Strader v. Monroe County

• Decision Date: 19 May 1902
• Docket Number: 336
• Citation: 202 Pa. 626,51 A. 1100
• Parties: Strader v. Monroe, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

51 A. 1100

202 Pa. 626

Strader v. Monroe, Appellant

No. 336

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 19, 1902

Argued March 11, 1902

Appeal, No. 336, Jan. T., 1901, by defendant from judgment of C.P. Monroe Co., Dec. Term, 1899, No. 9, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Henrietta Strader v. Monroe County. Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before CRAIG, P.J.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The court charged in part as follows:

[We say to you, gentlemen of the jury, if the plaintiff knew of the existence of the obstruction, the plank on the bridge, or saw it before she reached it, or was careless in not observing it, and then carelessly or imprudently ran into it or on it and the accident resulted from such carelessness and imprudence, then she cannot recover. She must show you that she was reasonably careful and prudent as she rode across that bridge at the point of the accident. She must satisfy you of that first. If she has, then you may proceed to the second question.]

[The county commissioners were bound to foresee and reasonably to provide against a common danger to ordinary travel on the bridge. It may be taken as a well known fact that bicycles when they strike obstructions in their path, even in the control of expert riders, are apt to deviate from their course and take a sudden and erratic direction, unexpected by the riders; just as no one can foretell the conduct of a frightened horse. The absence of guard rails or barriers at the point of the accident would have been a protection from the danger of going over the bridge, no matter what the movements of a bicycle may be. Therefore the peculiar liability or habit, if you choose, of a bicycle being known the commissioners ought to have put up the guard rails or barriers, and their neglect of duty in this particular was the proximate cause of the injury. Or to express the idea in another form: The aptness of bicycles to deviate from their course and to take sudden and unexpected directions when meeting obstructions in their path was ordinary knowledge and to be expected. If it were otherwise it would be extraordinary, because contrary to common observation and experience. The county commissioners should have guarded against that which was to be expected, and it will not excuse the negligence of the commissioners, or make that negligence the remote cause to assert that they could not foresee the peculiar aptness or freak of a bicycle to take sudden and unexpected courses when meeting obstacles in its path. The injury in the case must be the natural and probable consequence of the neglect to have had up guards or barriers and the consequence is such as, under the surrounding circumstances of this case, might and ought to have been foreseen by the county commissioners.]

Plaintiff presented these points:

1. It is the law of Pennsylvania that persons using bicycles on the public highways and bridges of the state are entitled to the same rights and subject to the same restrictions in the use thereof as are prescribed by law in the case of persons using carriages drawn by horses. Answer: We affirm that proposition. [4]

2. The plaintiff in the use of her bicycle on the bridge in question was not bound to use the carriage drive, but had the right to go over any part of the bridge open for travel. Answer: We affirm that proposition. [5]

7. Should the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was not expert, or was inexperienced in the use of the wheel, yet, she had a legal right to use the bridge in question, with her wheel and it was the duty of the county commissioners to have anticipated such use and provided for the same; and their failure to do so was negligence and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, provided she was not guilty of contributory negligence. Answer: Affirmed, if the jury believe that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in the slightest degree. [6]

8. If the jury believe that the driveway of the bridge was planked with plank running crosswise, and was so rough and uneven, at and for a long time before August 8, 1899, as to be exceedingly uncomfortable (if not dangerous), for wheelmen; and if the jury further believe that the floor of the bridge between the rails of the car track was planked with plank running lengthwise, and thus an invitation held out to the public using bicycles to use the car track; and if the great majority of wheelman did use the track, then the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in using the track at the time she received the injury complained of. Answer: We affirm that proposition. [7]

Defendant's point was as follows:

Under all the evidence of the case the plaintiff cannot recover and the verdict must be in favor of the defendant. Answer: We negative that proposition, because if we affirmed it, then we would be obliged to take this from you entirely. There was a motion made here by the defendant at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony asking us to take this case from you; in other words that a compulsory nonsuit should be entered by the court. If we are in error about that, gentlemen of the jury, there is a higher court to correct us. Therefore we negative this point. As we understand the law we could not affirm it. If we did we would take this case entirely from your consideration. [8]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $15,000. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were (2-8) above instructions, quoting them.

What we have said, practically passes on appellant's eight assignments of error; they are all overruled and the judgment is affirmed.

Charles B. Staples, of Staples & Erdman, with him D. S. Lee and Eilenberger & Huffman, for appellant. -- It is incumbent upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie cause of action resulting from defendant's negligence, clear from contributory negligence, on her part: Lynch v. Erie City, 151 Pa. 380; Kohler v. Penna. R.R. Co., 135 Pa. 346.

As the case was presented to the jury plaintiff failed to show why she did not see this plank in a direct line ahead of her, when according to the testimony of herself and her son she could have seen it had she looked and paid attention to where she was going and could easily and safely have avoided it: Beer v. Clarion Twp., 17 Pa.Super. 537; Haven v. Pittsburg & Allegheny Bridge Co., 151 Pa. 620; Robb v. Connellsville Borough, 137 Pa. 42; Shallcross v. Philadelphia, 187 Pa. 143; Sullivan v. Consolidated Traction Co., 198 Pa. 187; Benton v. Philadelphia, 198 Pa. 396; Sutphen v. North Hempstead, 30 N.Y.S. 128; McCauley v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 13 Pa.Super. 354; Lumis v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 181 Pa. 276; Robertson v. Penna. R.R. Co., 180 Pa. 43.

Rogers L. Burnett, for appellee. -- The case was for the jury: Davis v. Snyder Twp., 196 Pa. 275; Campbell v. City of York, 172 Pa. 222; Merriman v. Phillipsburg Borough, 158 Pa. 81; Kraut v. Frankford, etc., Pass. Ry. Co., 160 Pa. 334; Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 50; Scott Twp. v. Montgomery, 95 Pa. 444; Closser v. Washington Twp., 11 Pa.Super. 125; Mechesney v. Unity Twp., 164 Pa. 359; Trexler v. Greenwich Twp., 168 Pa. 217.

Before DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE DEAN:

The plaintiff and her son, the latter about thirteen years of age, residents of the borough of Stroudsburg, on August 8 1899, while riding bicycles, had occasion to cross a county bridge over Brodhead creek, the boundary of the borough on the east. The bridge was of three spans, two of 101 feet each and one of 116 feet. The bridge was twenty-eight feet wide, including a six feet wide footway on the north side, then a driveway thirteen feet wide, then six feet for a street railway, and then an unoccupied strip about three feet wide to the edge; the planks on the driveway were laid crosswise; those between the rails of the street railway longitudinally, thus making the latter much the smoother way. The mother and son reached the bridge about half past seven in the evening and rode on the driveway about two thirds of the way across; then concluded to return on the planks between the rails because of the smoother condition of the floor; about twelve feet from the west end of the bridge the mother's bicycle struck a piece of loose plank, about twenty by five inches, which had been used to patch a break or rut in the...