Stowell v. Arizona Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 7871
| Decision Date | 11 April 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 7871,7871 |
| Parties | Franklin J. STOWELL, Superintendent of Banks of the State of Arizona, Appellant, v. ARIZONA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, an Arizona Corporation, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
David J. Perry and Ralph G. Smith, Jr., Phoenix, for appellant.
Hill, Savoy & Mitchell, by John E. Savoy, Phoenix, for appellees.
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal. Appellant is the Superintendent of Banks of the State of Arizona. He is serving as statutory receiver of appellee Arizona Savings and Loan Association pursuant to A.R.S. § 6-422 et seq. 1
On November 13, 1962, the trial court entered an order awarding one Jonn E. Savoy attorney's ffes of $7,000.00 for services to the Arizona Savings and Loan Association. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order, but did not get authority from the trial court to take the appeal. He states that because a motion of appeal was filed with the clerk of the superior court there is an inference that the lower court did not object as the court could have directed appellant to discontinue the appeal.
The general rule is that a receiver may not ordinarily appeal without first obtaining authority of the court appointing him, Hatten v. Vose, 10 Cir., 156 F.2d 464. The theory behind this is that the receiver is a ministerial officer of the court appointing him and may act only subject to its order, Sawyer v. Ellis, 37 Ariz. 443, 295 P. 322. Appellant concedes that generally it is necessary to have permission of the court in order for a receiver to appeal from a decision of the court but contends that because in this case the receivership exists pursuant to statute the receiver's status differs from that of a common law or equity receiver. He has furnished this court with an affidavit in which it is alleged that the trial judge stated that as the question of attorney's fees in such actions had not been decided by this court it would be advisable for one of the parties to appeal the matter since the question might come up in the future. Affiant stated that the trial judge told him orally that he had no objection to an appeal being filed by the receiver.
A.R.S. § 6-424 contemplates that a petition for receivership filed in the name of the superintendent of banks pursuant to A.R.S. § 6-423 will be granted only by order of the superior court. The statute merely states who the receiver shall be. It does not restrict the power of the court over the receiver,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Culver
...571, 192 A.2d 95 (1963). 15 See also Matter of Harris, 221 U.S. 724, 31 S.Ct. 557, 55 L.Ed. 732 (1911). 16 Stowell v. Arizona Savings & Loan Assn., 93 Ariz. 310, 380 P.2d 606 (1963). 17 The details are set out in the findings of fact filed with the ...
-
Hill v. M. S. Alper & Son, Inc.
...upon its express permission and direction. McKenzie v. Standard Bleachery Co., 109 N.J.Eq. 429, 157 A. 845; Stowell v. Arizona Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Ariz. 310, 380 P.2d 606; Hatten v. Vose, 10 Cir., 156 F.2d 464; Hicks v. First Nat. Bank, 224 Ala. 494, 140 So. 882. Whether the appointing co......
-
United States v. Kanan
...the motion with respect to Mr. Kanan's personal papers. On April 11, 1963, in the course of its opinion in Stowell v. Arizona Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Ariz. 310, 380 P.2d 606, the Arizona Supreme Court asserted that the function of the superintendent of banks as a receiver "is wholly ministeri......
-
Holland v. Sterling Enterprises, Inc.
...Vose, 156 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir.1946); see also Coffey v. Gay, 191 Ala. 137, 67 So. 681, 682 (1914); Stowell v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass'n, 93 Ariz. 310, 380 P.2d 606, 607 (1963); McKenzie v. Standard Bleachery Co., 109 N.J. 429, 157 A. 845, 847 (1931); Hill v. M.S. Alper & Son, Inc., 1......