Stranberg v. Lasz
| Decision Date | 06 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 20712-9-III.,20712-9-III. |
| Citation | 115 Wash.App. 396,63 P.3d 809 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Lois C. STRANBERG and Leonard W. Lasz, Appellants, v. Alys O. LASZ; Theodore K. Odell and Ronald N. Odell, individually and as trustees of the Alys O. Lasz Living Trust, Respondents. |
Joseph Nappi, Jr., Huppin, Ewing, Anderson, Spokane, for Appellants.
Mary E. Schultz, Amy L. Rimov, Robert E. Kovacevich, Spokane, for Respondents.
Walter and Alys Lasz were married in July 1944; the couple had no children as the result of this marriage. After Walter Lasz died in 2000, his niece, Lois Stranberg, and his nephew, Leonard W. Lasz, (the "Stranbergs"), commenced this action when Alys Lasz and her sons (collectively referred to as the "Odells") refused to probate Walter's will and transferred all of the family farm property into the Alys O. Lasz Living Trust. The Odells took the position that there was no property to probate because all of the property passed to Alys Lasz under a 1962 community property agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Odells, concluding that Walter and Alys Lasz did not evince a mutual intent to abandon the community property agreement when they later executed reciprocal wills. The Stranbergs appeal. We conclude that because there is no conflict between the provisions of the community property agreement and the subsequent reciprocal wills, the Laszes did not evince a mutual intent to rescind the community property agreement when they executed the reciprocal wills. For that reason, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Walter and Alys Lasz were married on July 11, 1944. The couple had no children as the result of this marriage, but Alys had two children, Theodore and Ronald Odell, from a previous marriage.
Walter Lasz died on December 28, 2000. After Walter's death, his niece, Lois C. Stranberg, and his nephew, Leonard W. Lasz, commenced this action when Alys and her sons refused to probate the Last Will of Walter Lasz. The dispute in this action centers on the disposition of the Lasz family farm. Rather than probate the will, the Odells set up the Alys O. Lasz Living Trust and transferred all of the farm property to the trust. The Odells contend that there was no property to probate because all of the property passed to Alys Lasz under a community property agreement. The Stranbergs contend that the property should pass to them under Walter Lasz's will.
In October 1962, Walter and Alys Lasz executed an "Agreement as to Status of Community Property After Death of One of the Spouses." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 11. This agreement provides for the disposition of community property following the death of one spouse.
In 1991, 1995, and 1996, Walter and Alys Lasz executed reciprocal wills. Article IV, entitled "Residuary Estate," of the will executed by Walter Lasz in 1996 provides:
CP at 16 (emphasis added).
Under the language of Article IV and Article V of the 1991, 1995, and 1996 reciprocal wills, Lois Stranberg and Leonard Lasz are the beneficiaries of the residuary of each estate as to the farmland, and the primary remaindermen of the farmland under the first-to-die testamentary trust.
The residuary estate provision, Article IV, of the 1991, 1995, and 1996 reciprocal wills includes the description of the farm property to pass to Lois Stranberg and Leonard Lasz. Various changes were made to the 1996 reciprocal wills. Those changes included: (1) the removal of Raymond P. Lasz from the specific bequest section of Article III; and (2) the designation of additional farmland to be distributed to Leonard W. Lasz under Article IV.
After commencing this action, the Stranbergs sought to take the deposition of Robert Lamp, the attorney who prepared the reciprocal wills for Alys and Walter Lasz. The trial court denied the Odells' motion to quash and motion for a protective order to prevent the deposition of Mr. Lamp. At his deposition, Mr. Lamp testified that the Laszes did not tell him about the existence of the community property agreement. Mr. Lamp further explained that had he known of the community property agreement, he would have revoked it and that he would not have drafted the reciprocal wills the way that he had without first revoking the community property agreement.
The Odells moved for summary judgment requesting the court to determine as a matter of law that the residuary estate provisions of the reciprocal wills were inapplicable to the property passed pursuant to the community property agreement. In response to this motion, the Stranbergs requested a continuance for further discovery. In addition, the Stranbergs filed the affidavit of Lois Stranberg and the affidavit of Leonard Lasz. According to these affidavits, Walter and Alys Lasz had declared their intention that the farmland (described in the reciprocal wills) pass to Lois Stranberg and Leonard Lasz.
