Stratton, Admr. v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 09 May 1916
• Citation: 170 Ky. 61
• Parties: Stratton, Administrator, et al. v. Wilson.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

170 Ky. 61

Stratton, Administrator, et al. v. Wilson.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided May 9, 1916.

Appeal from Oldham Circuit Court.

ALEXANDER SCOTT BULLITT, WILLIAM MARSHALL BULLITT and KEITH L. BULLITT for appellants.

DAVID & DAVIS and D. H. FRENCH for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE THOMAS — Affirming, on appeal and cross-appeal.

The questions presented for determination on this appeal grow out of litigation to settle and distribute the estate of Wilton A. Stratton, who died intestate on October 18, 1913, at Los Angeles, California, but domiciled at the time in Oldham county. Previous to 1912, the decedent had lived for a great number of years in the city of Louisville, and in the spring of that year he purchased a country home near Crestwood, in Oldham county, where he made his home for the rest of his life. He was married to the appellant, who was then Miss Julia Eschmann, on February 24, 1913, the wedding taking place in the city of New York. On the 18th day of February preceding the marriage, the parties signed and executed the following contract, omitting signatures:

"THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 22d day of February, 1913, by and between Wilton A. Stratton, party of the first part, and Julia Eschmann, party of the second part, both of Oldham county, in the State of Kentucky.

"WITNESSETH: That whereas the said first and second parties are about to enter into a contract of marriage, and whereas it is desired between them to settle and adjust all property right or claims between them arising out of said proposed marriage, and whereas the said party of the first part, Wilton A. Stratton, wishes to make provision for said Julia Eschmann in lieu of dower or distributive share of his estate, both real and personal, and whereas said parties have agreed between themselves upon a provision for said second party, Julia Eschmann, and she has agreed and binds herself to accept same in lieu of any and all claims upon the estate of said Wilton A. Stratton during his life, or after his life should he die before her.

"Now, THEREFORE, this contract and agreement between said Wilton A. Stratton, party of the first part, and Julia Eschmann, party of the second part.

"WITNESSETH: That the said Wilton A. Stratton hereby agrees and binds himself, his heirs, administrators and assigns to pay to the said Julia Eschmann upon his death, if she survives him, she then being his wife, the sum of twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollars out of his estate in full settlement of any and all claims of dower or distributable share of said estate, real and personal, and should said Julia Eschmann die before said Wilton A. Stratton, then nothing shall be paid to her heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, and he further binds himself that if at any time after the solemnization of said marriage, he and said Julia Eschmann should become separated or divorced, he will pay to her upon such divorce being obtained by either of them the sum of ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars in full of any and all claims said Julia Eschmann might hold against him for alimony, or maintenance, or attorneys' fees in any such divorce proceedings.

"The said Julia Eschmann agrees to accept said sum of twenty-five thousand ($25,000.00) dollars upon the death of said Wilton A. Stratton in full settlement of any and all claims she might have as his widow for dower or distributable share of his estate, or should she become divorced from him at any time to accept said sum of ($10,000.00) dollars above set forth in full settlement of any and all claims for alimony or maintenance, or attorneys' fees.

"Said Wilton A. Stratton furthermore agrees and binds himself during the continuance of the marital relationship between him and the said Julia Eschmann to provide for her a good and comfortable living, so long as she lives and resides with him, but should she abandon him for any reason and refuse to live with him, then his responsibility from the time of said abandonment or refusal to live with him shall be limited to the sum of ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars above provided for, and only upon the conditions there provided for the payment of said ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars.

"IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness the signatures of said first and second parties, the day and year above written."

The contract was executed in duplicate but each party was not delivered a copy until the day they left Louisville for New York, which was the 22nd of February; and thus, although the contract had been signed by each of them on the 18th, it bears the date of actual delivery.

