Stratmore v. State Bar, S.F. 23201

• Decision Date: 04 August 1975
• Docket Number: S.F. 23201
• Citation: 538 P.2d 229,14 Cal.3d 887,123 Cal.Rptr. 101
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 538 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 803 Robert D. STRATMORE, Petitioner, v. The STATE BAR of California, Respondent.

Page 101

123 Cal.Rptr. 101

14 Cal.3d 887, 538 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 803

Robert D. STRATMORE, Petitioner, v. The STATE BAR of California, Respondent.

S.F. 23201.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 4, 1975.

William K. Coblentz and Jacobs, Sills & Coblentz, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Herbert M. Rosenthal and Arthur L. Margolis, San Francisco, for respondent.

BY THE COURT:

Robert D. Stratmore, admitted to practice in 1972, was ordered to show cause why our order admitting him to practice should not be revoked for the commission of acts involving moral turpitude before his admission to practice. It was charged in particular, inter alia, that in 1971 he knowingly made false representations regarding his expenses to eleven New York law firms with the intent to deceive the firms and thereby obtained money to which he was not entitled. Following evidentiary hearings both the local committee and Board of Governors of the State Bar (hereafter called the board) determined that the evidence sustained the foregoing charge. The local committee recommended that Stratmore be suspended from practice for six months and placed on probation for an additional eighteen months. The board recommended that he be suspended from practice for two years but that we stay execution of our order and place him on probation for that period on certain conditions (including nine months actual suspension) and order him to comply with rule 955, California Rules of Court, or that we revoke his license to practice if we lack authority to suspend him.

Business and Professions Code section 6100 provides that we may suspend or disbar an attorney for specified causes 'arising after his admission to practice.' However section 6087 of that code provides: 'Nothing in (the State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6000--6172)) shall be construed as limiting or altering the powers of the Supreme Court of this State to disbar or discipline members of the bar as this power existed prior to the enactment of (the State Bar Act).'

Our inherent power over the admission, disbarment, and suspension of attorneys has long been recognized. (See, e.g., Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 210, 225, 230, 113 Cal.Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 253--254, 272 P.2d 768; The People v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 143, 150.) With respect to admission to practice, it has been stated that 'The legislative standards are but minimum standards which must be applied; this court retains inherent power to require additional standards if it is not satisfied that the legislative qualifications are sufficient (In re Lavine . . . 2 Cal.2d 324, 328, 41 P.2d 161, 42 P.2d 311).' (Emslie v. State Bar, Supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 225, 113 Cal.Rptr. at p. 183, 520 P.2d at p. 999; see also 144 A.L.R. 150, 151.)

Similarly the statutory grounds for discipline are not exclusive. (See, e.g., Fish v. The State Bar (1931) 214 Cal. 215, 223, 4 P.2d 937; Howe v. The State Bar (1931) 212 Cal. 222, 230, 298 P. 25; In re Bailey (1926), 30 Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29, 31 (275 U.S. 575, 48 S.Ct. 31, 72 L.Ed. 434 cert. dism. for failure to comply with rules); Gould v. State (1930) 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309, 312; Thomas v. State (1953), 87 Ga.App. 765, 75 S.E.2d 193, 196; In re Ratner (1965) 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865, 867; In re McBride (1956) 164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 113, 116; A.B.A. Problems and Recommendations on Disciplinary Enforcement (1970 Final Draft) Section II, 'The Inherent Power of the Court to Supervise the Disciplinary Process,' pp. 13--17.) Fish and Howe, for example, held that an attorney may be disciplined for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct although his conduct did not come within the terms of a statute authorizing discipline, and Bailey stated: '(T)he court will disbar an attorney for any reason and in any manner prescribed by the Legislature. But a statute cannot limit the inherent power of the court which admitted him to also disbar him for any additional reason which may satisfy the court he is no longer fit to be one of its officers.' (Bailey 248 P. at p. 31.)

Several early cases concluded that the courts lack authority to disbar or suspend an attorney on any ground other than those enumerated by statute. (In re Collins (1905) 147 Cal. 8, 13, 81 P. 220; see In re McCowan (1917) 177 Cal. 93, 104, 170 P. 1100; In re Morganstern (1923) 61 Cal.App. 702, 707, 215 P. 721.) The cited cases, however, were impliedly overruled or disapproved in Fish v. The State Bar, Supra, 214 Cal. 215, 223, 4 P.2d 937 and Howe v. The State Bar, Supra, 212 Cal. 222, 230, 298 P. 25 and are inconsistent with the above cited cases recognizing our inherent power to require standards with respect to admission to practice in addition to those imposed by the Legislature (In re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal.2d 324, 328, 41 P.2d 161, 42 P.2d 311; see Emslie v. State Bar, Supra, 11 Cal.3d 210, 225, 113 Cal.Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991). After Fish, Howe and Lavine, this court in Sullivan v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 488, 495, 496, 170 P.2d 888 made statements which are in accord with cases such as Collins. Sullivan, however, did not cite any cases to support the statements, nor did Sullivan mention our inherent power over discipline. Insofar as Sullivan is inconsistent with the views expressed herein it is disapproved.

Stratmore's manifest unfitness to practice was demonstrated by the proof that he obtained money from the New York law firms by fraudulent means for the purpose of personal gain. (See Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1966) 65 Cal.2d 447, 471--472, 55 Cal.Rptr. 228, 421 P.2d 76.) Since under our inherent power we may discipline an attorney for...