Stowe v. Head
| Decision Date | 30 March 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-86-0026-CV,12-86-0026-CV |
| Citation | 728 S.W.2d 120 |
| Parties | Earl STOWE, et al., Appellants, v. Ione HEAD, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Gus E. Meriwether, J.B. Sallas, Sallas, Meriwether & Pemberton, Crockett, for appellants.
Claude C. Roberts, Butler & Binion, Houston, James W. Turner, Turner & Durrance, Crockett, for appellees.
This is a suit in which the plaintiffs sought construction and/or reformation of a deed to lands in Houston County. The trial court disregarded certain jury findings and rendered a take-nothing judgment against Earl Stowe, Douglas Harrison, and Eugene Harrison, plaintiffs/appellants, in favor of Ione Head, Wm. D. Denny, Jr., Shelley Dominy, and Geneva Carroll, defendants/appellees. We affirm in part, and reverse and render in part.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts. On November 30, 1967, appellees and others, as the sole joint owners of 1166.48 acres of land on the John Moore League in Houston County, executed a partition deed effecting a division of the "surface" estate of said lands. Under the terms of the partition deed, appellees' predecessor in title 1 was awarded as her share and portion of such lands, a certain Mrs. LeGory died testate on June 30, 1971. Her will was admitted to probate and recorded on July 19, 1971. By the terms of her will, Mrs. LeGory appointed Wm. Denny and J.L. Burton (formerly the guardian of her estate) joint independent executors. However, Burton alone qualified to act in such capacity. On January 21, 1972, Burton, acting in his capacity as independent executor, executed a warranty deed as grantor in favor of appellants as grantees, purporting to convey the 290.85 acre tract. The deed recited that "the timber standing and growing upon the above described land has been conveyed to Stowe Lumber Company, Inc." but contained no reservation or exception of the minerals underlying the tract described in the conveyance. The 290.85 acres was described by metes and bounds in the deed, and immediately following the description, the deed recites, "and being the tract set apart to J.L. Burton, Guardian, in a partition between Robert L. King, Sr., et al., dated November 30, 1967, now appearing of record in Book 433, page 576 of the Deed Records of Houston County, Texas." As already indicated, the deed contained a covenant of general warranty.
290.85 acre tract, as well as an undivided one-half interest in an adjacent 3.22 acre tract given to provide LeGory with access to the 290.85 acre tract from a public road. The provisions of the partition deed recited that "[a]ll oil, gas and other minerals" underlying the 1166.48 acres were excepted from the partition. Additionally, all merchantable pine timber standing and growing on said acreage was excepted for a two-year period.
The court submitted five special issues to the jury relating to an alleged 2 mutual mistake of the parties. Special Issue 1 inquired whether the parties had an agreement before the deed was signed that Burton was "to sell and convey to Plaintiffs the undivided one-half interest in the surface estate of the 3.22 acres." The jury answered this issue, "Yes," but answered Special Issue 2, inquiring whether the failure to include this interest in the deed was the result of a mutual mistake, "No." Special Issues 3 and 4 inquired whether the parties had an agreement whereby the executor was to sell and convey the undivided one-fourth interest in the "oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under the 1166.48 acres," and whether the failure to include such mineral interest in the deed was the result of a mutual mistake. The jury answered both of these issues "Yes." Special Issue 5 inquires whether one or more of the plaintiffs "knew of, or should have discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the mistake more than four years prior to [the filing of the suit]." 3 The jury answered, "No."
The trial judge held, and the judgment expressly recites, that both the partition deed and appellants' deed were clear and unambiguous; that appellants' deed (unreformed) conveyed no interest in the oil, gas, and minerals underlying the 290.85 acres or the remainder of the 1166.48 acres; that appellants' deed conveyed no interest in the 3.22 acre tract; and that appellants were as a matter of law, "charged with notice and knowledge of the mistake alleged" on a date more than four years prior to the filing of this suit. The trial court, in express disregard of the jury's answers to Special Issues 1, 3, 4, and 5, held that appellants' reformation action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations, and also expressly denied appellants' petition for a declaratory judgment that the deed conveyed, in addition to the surface interest in the 290.85 acres, an undivided one-half interest in the 3.22 acres or an undivided one-fourth interest of the oil, gas, and other minerals underlying the 1166.48 acres. The judgment contains a declaration "that notwithstanding the verdict of the jury in answer to Special Issues Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5 ... that [appellants] take nothing by their suit."