Briefly stated, the circumstances under which the marriage was agreed to and the contract executed, are these: Neither party had ever been married. Mr. Stratton was about 62 years old and Miss Eschmann about 52 years old. She was then and had for some considerable time immediately previous, been employed by Mr. Stratton as housekeeper at a salary of $35.00 per month. He was not in the best of health and to regain and repair it he concluded to take a trip abroad. He seems to have become very much pleased with the services of Miss Eschmann, not only as a housekeeper but in her attentions to his personal welfare as well, and he desired that she attend him upon his contemplated trip. To avoid any grounds for suspicion or scandalous gossip, he conceived the idea of marrying Miss Eschmann before starting on the trip and suggested it to his cousin and personal friend, Edward T. Farmer, but at the time stated that he would be unwilling to enter into the marriage unless there could be an understanding between himself and Miss Eschmann as to property rights growing out of the marriage. The deceased at that time was worth something like $230,000.00, thirty thousand dollars of which was real property situated in Jefferson and Oldham counties, and the remainder was personal property, almost the entire portion of which consisted of solvent bonds and corporation stock, each being a well-paying investment.

The first conversation with Farmer concerning the proposed marriage occurred about February 7, of that year, and the subject was further discussed between them some four or five days thereafter. On the 17th day of February the matter was discussed by the three, Stratton, Farmer, and Miss Eschmann, and the terms of it, as afterwards incorporated into the writing, were each and all agreed to and the writing drawn up and subscribed by the parties the next day as we have stated, but not delivered until the 22nd. The attorney who drafted the contract, Mr. John J. Davis, realizing that Miss Eschmann should be apprised of the extent of the property of her contemplated husband, went to the home of Mr. Stratton on the 19th day of February, and there fully informed her of the amount of the property which Mr. Stratton owned; and, as the attorney states, of her rights in and to such property as surviving widow. To this she replied: "I didn't know that he had so much or that I was entitled to so much," whereupon the attorney replied: "Well, you know it now. The marriage has not been consummated and there is nothing that you couldn't withdraw from at this time," whereupon she replied, "It is too late. I have already signed the contract. I signed too quick." The marriage was afterwards consummated as we have stated, and the trip abroad was made lasting until some time in October. Upon their return they did not come direct to their home but proceeded to the city of Chicago, where a stop of a few days was made, after which they went to Los Angeles, California, where, on October 18, the death of the husband occurred. The only heir at law of the decedent is the appellee, Mrs. Ada Stratton Wilson, who is the only child of a brother of the deceased. After the death of her husband, the appellant as his widow, returned to the Crestwood home and has since occupied it, in the meantime qualifying as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband.

The litigation in which the judgment was rendered from which the appeal is prosecuted, consists of several separate suits and proceedings concerning the estate, all of which were consolidated in the court below, and for the purpose of this opinion, it is not necessary that they be either separately stated or noticed. The chief controversy between the parties and the storm center of this litigation is, as to the validity of the antenuptial contract which we have herein copied, the widow contending that she is not bound by it, and that she is therefore entitled to her distributable share of her husband's estate as though no contract was made; while the heir is insisting that the contract is valid, and was at the death of the decedent in full force, and the widow is, therefore, entitled to but $25,000.00, the amount named in the contract. This latter view is the one taken by the trial court, and from the judgment so holding the widow has appealed.

In the court below there were three grounds urged by the widow as to why the contract is not binding upon her, they being: (1) That the contract is void on its face; (2) that before signing it she was not aware of the value of the estate of her future husband, and that she was therefore induced by this fraudulent concealment to place her name to it and to agree to its terms, and, (3) that the contract after their marriage was orally rescinded by herself and her husband before his death.

We will consider these in the reverse order. As to the third ground stated, without passing on the question as to whether this character of contract can be orally rescinded, it is sufficient to say that there is no evidence of any character of a rescission, except the testimony of the widow, which is manifestly incompetent under section 606 of the Civil Code of Practice. This is so apparent that counsel for her did not mention it in the argument of the case, nor does he refer to it in his brief. We, therefore, do not deem it...