Strain v. Southerton

• Decision Date: 18 June 1947
• Docket Number: 30363.,30362
• Citation: 148 Ohio St. 153,74 N.E.2d 69
• Parties: STRAIN v. SOUTHERTON et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

74 N.E.2d 69

148 Ohio St. 153

STRAIN v. SOUTHERTON et al.

Nos. 30362, 30363.

Supreme Court of Ohio

June 18, 1947

Syllabus by the Court

1. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution of Ohio inhibits the General Assembly from delegating its power to make a law but that body may properly enact a law conferring authority or discretion on a designated governmental agency to carry provisions of such law into execution and granting such agency the power to inquire into and determine facts under rules of its own creation which conform to the standards and policy contained in the lwa.

2. The Minimum Wage Act of Ohio, comprising Sections 154-45d to 154-45t, General Code, is a welfare measure passed by the General Assembly pursuant to the authority conferred by Section 34 of Article II of the Constitution. It sets forth the policy motivating its enactment, outlines standards to be observed in the determination of a 'fair wage,' prescribes the procedure to be followed by the governmental agency designated to carry the law into execution and does not represent a delegation of legislative power.

3. Such act is valid legislation and does not offend or transgress the federal or state Constitutions.

Appeal from Court of Appeals.

These two cases, originating in the Court of Common Pleas of Athens county, involve identical questions and will be discussed together.

George A. Strain, Director of the Department of Industrial Relations, trustee, is plaintiff in both actions and Walter S. Southerton and Carl R. Wilson, doing business as Athens Steam Laundry, are defendants.

Section 154-45s, General Code, a portion of the Ohio Minimum Wage Act, provides in part that the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations, at the request of any woman or minor worker who has been paid less than the minimum wage to which she or he was entitled under a mandatory minimum fair wage order, may take an assignment of such wage claim in trust for the assigning employee and may bring any legal action necessary to collect such claim.

Proceeding under the authorization of that section, the plaintiff took an assignment of wage claims from two alleged women employees of the Athens Steam Laundry and brought separate actions on the claims against the proprietors of the laundry to recover the difference between the wages actually paid such employees over specified periods of time and the amounts asserted to be due them for such periods under a mandatory minimum wage order, designated as 'Mandatory Order Number 1,' issued by the Minimum Wage Division of the Department of Industrial Relations.

In each case the defendants filed an answer consisting of two defenses. The second defenses of the answers in both cases are the same and read as follows:

'For second defense to plaintiff's petition, these answering defendants say that Sections 154-45d 154-45t known as the Minimum Wage Law and especially Sections 154-45h, 154-45j, 154-45m, 154-45p and 154-45s, contravene the Constitution of Ohio and especially Article II, Section 26, thereof, for the reason that no statute in said act fixes a minimum wage for minors or females and to authorize a board to fix minimum wages as is provided by said act is an unwarranted and illegal delegation of power not authorized by the Constitution of Ohio.'

A demurrer was filed to such second defense of the answer in each action on the ground that 'the same is not sufficient in law to constitute a defense.'

Upon hearing, the trial court overruled the demurrers. The plaintiff declined to plead further and final judgments were entered for the defendants in both cases.

Appeals on questions of law to the Court of Appeals resulted in the reversal of the judgments below, with a remand of the causes for further proceedings. The opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals is reported in 75 Ohio App. 435, 62 N.E.2d 633.

Because of the constitutional questions presented, the two cases are now in this court on appeals as of right.

R W. Finsterwald and Woolley & Rowland, all of Athens, for appellants.

Hugh S. Jenkins, Atty. Gen., and Joseph S. Gill, of Columbus, for appellee.

ZIMMERMAN Judge.

These appeals challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio Minimum Wage Act (Sections 154-45d to 154-45t, General Code) fixing minimum fair wage standards for women and minors.

The contentions of the defendants, appellants herein, are stated in their brief as follows: '1. The General Assembly of the state of Ohio has not the power or authority under the Constitution to enact minimum wage legislation in the form it has attempted in the act under question.

'2. The Minimum Wage Law provides for an unauthorized delegation of legislative power.'

Authority for the enactment of legislation on the subjects of hours of labor and minimum wages is found in Section 34, Article II of our Constitution, adopted by vote of the electors of the state of Ohio on September 3, 1912, which reads: 'Laws may be passed fixing and regulating the hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employees; and no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit this power.'

This brings us to a resume of the statutes, enacted by the General Assembly pursuant to the quoted constitutional grant of power, which are pertinent to the instant cases.

Section 154-45d, General Code, is devoted to definitions. Embraced in the section are the following statements:

'7. 'An oppressive and unreasonable wage' shall mean a wage which is both less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health.

'8. 'A fair wage' shall mean a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered. In establishing a minimum fair wage for any service or class of service under this article, the director, superintendent or the wage board without being bound by any technical rules of evidence or procedure (1) may take into account all relevant circumstances affecting the value of the service or class of service rendered, and (2) may be guided by like considerations as would guide a court in a suit for the reasonable value of services rendered where services are rendered at the request of an employer without contract as to the amount of the wage to be paid, and (3) may consider the wages paid in the state for work of like or comparable character by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum fair wage standards.'

We are of the opinion that the phrases, 'may take into account,' 'may be guided' and 'may consider,' as used in paragraph eight of the section should be interpreted as meaning, ' shall take into account,' etc., in order to carry out the purpose of the General Assembly as it appears from a general view of the act under consideration. State ex rel. Myers v. Board of Education, 95 Ohio St. 367, 116 N.E. 516; Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., v. Dept. of Labor, 289 N.Y. 262, 45 N.E.2d 434, 143 A.L.R. 1078.

Section 154-45e, General Code, declares the policy of the act as follows: 'It is hereby declared to be against public policy for any employer to employ any woman or minor in an occupation in this state at an oppressive and unreasonable wage as defined in section 1 of this act, and any contract, agreement or understanding for or in relation to such employment shall be null and void.'

Section 154-45f, General Code, confers authority on designated officials to investigate and ascertain the wages of women and minors employed in any occupation in the state.

Section 154-45g, General Code, provides that the director shall appoint a wage board to report upon the establishment of minimum fair wage rates for women and minors in a given occupation if he is of the opinion that any substantial number of such women and minors are receiving oppressive and unreasonable wages.

Section 154-45h, General Code, provides for wage boards composed of representatives of employers, employees and the public, with a detailed outline of their rights and duties.

By Section 154-45i and 154-45j, provision is made for the acceptance or rejection by the director of the wage boards' findings, and for the publication of such findings as a directory order defining minimum fair wages in the particular occupation, if such findings are accepted. Section 154-45j also empowers the director in comprehensive terms to embody in his directory order such administrative regulations as he deems appropriate to safeguard the minimum fair wage standards established.

Section 154-45m, General Code, authorizes the director to make his directory orders mandatory after they have been in effect for three months.

Section 154-45n provides that the director may change his orders through the same procedure by which he originally made them, and Section 154-45o permits changes in administrative regulations.

By Section 154-45p it is provided that decisions of the director on questions of fact shall be final, and that rulings and holdings on questions of law involved in his decisions or orders may be reviewed by the Court of Common Pleas.

In summation, the powers which the director possesses under the Minimum Wage Act are:

1. To appoint wage boards to recommend, after investigation, minimum wages for women and minor workers, based on standards prescribed by the General Assembly.

2. To accept or reject the boards' findings.

3. To publish the findings accepted, as a directory order defining minimum fair wages in an occupation and later to make such order mandatory.

4. To publish administrative rulings in amplification of the orders, and to classify wage rates within an occupation.

In view of the foregoing...