The court refused to allow additional discovery and granted summary judgment in favor of the Odells. The Stranbergs appeal.
Standard of Review. When reviewing a summary judgment, this court undertakes the same inquiry as the trial court and considers all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wash.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994). Rules of contract construction apply to community property agreements. In re Estate of Wahl, 31 Wash. App. 815, 818, 644 P.2d 1215 (1982),aff'd,99 Wash.2d 828, 664 P.2d 1250 (1983). The question of whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is an issue of law reviewed de novo. State v. Nason, 96 Wash.App. 686, 691, 981 P.2d 866 (1999),cert. denied, 531 U.S. 831, 121 S.Ct. 85, 148 L.Ed.2d 46 (2000). A court may look to parol evidence to explain an ambiguity in a contract. Id. A provision is not ambiguous merely because the parties suggest opposing meanings. Mayer v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc., 80 Wash. App. 416, 421, 909 P.2d 1323 (1995). However, the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law. Id. at 420, 909 P.2d 1323.
Alys and Walter Lasz executed a community property agreement in 1962. Because community property agreements are treated like contracts, the general rules of contract rescission and abandonment apply. Higgins v. Stafford, 123 Wash.2d 160, 165, 866 P.2d 31 (1994) (citing In re Estate of Lyman, 7 Wash.App. 945, 948, 503 P.2d 1127 (1972), aff'd, 82 Wash.2d 693, 512 P.2d 1093 (1973)). To abandon a community property agreement, the parties must clearly demonstrate a mutually-manifested intention to abandon the agreement. Higgins, 123 Wash.2d at 165, 866 P.2d 31. To make this determination, courts will give great weight to evidence of the parties' intent by examining the wording of the written agreement and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including the subject matter of the transaction and the subsequent acts of the parties. Id. (citing In re Estate of Brown, 29 Wash.2d 20, 28, 185 P.2d 125 (1947)).
Are the Wills and the Community Property Agreement Inconsistent? The Stranbergs' primary argument is that a mutual intent to abandon the community property agreement is established because the language of the three subsequent reciprocal wills is inconsistent with the language of the community property agreement.
Generally, two contracts are in conflict if the legal effect of the subsequent contract rescinds the earlier contract and becomes its substitute—making the subsequent contract the only agreement between the parties covering that same subject matter. Higgins, 123 Wash.2d at 165-66, 866 P.2d 31 (citing Bader v. Moore Bldg. Co., 94 Wash. 221, 224, 162 P. 8 (1917)). The community property agreement here is not inconsistent with the wills as none of the reciprocal wills rescinds the community property agreement and the community property agreement and the wills can be read together. In other words, contrary to the assertions of Ms. Stranberg, none of the wills has the legal effect of becoming the only agreement between the parties with regard to the disposition of the farmland in question.
The documents here are not in conflict because they can be read together. The community property agreement provides for the disposition of community property at the death of one spouse. Walter Lasz's 1996 will has a residuary estate clause that applies to property "not otherwise disposed of." CP at 16. The residuary estate clause then has two different subsections that apply depending on whether Alys survives him. The problem here is that if Alys survived him, the community property agreement ensured that the farmland described in subsection B would not pass to the residuary estate. Hence, if Walter predeceased Alys, subsection B would have no effect. However, if Alys predeceased Walter, the farmland would pass to Walter under the community property agreement and would then pass to the Stranbergs under subsection B of the residuary estate clause.
The Stranbergs maintain that the operation of these two documents is inelegant. We agree. Reading these two documents together results in a disposition where the residuary clause is operable to pass the property to the Stranbergs under two circumstances: (1) if Alys predeceased Walter, and the property was part of his residuary estate at the time of his death, or (2) if Walter predeceased Alys, and the property was part of her residuary estate at the time of her death. Simply put, the wills governed the disposition of property that was not passed by the community...
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