Stratman v. Leisnoi, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. S-8103,S-8103
• Citation: 969 P.2d 1139
• Parties: Omar STRATMAN, Appellant, v. LEISNOI, INC., Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 1139

969 P.2d 1139

Omar STRATMAN, Appellant, v. LEISNOI, INC., Appellee.

No. S-8103.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Dec. 18, 1998.

Michael J. Schneider and Eric R. Cossman, Law Offices of Michael J. Schneider, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellant.

Edgar Paul Boyko and Robert L. Breckberg, Edgar Paul Boyko and Associates, Anchorage, for Appellee.

Before MATTHEWS, C.J., and COMPTON, FABE, and BRYNER, JJ.

OPINION

COMPTON, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Leisnoi, Inc. sued Omar Stratman to quiet title to a parcel of property referred to hereafter as "Termination Point." The superior court granted summary judgment and awarded attorney's fees to Leisnoi. We vacate those decisions and remand with an order to enter a stay, as explained below.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 1974 the Secretary of the Interior certified Leisnoi, under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), as the village corporation for Woody Island. This certification entitled Leisnoi to select lands to be patented to it by the United States. The lands Leisnoi selected included parcels on which Stratman held federal or state grazing leases and parcels that Stratman allegedly used for recreational purposes. In 1976 Stratman, and others, commenced an action in federal district court against the Secretary of the Interior seeking to decertify Leisnoi, to enjoin the United States from patenting to Leisnoi any of the lands that Leisnoi had selected, and to void any conveyances already made to Leisnoi. The district court dismissed the case as to most plaintiffs for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but permitted Stratman and one other plaintiff to amend their complaint. The court determined that they were entitled to actual (as opposed to merely constructive) notice of Leisnoi's pending certification due to their record interests in grazing leases. They had not received such notice. Leisnoi then quitclaimed any interest in lands subject to the above mentioned leaseholds. The district court then dismissed Stratman's action, finding that there was no longer any "case or controversy." Stratman appealed, arguing that, as a recreational user of the land in question, he had an interest sufficient to entitle him to pursue the decertification action against the Secretary of the Interior.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that Stratman's previous use of the land for "hunting, camping, picnicking, and photography" was sufficient to show an injury particular to Stratman resulting from Leisnoi's removal of this land from the public domain. The court determined that this injury would be redressable "by enjoining the defendant's removal of the land from the public domain." The court further concluded that, even though it was only Stratman's record interest that had entitled him to actual notice (and thus excused him from exhausting his administrative remedies) in the first place, Leisnoi's quitclaim could not retroactively extinguish his right to that notice. The court remanded Stratman's case to the district court for further proceedings. The year was 1981.

In 1980 Leisnoi had merged with Koniag, Inc., the regional corporation for the area. In 1981 a Leisnoi shareholder filed a derivative action seeking to undo the merger (hereinafter the "demerger litigation"). In 1982 Stratman and the merged Leisnoi/Koniag entered into a settlement agreement whereby Stratman agreed to dismiss his decertification suit and Leisnoi/Koniag agreed to sell certain lands to Stratman, to be conveyed by quitclaim deed. After the execution of the settlement agreement in March 1982, Stratman dismissed the decertification litigation. In 1983 Leisnoi and Koniag settled the demerger litigation, with court approval, by rendering the merger void ab initio.

In 1985 Leisnoi received a patent to the surface rights of the land at issue in the decertification-litigation settlement agreement. Stratman sought to enforce the settlement agreement, but Leisnoi refused to honor it. In 1988 Stratman successfully pursued an action in superior court to enforce the settlement agreement, and Leisnoi appealed. In 1992 this court ruled that Leisnoi was not bound by the decertification-litigation settlement agreement--no enforceable contract existed between Stratman and Leisnoi.

