Strandlien v. State

• Decision Date: 26 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-8.,05-8.
• Citation: 2007 WY 66,156 P.3d 986
• Parties: Chad D. STRANDLIEN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

156 P.3d 986

2007 WY 66

Chad D. STRANDLIEN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 05-8.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 26, 2007.

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Nathan A. Preuss, Student Intern, State Public Defender Program. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Causey.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant Chad Strandlien seeks review of his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).¹ Strandlien contends among other things, that he was denied a speedy trial and that defense counsel rendered constitutionally deficient assistance by failing to consult with a pertinent expert witness. We find no speedy trial violation, but we do find that Strandlien was denied effective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse Strandlien's conviction.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Strandlien raises the following issues in his opening brief:

I. Did the length of time between the traffic collision, the initial [DWUI] charge, and the subsequent Aggravated Homicide by Vehicle charge and conviction deny Mr. Strandlien's Constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial?

II. Did the destruction of the blood sample prohibit Mr. Strandlien from being able to refute testimony about how much he had to drink which may have affected whether the jury believed his drinking was the proximate cause of death?

III. Was [Mr. Strandlien] unconstitutionally prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel when:

(A) Mr. Roybal[²] failed to communicate a plea offer; and

(B) Mr. Murray[³] failed to present available defenses that were likely to change the outcome of the trial?

IV. Did the accumulative [sic] effect of these errors prevent Mr. Strandlien from receiving a fair and just trial?

After this Court remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on Strandlien's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Strandlien submitted a supplemental brief on the issue:

Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not hiring an expert to refute the State's theory of the case.

FACTS

[¶ 3] On May 29, 2001, while driving on a two-lane highway, Strandlien collided with another vehicle. The sole occupant of the vehicle, Mary Terrell, was killed. A blood sample taken from Strandlien shortly after the accident revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .20 percent.

[¶ 4] The State initially charged Strandlien on September 12, 2001, with the misdemeanor offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2001),⁴ and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Strandlien was arrested pursuant to that warrant on October 8, 2002. Approximately five months later, on March 14, 2003, the State moved to dismiss the DWUI charge, stating it intended to refile the case under a more appropriate charge. The circuit court granted the State's motion and, on March 20, 2003, entered an order dismissing the DWUI charge. On June 12, 2003, the State filed a new criminal information charging Strandlien with aggravated vehicular homicide under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i). After a two-day trial commencing on January 7, 2004, a jury found Strandlien guilty on the charged offense. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of three to ten years. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Speedy Trial

[¶ 5] We begin our discussion by addressing the speedy trial issue since a violation of Strandlien's speedy trial right would result in a dismissal with prejudice of the aggravated vehicular homicide charge. Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 17, 121 P.3d 790, 797 (Wyo.2005); Walters v. State, 2004 WY 37, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo.2004). Strandlien did not allege a speedy trial violation below. Although we have no decision to review, we will nevertheless address the issue because it implicates a fundamental constitutional right. See Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 113 (Wyo.1992) (it is not necessary for a defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial in order to claim a speedy trial violation).

[¶ 6] Strandlien acknowledges that W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)⁵ was not violated in this case and that our review is limited to a constitutional analysis. Under both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions, we determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred by analyzing the four-part test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The Barker test requires the balancing of four factors: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; Sisneros, ¶ 17, 121 P.3d at 797; Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo.2001). None of these factors alone are dispositive. Rather, they must be considered together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; Warner, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d at 26.

[¶ 7] The threshold issue to be resolved is the interval to be used to calculate the length of delay. On this point, Strandlien's argument wavers as to precisely when the speedy trial clock began to run. On one hand, he claims that the speedy trial period began upon the filing of the misdemeanor DWUI information. On the other hand, he suggests that the clock started on the date of his arrest on the DWUI charge.

[¶ 8] Under existing case law, the speedy trial period begins to run upon the filing of a criminal complaint or the arrest of the defendant, whichever occurs first.⁶ State v. Humphrey, 2005 WY 131, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 1027, 1029 (Wyo.2005). See also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). We have recognized that when one charge is dismissed and supplanted by another, the constitutional speedy trial clock is not affected. Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wyo.1985) Under such circumstances, "the periods of formal charge by a single sovereign for the same criminal act are tacked [together] even if the charges are different." Id.

[¶ 9] Based on these principles, we find that the speedy trial clock in this case began to run when Strandlien was initially charged with DWUI on September 12, 2001. The clock stopped on March 20, 2003, when the circuit court dismissed the DWUI information. Humphrey, ¶¶ 11-12, 120 P.3d at 1029-31; see also MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 6-10, 102 S.Ct at 1501-03, 71 L.Ed.2d 696. It resumed again on June 12, 2003, when the aggravated vehicular homicide charge was filed, and continued to run until Strandlien's trial began on January 7, 2004. The total elapsed time to trial, excluding the period between the dismissal and refiling of the information, was 762 days. See Humphrey, ¶¶ 11-12, 120 P.3d at 1029-31 (the time between dismissal and recharging is not counted in the speedy trial calculation). We agree with Strandlien that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial and further analysis of the remaining speedy trial factors is required. See Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 34, 93 P.3d 222, 232 (Wyo.2004) (720-day delay); Warner, ¶ 12, 28 P.3d at 26 (658-day delay).

[¶ 10] We now turn to the reasons for the delay. On this factor we examine which party was responsible for the delay.

"A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay."

Wehr [v. State], 841 P.2d [104,] 112-13 [(Wyo.1992)] (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). Official bad faith in causing delay is weighed heavily against the government. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. "Delays attributable to the defendant are deducted from the equation." Jennings v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo.2000). "We weigh any delay properly attributable to the defendant against the delay chargeable to the State. We have frequently acknowledged a defendant may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by his own dilatory practices." Wehr, 841 P.2d at 113.

Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 42, 99 P.3d 457, 471-72 (Wyo.2004).

[¶ 11] In Strandlien's case, we initially note that almost thirteen months elapsed between the filing of the DWUI information and Strandlien's arrest. As previously noted, Strandlien did not raise the speedy trial issue below. Consequently, the record is silent as to why the delay occurred in serving the arrest warrant. Given the state of the record, we cannot weigh the 13-month delay in favor of or against either party. See generally Warner, ¶ 13, 28 P.3d at 26.

[¶ 12] We also find that several delays occurred with Strandlien's consent and other delays were the result of Strandlien's actions. These delays, totaling 127 days, include a continuance of the initial hearing/arraignment on the DWUI charge, a continuance of his district court arraignment on the vehicular homicide charge, two continuances resulting from a change in defense counsel and a continuance of the trial date to accommodate an essential witness. The record also reveals that Strandlien filed numerous pretrial motions, including two suppression motions and a motion to dismiss. The time required to...