Strang v. Swafford
| Citation | 47 N.W. 1023,81 Iowa 695 |
| Parties | STRANG v. SWAFFORD ET AL. |
| Decision Date | 27 January 1891 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from district court, Linn county; JAMES D. GIFFEN, Judge.
C. G. and L. G. Swafford were partners and composed the firm known as Swafford Bros. Prior to March 17, 1888, they owned 265 acres of land, which is a subject of controversy in this case. On that day they conveyed the land by warranty deed to defendant L. B. Strang, who is, and was then, father-in-law to L. G. Swafford. The consideration for the land as claimed by Strang is $2,110, advanced by him to Swafford Bros. from time to time, with a liability for the payment of incumbrances on the land of $3,800. On the same day, for a consideration of $775, C. G. and L. G. Swafford made to defendant Strang a chattel mortgage on certain personal property, then on the farm before conveyed, the said farm and personal property being all the property owned by said Swaffords not exempt from execution. At the time of these transfers the plaintiff was, and still is, a judgment creditor of Swafford Bros., and this action is to set aside these transfers of property as in fraud of their rights. The district court denied the prayer of the petition, and from its judgment the plaintiff appeals.Wm. G. Clark and James A. Reed, for appellants.
Milton Remley and H. B. Heberling, for appellee Strang.
Appellant follows his statement of facts preceding his argument as follows: The consideration of the questions thus presented will be a very acceptable way of disposing of the case.
1. The first proposition leads us to consider the circumstances under which the transfers were made. In the latter part of 1887, there were pending against Swafford Bros. three separate suits, in which judgment had been obtained, two of which constitute liens on the land in question, to the amount of $2,800, and is a part of the incumbrance referred to in the statement of facts. The other was the suit of plaintiff in which the judgment was obtained now sought to be enforced against the land. At the time of the transfer these suits had not been finally determined. The fact of the pendency of the suits was known to defendant Strang before and at the time of the transfers, and he was fully aware that the Swaffords were being pressed by their creditors, and were in fact insolvent. These are the prominent facts upon which appellant relies to establish the fact of the fraud. We do not understand that it is seriously questioned but that Strang loaned to L. G. Swafford or to Swafford Bros. from October, 1885, to March, 1886, $2,110, nor that he actually furnished $775, for which the chattel mortgage was given as security. A disputed question in the case is whether the $2,110 was loaned to L. G. Swafford or to the firm, and it will be well to first settle that question of fact, to more readily know the legal questions to be met. Appellant insists upon the fact that it was an individual loan to L. G. Swafford, but we think otherwise. Nothing is clearer than that L. G. Swafford, in obtaining the money, intended it for the firm, and not, as is thought, to meet his obligation to the firm, but because the firm needed money. There is no testimony to show that he was required to furnish such money. It does appear that both members of the firm procured from their friends, money for the use of the firm, but nothing to show that it was because of an individual obligation to do so. L. G. Swafford, who obtained it, says it was for the firm, and was used by the firm. Such is the general purport of the evidence with reference to that fact. Some statements, as that the money was obtained or loaned to L. G. Swafford, are in the record, but have reference more particularly to the fact that he was the one who asked for and received it. We think the money was loaned to the firm. With the fact established that Strang was a bona fide creditor of the firm, very much of the difficulty on this point of the case is removed. Of course Strang could be a creditor, and yet act with a fraudulent intent in accepting the conveyances, but, in such a case, it is far more difficult to show the fact. From the evidence it appears that Mr. Strang is quite a wealthy and prosperous farmer. His testimony impresses us with the belief that he is a man of remarkable candor and fairness, not deviating from the truth when against his interest, as in many cases he might have done to his apparent advantage. From the evidence we find about this state of facts at the time of the transfers: Strang was a creditor of the firm. He had loaned the $2,110, without a thought that it was unsafe. In the fall of 1887, and later, to the time of the transfer, he knew the firm was financially embarrassed, and in failing circumstances. He was offered the farm, with what then appeared to be an incumbrance of $3,800, in payment. He was in the position of accepting...
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