Stratman recorded a lis pendens against the lands that had been patented to Leisnoi in 1985 and moved the federal district court to reopen his decertification suit. The court denied this motion and Stratman appealed. During the pendency of this appeal, Leisnoi moved the court to expunge the lis pendens. The court denied this motion without prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the decertification motion, and reversed. In 1995 the federal district court entered the order reopening Stratman's decertification suit. Leisnoi again moved to expunge the lis pendens. The court denied this motion. Soon thereafter, it entered an order "remanding" the case to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) for it to determine in the first instance whether Leisnoi had been properly certified. IBLA has yet to make this determination.

In 1996 Leisnoi filed this action in superior court to quiet title to a parcel of land known as Termination Point, which is part of the land patented to Leisnoi in 1985. Stratman removed this action to federal district court. Stratman also filed a partial release of his lis pendens, which would permit Leisnoi to convey Termination Point to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustees (EVOS). Such a conveyance was Leisnoi's asserted reason for bringing the quiet-title action. The federal district court remanded the action back to the state court, explaining that this was "an action to quiet title under state law which does not present a federal question. Whether the state court has jurisdiction is a matter to be decided in that court." Following this remand, Leisnoi moved for summary judgment, arguing that, even if Stratman's decertification action succeeded, it could not affect Leisnoi's title to Termination Point. Stratman filed a cross-motion to dismiss, or to stay pending determination of the federal action. The superior court found that Stratman has no interest in title to Termination Point and that he lacks standing to sue to challenge the patent from the United States. The final judgment quieted title to Termination Point in Leisnoi and barred Stratman "from asserting, individually or on behalf of others, any claim in Termination Point adverse to Leisnoi, Inc." The superior court also awarded attorney's fees to Leisnoi, finding that Stratman is not a public-interest litigant.

Stratman appeals.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. We will affirm when the record presents no genuine issues of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Arctic Tug & Barge v. Raleigh, Schwarz & Powell, 956 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Alaska 1998).

IV. DISCUSSION

Can the Superior Court Resolve the Quiet-Title Action at this Time?

Stratman's principal argument is essentially that a state court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of his decertification action. He maintains that, in order to quiet title to Termination Point, it is necessary to adjudicate the merits of the decertification action. ¹ As explained above, Leisnoi does not directly contest this point. Rather, Leisnoi argues that the state court has jurisdiction to quiet title to the lands in question, and that there is nothing Stratman can do to affect Leisnoi's title.

They are both correct, to a degree. Stratman makes no credible argument that the state does not have jurisdiction to quiet title to the land, standing alone. Leisnoi makes no argument that the state does have jurisdiction to determine the merits of Stratman's decertification action. The superior court did not see itself as determining the merits of the decertification action. The question it purportedly resolved was whether the decertification suit, even if successful, could cast a cloud over Leisnoi's title to Termination Point.

The essential question on appeal is whether the superior court must, in fact, determine the merits of the decertification action in order to quiet title to Termination Point. If it would have to do so, then, although the state court will, at some point, be able to quiet title to the lands in question, it must wait until the necessary issue has been finally resolved, either by settlement or in federal court--the only court with jurisdiction to finally determine the merits of the decertification action.

A. If Stratman Succeeds in His Decertification Action, Would the Federal District Court Have the Power To Grant a Remedy Affecting Leisnoi's Title to Termination Point?

Leisnoi contends that Stratman's decertification action cannot affect Leisnoi's title to Termination Point. Stratman does not contest the superior court's determination that he cannot directly challenge the patent conveying Termination Point to Leisnoi. He argues, instead, that the federal district court may, as a remedy in his decertification action, equitably undo the transaction whereby Leisnoi received that patent.

The superior court concluded that the federal district court would not be able to equitably "undo" that transaction. It observed that, in Lee v. United States, 629 F.Supp. 721, 729 (D.Alaska 1985), the court addressed the question of equitable remedies within the framework of ANCSA. In Lee, the court held that ANCSA preempted common-law remedies:

Congress intended ANCSA to "occupy the field" in this area and to preempt any common-law theories or other statutory claims that individuals might assert. Given the extensive set of provisions in ANCSA delineating the rights of individual claimants to ANCSA-conveyance lands,...