Strait v. Belcan Eng'g Grp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11 C 01306.,11 C 01306.
• Citation: 911 F.Supp.2d 709
• Parties: Matthew STRAIT, et al., individually, and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BELCAN ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. d/b/a Belcan Corp., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

911 F.Supp.2d 709

Matthew STRAIT, et al., individually, and on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.BELCAN ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. d/b/a Belcan Corp., Defendant.

No. 11 C 01306.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

Nov. 29, 2012.

Aaron Benjamin Maduff, Walker R. Lawrence, Maduff & Maduff, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Gregory Michael Utter, Rachael Anne Rowe, Thomas Frost Hankinson, Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Cincinnati, OH, Michael Lawrence Sullivan, Goldberg Kohn Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge.

On February 24, 2011, Plaintiff Matthew Strait (“Strait”) filed a Complaint, for himself and on behalf of similarly situated others, against Defendant Belcan EngineeringGroup, Inc. (“Belcan”) pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., and the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act, 820 ILCS 175/1 et seq. (R. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff Scott Brooks (“Brooks”) later opted in to this lawsuit. ( See R. 25–2.) Specifically, Plaintiffs Strait and Brooks (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Named Plaintiffs”) allege that Defendant Belcan deprived them of an overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. Before the Court are two motions: (1) Plaintiffs' motion for collective and class certification (R. 80, Pls.' Cert. Mot.); and (2) Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (R. 63, Sum. Jgmt. Mot.). For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion, denies as moot Defendant's motion with respect to the collective and class claims, and grants the remainder of Defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Belcan is an Ohio corporation and one of the country's largest providers of third-party contracting services of full-service engineering contractors, employing thousands of contractors throughout Illinois and the United States. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Belcan employs dozens or even hundreds of engineers, designers and/or other employees working on outsourced projects. (Undisputed Resp. Facts ¶ 1.) ¹ Belcan classifies certain employees as exempt under the FLSA and therefore pays them only straight-time overtime, rather than time and a half, for all hours worked over 40 in a week. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Full-time exempt employees work for customers at more than 20 Belcan facilities and about 30 customer facilities nationwide. (R. 100–3, Pls.' Sum. Jgmt. Opp. Ex. 1, 2011 Wirth Decl. ¶ 6.) Belcan's full-time exempt employees include most internal IT staff, some human resources personnel, many administrative personnel, top-level General Managers and Operations Managers at Belcan locations, Belcan Vice Presidents, engineers and designers. (R. 99–2, Wirth Aug. Decl. ¶ 4)

Plaintiff Strait is currently an employee of Belcan. (Undisputed Facts ¶ 1.) ² He began working at Belcan in March 2009. ( Id.) Plaintiff Brooks is a former employee of Belcan, who worked for Belcan from March 19, 2009 to March 18, 2011. ( Id. ¶ 2.) As explained below, both Strait and Brooks worked as employees at a Caterpillar facility in Aurora, Illinois. ( Id. ¶ 3.) Belcan classified Strait and Brooks as direct, exempt, full-time employees paid on a salary basis. ( Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.)

The Court discusses additional facts, where relevant, within the context of the analysis below.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. FLSA Collective Actions

Pursuant to the FLSA, “employees are entitled to overtime pay ( i.e., one and one-half times the regular rate) for any hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, unless they come within one of the various exemptions set forth in the Act.” Schaefer–LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 679 F.3d 560, 572 (7th Cir.2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213). The FLSA “gives employees the right to bring their FLSA claims through a ‘collective action’ on behalf of themselves and other ‘similarly situated’ employees.” Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 605 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir.2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)). District courts have broad discretion in managing collective actions under the FLSA. Id. at 449.

The Seventh Circuit has not established criteria for determining whether employees are “similarly situated” for purposes of the FLSA, but “ ‘the majority of courts ... have adopted a two-step process for determining whether an FLSA lawsuit should proceed as a collective action.’ ” Franks v. MKM Oil, Inc., No. 10 CV 00013, 2012 WL 3903782, *9 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 7, 2012) (quoting Jirak v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 566 F.Supp.2d 845 (N.D.Ill.2008)); see also Frye v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc., 495 Fed.Appx. 669, 671–72 (6th Cir.2012) (recognizing that the second stage warrants a “stricter standard” than conditional certification); Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir.2012) (finding that a more stringent standard applies to final certification compared to conditional certification); Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 554–55 (2d Cir.2010) (recognizing that a two-step method is sensible); Camilotes v. Resurrection Health Care Corp., 286 F.R.D. 339, 345 (N.D.Ill.2012); Medina v. Happy's Pizza Franchise, LLC, No. 10 C 3148, 2012 WL 1094353, *2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 2, 2012).

At the first stage, a named plaintiff “can show that the potential claimants are similarly situated by making a modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” Franks, 2012 WL 3903782, at *9 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Medina, 2012 WL 1094353, at *2. At the second stage, however, the court's inquiry becomes more stringent. Franks, 2012 WL 3903782 at *9 (citing Jirak, 566 F.Supp.2d at 848);see also AON Corp. Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., No. 08 C 5802, 2010 WL 1433314, *5 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 8, 2010) (“The second stage analysis requires the court to employ a much stricter standard in making a final determination on the similarly situated question considering a number of factors including the disparate factual and employment settings of the individuals plaintiffs and the defenses available to defendants that are individual to each plaintiff.”). At the second stage, the court considers “ ‘(1) whether the plaintiffs share similar or disparate factual and employment settings; (2) whether the various affirmative defenses available to the defendant would have to be individually applied to each plaintiff; and (3) fairness and procedural concerns.’ ” Franks, 2012 WL 3903782, at *9 (quoting Mielke v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 313 F.Supp.2d 759, 762 (N.D.Ill.2004)). Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they are “similarly situated.” See Medina, 2012 WL 1094353, at *2 (citing Russell v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 721 F.Supp.2d 804, 811 (N.D.Ill.2010)).

Both parties acknowledge that the second stage standards apply to Plaintiffs' certification motion because the parties have completed fact discovery on the issues relevant to this motion. (R. 86, Pls.' Cert. Mem. at 26; R. 99, Def.'s Cert. Opp. at 23); see also Medina, 2012 WL 1094353, at *2 (“After discovery is completed and the opt-in plaintiffs are identified, the more stringent second step occurs.”).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 23(a) contains four prerequisites for class certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 23(a); Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). In addition to satisfying the Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiffs must show that the proposed class satisfies one of the three requirements set forth in Rule 23(b). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997);Oshana v. Coca–Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir.2006). Here, Plaintiffs seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3). For certification under 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs must show that a single injunction would provide relief to each member of the class. See Wal–Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2557. To certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), they must show that “questions of law and fact common to members of the class predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the class” and that the “class action device is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently resolving the dispute in question.” Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSys., 669 F.3d 802, 808, 814 n. 5 (7th Cir.2012); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).

In order to grant class certification under Rule 23, the Court must be “satisfied, after a rigorous analysis” that the rule's requirements are met. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (citation omitted). Because “ ‘[t]he class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action,’ ” the court's rigorous analysis frequently “entail[s] some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim.” Id. at 2551–52 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982)). Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving each disputed requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Messner., 669 F.3d at 811. District courts have broad discretion in determining motions for class certification. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979); Messner, 669 F.3d at 811.

III. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining ...