Stratton v. Allegheny County
| Decision Date | 22 May 1914 |
| Docket Number | 86 |
| Citation | 91 A. 894,245 Pa. 519 |
| Parties | Stratton, Appellant, v. Allegheny County |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 20, 1914
Appeal, No. 86, Oct. T., 1914, by plaintiff, from decree of C.P. Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1913, No. 1981, in equity refusing an injunction, in case of E. L. Stratton v. The County of Allegheny and The City of Pittsburgh and I. K Campbell, J. Denny O'Neil and S. J. Toole, Commissioners of the County of Allegheny; William A. Magee, Mayor of said City of Pittsburgh, and E. S. Morrow, Controller, and John M Goehring, E. V. Babcock, Robert Garland, William A. Hoeveler, J. P. Kerr, P.J. McArdle, Enoch Rauh, W. G. Wilkins and S. S. Woodburn, Councilmen of said City of Pittsburgh. Affirmed.
Bill in equity by a taxpayer to declare void a contract entered into between the County of Allegheny and the City of Pittsburgh, and for an injunction.
SWEARINGEN, J., filed the following opinion:
The important question in this case is the constitutionality of the Act of April 18, 1913, P.L. 96. It has been attacked upon the following grounds:
1. It is alleged that the act violates Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution, which provides:
2. It is also alleged that the act violates Article III, Section 20, which provides that:
"The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever."
In the courts, the presumption is that a statute, regularly enacted by the law-making branch of the government, is constitutional. "We can declare an Act of Assembly void, only when it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably, plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation on our minds": Com. ex rel. v. Hyneman, 242 Pa. 244.
Is the act now in question a local or special law, within the meaning of the prohibition contained in Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution above quoted? The act authorizes the construction of joint county and municipal buildings. Both counties and cities must have such buildings, and the cost thereof must be paid out of the public funds raised by taxation. There can be no doubt that the act purports to regulate the "affairs of counties and cities." If, therefore, it is a local or special law, as contended by the complainant, it offends against said Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution. If it is not a local or special law, the legislature did not transcend its powers in enacting the same.
The act provides:
"That in each county of this Commonwealth, where the county seat is within the limits of any city, the county commissioners and the corporate authorities of such city shall have the power, and they are hereby authorized, to agree upon a site within the limits of such city, and to erect thereon a joint county and municipal building, to be used by the county for court house and other county purposes and to be used by the city for municipal purposes."
It is apparent, of course, that the act did not apply, and it was not intended to apply, to all the counties and cities of the State, at the date of its passage. But no county nor city was excluded from its operation. In time every county seat in the State may be within the limits of a city, for no distinction is made between cities. It is a fact, of which we take notice, that the act does apply to many counties and cities. Harrisburg in Dauphin County, Scranton in Lackawanna County, New Castle in Lawrence County, Philadelphia in Philadelphia County, and Pittsburgh in Allegheny County, are some that may be mentioned. But it does not now apply to all counties. Therefore the act is one of classification. It authorizes the erection of joint county and municipal buildings, where the county seat is within the limits of a city, and it necessarily excludes from its present operation those counties in which such conditions do not exist. Is this a genuine classification, founded upon "natural, reasonable and necessary conditions"?
It seems to us that there is a real distinction between counties, wherein the county seats are within the limits of cities, and counties where they are not. In the former case, cities have grown up from natural causes. They have necessarily become the centers of great populations with all that is implied thereby. The counties have in consequence, and likewise from natural causes, also become of great importance. In a county, where such a condition exists, the two municipalities must have buildings for the transaction of the business of the public. A more commodious and convenient building can be erected jointly than can two or more be erected separately, and necessarily the expense to the taxpayers of both will be far less. Many difficulties in securing a suitable and proper site will be avoided by a joint building. But the great consideration is the convenience of the public. The convenience of the people in transacting their business with the county and city will be much more efficiently subserved by having the courts and the public offices of both municipalities in substantially the same place. Especially is this true here, where the population of Pittsburgh is almost half of the entire population of the County of Allegheny. It is therefore apparent that there is a real, not a fanciful, distinction between counties in which the county seats are located within the limits of cities, and those in which they are not. The former do possess "natural, reasonable and necessary conditions," which do not belong to the latter. Pittsburgh's Petition, 217 Pa. 227.
We cannot distinguish between the classification prescribed in the act under consideration and that in the Act of May 6, 1897, P.L. 46. The latter made bridges over strams which divided counties a separate class and over streams which divided counties a separate class and authorized the counties to rebuild them, under certain conditions. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice MITCHELL, held that the classification was genuine and founded upon a real distinction. In the opinion it is said:
"The first condition" (a bridge over a river or stream forming the boundary line between two counties) Seabolt v. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 318.
In the said Act of 1897, the conditions prescribed co-existed in but few counties of the State, and they probably never will coexist in all of them. These conditions limited the operation of the act to but few places and necessarily made it local in effect. But the court held that, since the conditions were genuine and called for legislation peculiar thereto, the mere fact that it applied to but few places did not make the law local and special within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition. In this Act of 1913, there are no conditions which will necessarily restrict its operation to particular counties. In due time, and from purely natural causes, the act may extend to all the counties of the State, for none can be excluded. And we discover no prohibition in the Constitution against making cities, which are county seats, a distinct class for necessary legislative purposes. Other circumstances than mere differences in population justify classification. In the Act of February 7, 1906, P.L. 7, authorizing the annexation of cities and providing for a temporary government and the payment of the indebtedness of each and the enforcement of claims, such cities had to be "contiguous or in close proximity" and no borough must intervene. Thus the act did not apply to all cities, and it was therefore a classification founded upon the conditions stated. This was sustained in: Pittsburgh's Petition, 217 Pa. 227, supra.
We must therefore conclude that the classification prescribed in the Act of April 18, 1913, is founded upon a real, genuine distinction and that therefore it is a general, and not a local or special, law. It is not local, because it does not pertain to a definite place and is not restricted to one portion of the State. It is not special, because it does not relate to particular persons, places or...
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