Appellants assert five points of error. By their first point, they contend the trial court erred in sustaining appellees' motion for judgment, and in disregarding the jury's negative answer to Special Issue 5, because "there is evidence to support the jury's finding in answer thereto." In their second point of error, appellants argue that the court "erred in holding that the [appellants] were charged as a matter of law with notice and knowledge of the mistake alleged by [them] " at a time more than four years before the date 4 this suit was filed by appellants, contending that a fact issue existed as to the date when appellees first learned of the mutual mistake or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the same. Appellants argue that the jury's negative finding to Special Issue 5 resolved that fact issue in their favor. Appellants claim by their third point of error that the trial court erred in denying their motion to disregard the jury's negative answer to Special Issue 2 because the evidence conclusively establishes that the one-half interest in the 3.22 acre tract (surface only) constitutes an easement appurtenant to the 290.85 acres. Appellants allege by their fourth point of error that the trial court erroneously construed Burton's deed to them as a conveyance of "only the surface title to the 290.85 acre tract." Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the deed from Burton, when read along with the partition deed, conveyed only the "surface" of the 290.85 acres. From appellants' argument under the point, we understand that appellants claim the deed from Burton conveyed in addition to the surface, at least one-fourth of the oil, gas, and minerals underlying the 290.85 acre tract because no express reservation or exception of minerals is set forth in the deed.
Appellees, in response to appellants' arguments, contend: (1) that Burton's deed to appellants was unambiguous, and since it referred to the partition deed which awarded a surface interest only to LeGory, Burton's deed conveyed only the surface interest in the 290.85 acres, notwithstanding the fact that the deed contained no reservation or exception of oil, gas, and other minerals; (2) that appellants were charged by law with knowledge (notice) that Burton's deed conveyed no mineral interest in the three tracts awarded to the other cotenants in the partition; and that said notice was imparted to appellants on a date more than four years before the filing of this suit, hence the reformation remedy is barred by the four-year statute of limitations; and (3) that since appellants did not carry their burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that they had notice that Burton's deed conveyed no minerals, the four-year statute of limitations bars that remedy. Appellees also argue that there is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue 5.
We now address appellants' points one and two. Under these points appellants argue that the question of whether they had actual notice of the "mistake alleged," or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the "mistake" at a date more than four years before the suit was filed on May 27, 1981, is a fact question which was resolved in their favor by the jury's answer to Special Issue 5, which finding is supported by the evidence. Therefore, appellants contend the court erred in disregarding the jury's answer to the issue and rendering a judgment denying the reformation of the deed. Appellants during the course of their argument under the points cite, inter alia, Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39 (Tex.1971); McClung v. Lawrence, 430 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1968); Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959); Gilmore v. O'Neil, 107 Tex. 18, 173 S.W. 203 (1915). An analysis of these authorities 5 was made by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.1980). The mistake at issue in Brown arose out of an ambiguous reservation of a royalty interest contained in the deed from Brown to Havard's immediate predecessor in title. The Brown court fairly summed up the rule enunciated by the above-cited authorities to be, that while the four-year statute of limitations (former Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5529) 6 is applicable to suits seeking reformation of instruments, the statute does not begin to run until the mistake is, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered. Such is unquestionably the rule in Texas. However, none of the cases noted above, or the authorities cited by the Supreme Court in Sullivan, 471 S.W.2d at 45-47 in support of its opinion, involved a mistake which was clearly disclosed by an instrument in the grantees' chain of title. The recorded partition deed in this case was an essential...
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