Stratton v. Department of Labor and Industries
| Decision Date | 16 October 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 1191--I,1191--I |
| Parties | R. E. STRATTON, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Jackson, Ulvestad & Goodwin, Daniel G. Goodwin, Seattle, for appellant.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., William T. Scharnikow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Labor & Industries, Seattle, for respondent.
This is an appeal by R. E. Stratton from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury confirming a decision of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals awarding him 100 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities rather than a total permanent disability pension.
Stratton was injured on October 11, 1957. The Department of Labor and Industries awarded him 70 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disability and closed his claim. On appeal to the board, Stratton was granted a permanent partial disability award of 100 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities. His appeal to the Superior Court from the order resulted in a jury verdict awarding him a total permanent disability pension. The judgment upon this verdict was reversed and a new trial granted because of immaterial and confusing matters in one of the instructions. Stratton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 1 Wash.App. 77, 459 P.2d 651 (1969). In the second trial, from which this appeal lies, the jury upheld the board's order which granted Stratton a permanent partial disability award of 100 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities rather than a total permanent disability pension.
The problem in this case arises from the application of RCW 51.52.115, which requires that if the case is submitted to a jury the court shall by instruction advise the jury of the exact findings of the board on each material issue. Stratton's assignments of error are directed to the medical part of the board's findings so incorporated into the required instruction as follows:
3. On or about April 29, 1964, the claimant suffered from a psychiatric disorder which was causally related to his industrial injury and was diagnosed as anxiety neurosis with conversion symptoms. Associated with this psychiatric disorder is a demonstrated lack of motivation in the claimant to seek out and maintain gainful employment, coupled with a strong tendency and desire to realize a monetary gain from his injury.
(Italics ours.) It is Stratton's contention that the italicized sentence is not a medical finding based upon the evidence, but rather an argumentative assertion that he was not motivated to find work and desired to realize a monetary gain from his injury. We agree.
The board found, and the jury was so advised, that Stratton was permanently partially disabled from a physiological standpoint, which disability was equal to 60 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities. Also, the board found, and the jury was so advised, that Stratton's injury had caused a psychiatric disorder which increased his total permanent partial disability to 100 percent of the maximum allowable for unspecified disabilities. The issue presented to the jury, therefore, was whether or not Stratton's condition, both physiological and psychiatric, rendered him totally and permanently disabled. Subsection 3 above quoted was an attempt by the board to state its findings as to the psychiatric aspect of Stratton's problems.
The first sentence was proper. However, the second sentence, which is italicized, is not based upon any medical or other evidence in the record and is an opinion of the board that Stratton won't look for work and has a strong desire to make money from his injury. This description of Stratton's attitude, unsupported as it is by the evidence, is a comment upon his character and an argument as to why he should not be awarded his pension. It is highly prejudicial and improper.
There was medical evidence in the record that Stratton had a well-defined neurosis of a kind which would prevent him from being motivated to seek or hold employment, and that unconsciously he did not wish to give up the monetary gains to be derived from his illness. Following are examples of this:
Q. And doctor, would you tell us why you feel that he would not be--that, is, he would be totally and permanently disabled the rest of his life? A. Well, because one, because the neurotic reaction I felt was fixed and that the motivation for doing very much about it was limited and, then, well, there are other...
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Miller v. Kennedy
...the extent of our authority. See Greene v. Rothschild, 68 Wash.2d 1, 402 P.2d 356, 414 P.2d 1013 (1965); Stratton v. Department of Labor & Indus., 7 Wash.App. 652, 501 P.2d 1072 (1972). battery as an intentional tort, but the failure to tell the patient about the perils he faces is the brea......
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Clark Cnty. v. McManus
...the industrial appeals judge's decision, was also a “material issue ” within the meaning of RCW 51.52.115. We rejected a similar argument in Stratton. In that case, we considered whether an administrative law judge's preliminary determination in a proposed decision and order, which was subs......
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Clark Cnty. v. McManus
...preponderance of credible evidence that the Board's findings and decision are incorrect. Id. at 754-55. Stratton v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 7 Wn. App. 652, 501 P.2d 1072 (1972). (Stratton II) is instructive on whether the trial court erred in failing to do so in this case. In Stratton II, ......