Stradford v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., No. C-2-86-428.

• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: Louis Abraham Jacobs, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff
• Citation: 755 F. Supp. 760
• Parties: Jacqueline STRADFORD, Plaintiff, v. ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., Defendant.
• Docket Number: No. C-2-86-428.
• Decision Date: 17 January 1991

755 F. Supp. 760

Jacqueline STRADFORD, Plaintiff,
v.
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP., Defendant.

No. C-2-86-428.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, E.D.

January 17, 1991.

Louis Abraham Jacobs, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff.

John Wolcott Zeiger, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HOLSCHUH, Chief Judge.

This matter is presently before the Court on defendant Rockwell International Corporation's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant argues that the allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint do not state a cause of action under section 1981 in light of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Jacqueline Stradford, an African-American female, began employment with defendant Rockwell on or about September 21, 1981 as a Transfer Section Representative at Salary Grade 3. Two white males, Bob Higgins and Dan Ault, were hired at about the same time as plaintiff, and although they initially received the same salary as plaintiff, in September 1982 plaintiff was receiving a lower rate of pay than these two individuals. In February 1983 plaintiff discussed her salary with

755 F. Supp. 761

William G. Louwers, one of plaintiff's supervisors, and during that month plaintiff received a merit increase of $142.00 per month and a change to Salary Grade 5. Higgins and Ault allegedly received substantially higher merit increases. Plaintiff complained about the limitation of her merit increase through what she describes as "an internal appeal process," and a positive adjustment in her increase was made and applied retroactively

In February 1984 plaintiff received a merit increase of approximately five percent. Plaintiff complained about this increase through the "internal appeal process," and plaintiff's merit increase was ultimately raised to seven percent effective January 1984. Plaintiff received a four percent merit increase in April 1985. Her overall job performance was rated at that time as "satisfactory," although she had previously received evaluations of "satisfactory plus" and "excellent." Plaintiff alleges that prior to her April 1985 evaluation she had never received any notice that her job performance was slipping. Plaintiff complained about the April 1985 increase but she did not receive additional compensation.

Plaintiff further alleges that in early 1983 Louwers told supervisor Don Elder that three employees, including plaintiff, would have to be fired, in part because they were not "team players." However, Elder did not discharge plaintiff. Plaintiff complained to Louwers about her employment conditions, including lack of clerical support, overload of work, demeaning public comments about her job performance, and preferential treatment given to white male employees. In December 1984 plaintiff declined the opportunity to be considered for the position of Employment Recruiter. Plaintiff alleges that she was approached about that position only because "Louwers wanted her out of his department." Also, during the three-year period prior to the commencement of this action there were at least three openings in defendant's Labor Relations Department for Labor Relations Representatives. That position in general offers promotional opportunities beyond Salary Grade 5. Plaintiff did not apply for any of the Labor Representative position openings, allegedly because it was indicated to her that several years of experience in labor relations was required. Plaintiff claims that she was qualified to be a Labor Representative. White males were hired to fill the three Labor Representative openings.

In September 1985 plaintiff sought a transfer to the position of Personnel Associate in the Systems and Records Department, a clerical position classified as salaried non-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiff claims that the Personnel Associate position had promotional opportunities, although defendant states that the position was lower paying and had lesser responsibilities than plaintiff's position of Transfer Section Representative. Plaintiff was not granted the transfer, and she was told that the department did not know whether it would fill the position. The employee holding the position of Personnel Associate was asked to remain in that position.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 8, 1985. Thereafter, Louwers allegedly retaliated against plaintiff in various ways, and plaintiff filed an amendment to her EEOC charge on December 9, 1985, alleging retaliation. Plaintiff allegedly did not receive a February 1986 merit increase, and she further alleges that Al Sikora, a white male, did timely receive his annual merit increase. Finally, plaintiff claims to have suffered and allegedly continues to suffer emotional distress, mental anguish, and physical harm, including weight gain, due to the discrimination, retaliation, and unfair treatment committed by Louwers.¹

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 17, 1986. The original complaint contained four causes of action: race and sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII; breach of contract; and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On July 25,

755 F. Supp. 762

1988 the Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract and emotional distress claims. A motion to amend the complaint was filed on December 6, 1989, in which plaintiff sought to make three amendments: (1) deletion of the state law claims on which the Court had granted defendant's motion for summary judgment; (2) addition of a cause of action under Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.99, as amended effective September 28, 1987;² and (3) revision of her 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim in light of Patterson. The motion to amend was granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, plaintiff was permitted to delete the previously dismissed state law claims and to revise the allegations pertinent to the section 1981 claim in light of Patterson. However, plaintiff's motion to add a claim under Ohio Rev.Code § 4112.99 was denied, as the Court concluded that to give retroactive effect to that statute would be contrary to Ohio statutory and constitutional law as interpreted in Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988)

Plaintiff's amended complaint was filed on May 8, 1990, and it contains two causes of action: a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, in the section 1981 claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant Rockwell violated that statute "by impairing her promotional opportunities and denying her a transfer to a position with potential promotional opportunities and retaliating against plaintiff due to her race and opposition to racist practices and participation in administrative processes to rectify such discrimination." Defendant Rockwell moves for summary judgment on the section 1981 claim, arguing that the conduct alleged in the complaint does not state a claim cognizable under section 1981 after Patterson. Plaintiff argues in response that in denying her positions which offered promotional opportunities defendant denied her the equal right to make contracts. Plaintiff further alleges that the retaliatory conduct of her supervisor at Rockwell impaired her ability to enforce her contract rights. Accordingly, plaintiff's position is that the complaint does state a cause of action under section 1981 even after Patterson.³

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides:

Summary judgment ... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

"This standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original); Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.1984).

Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is genuine; "that is, if the evidence is such that a

755 F. Supp. 763

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The purpose of the procedure is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried. Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 111 (6th Cir.1978). Therefore, summary judgment will be granted "only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, ... and where no genuine issue remains for trial, ... for the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 728, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)); accord County of Oakland v. City of Berkley, 742 F.2d 289, 297 (6th Cir.1984)

In making this inquiry, the standard to be applied by the Court mirrors the standard for a directed verdict. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

"The primary difference between the two motions is procedural; summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at trial

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