating that both respondent and his conceded employee, Mulanix, the claimant in that case, testified that Mulanix had authority to employ and pay Johnson. That issue was not essential therein and hence was not thereby concluded.

Appellant alleged that he was entitled to recover under the laws of Montana, citing certain provisions thereof. This was denied by respondents. At the hearing respondents' objection to appellant's offer of these Montana statutes was sustained. Thereafter appellant expressly withdrew such offer, and he now relies solely upon the presumption that in the absence of contrary pleading and proof the statute of a foreign state will be presumed to be the same as that of the forum. (Maloney v. Winston Bros. Co., 18 Ida. 740, 763, 111 P. 1080; Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank v. Pingree, 40 Ida. 118, 129, 232 P. 5; Cummings v. Lowe, 52 Ida. 1, 5, 10 P.2d 1059; Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Ida. 10, 34, 59 P.2d 1087; Owen v. Taylor, 62 Ida. 408, 419, 114 P.2d 258; Nicholas v. Idaho Power Co., 63 Ida. 675, 680, 125 P.2d 321.)

No contention is made, aside from the jurisdictional question involved herein, and the defenses of casual employment, and, though not particularly urged, whether appellant was in fact an employee, that under our statute the appellant would not be entitled to recover. The presumption thus carries us to our statutes. (McMullen v. Warren Motor Co., 174 Wash. 454, 25 P.2d 99, 101; 31 C. J. S., Evidence, p. 768, sec. 133.)

While not unmindful of sec. 43-1003, I. C. A., the second sentence in sec. 43-1415 ^[1] is controlling and obviously was not designed to restrict the board's jurisdiction.

While the Industrial Accident Board is a tribunal of limited scope, it has general and exclusive original jurisdiction in the state field of industrial accidents. Secs. 43-902 and 43-1003, I. C. A.; 71 C. J., Workmen's Compensation Acts, p. 920, secs. 662, 663. The Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed. (Hustead v. H. E. Brown Timber Co., 52 Ida. 590, 17 P.2d 927; Page v. State Insurance Fund, 53 Ida. 177, 22 P.2d 681; Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Ida. 438, 74 P.2d 171; Brink v. H. Earl Clack Co., 60 Ida. 730, 96 P.2d 500; Olson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 62 Ida. 423, 112 P.2d 1005; Stover v. Washington County, 63 Ida. 145, 118 P.2d 63; Long v. Brown, 64 Ida. 39, 128 P.2d 754.) Sec. 43-1415 does not limit the board's jurisdiction to accidents occurring within the state. If the particular employment, though outside the state, be so connected with the employer's business within the state as to be a concomitant and integral part thereof, the statute may reasonably be construed under a liberal interpretation thereof to encompass within the board's jurisdiction accidents happening in the course of such employment. (State v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N.W. 185, 3 A. L. R. 1347.) Herein, the employment at the place of the accident, while outside of the state, was clearly inseparably incidental to the way the employer conducted his business of buying, shipping, and selling fruit, the situs of which was in Idaho.

If Johnson was an employee and the employment was not casual the extraterritorial employment herein was merely a phase of the employer's commercial activities, and, being part of a continuous trip (undesignedly interrupted by the accident,) which, though interstate, was solely in component furtherance of the business here in Idaho. Appellant's services did not have a fixed and stationary status in connection with the employer's business outside of the state of Idaho, as in Watts v. Long, 116 Neb. 656, 218 N.W. 410. Therefore, under the section of the statute above noted the board had jurisdiction. (Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines, 105 F.2d 622; State v. District Court, supra; Note, 3 A. L. R. 1351; Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N.W. 977; Val Blatz Brewing Co. v....