Stratton v. People

• Decision Date: 01 April 1880
• Citation: 5 Colo. 276
• Parties: STRATTON v. THE PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

5 Colo. 276

STRATTON v. THE PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Colorado

April, 1880

Error to District Court of Arapahoe County.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Messrs BROWNE & PUTNAM and Mr. J. Q. A. KING, for plaintiff in error.

The ATTORNEY-GENERAL, for defendants in error.

ELBERT C. J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of one Daniel Farr, tried at the January term, 1879, and convicted of manslaughter. The only errors complained of were in the selection of the jury. The jurors, Cheever, Roblin and Eyser stated in their examination that they were opposed to capital punishment, and were then challenged for cause by the people. On the further examination of Cheever and Roblin, it was disclosed that on their consciences and on principle they thought the law which provided for the infliction of the death penalty in any case was wrong, but they each announced that if they were empaneled as jurors in a jurisdiction where the law provided the punishment of death for crime, and the evidence in the case required them to return a verdict which would result in a death-sentence, they could, notwithstanding their conscientious scruples, return such verdict, and would make their scruples subservient to their duty as jurors.

The exclusion of these three jurors upon the grounds stated is assigned for error.

Upon the jury as finally constituted there were two talesmen. Conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death-penalty do not necessarily disqualify a juror entertaining them. They must be such as would preclude him finding a verdict of guilty in a capital case, or from trying it fairly. Bishop's Crim. Practice, Sec. 918, and cases cited.

The juror's oath gives the measure of his duty. He is to well and truly try the issue joined, etc., and a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence.

If notwithstanding his conscientious scruples, he will render a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence, and if upon this point his answers leave no uncertainty, this is all the law requires. Beyond this the possibility of an advantitious advantage to the prisoner, springing from the juror's convictions on the policy of the law, is an impracticable refinement which courts will not pursue.

In the case of the Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 S. and R. 155, the juror answered, 'that he had conscientious scruples on the subject of capital punishment, and that he would not, because he conscientiously could not, consent or agree to a verdict of murder in the first degree, death being the punishment, though the evidence required such a verdict.' This was held (Gibson, J., dissenting) good cause for challenge.

In the case of Gates v. The People, 14 Ill. 434, the juror answered, 'that he should be very reluctant to render a verdict of guilty of an offense punishable with death, even if his judgment was convinced of the prisoner's guilt; that he would probably be the last juror to agree to such a verdict, but he did not know but what he might be starved to render it; he thought he should hang the jury and thus defeat a verdict of guilty.

Treat, C. J. says: 'A juror ought to stand indifferent between the prosecutor and the accused. He should be in a condition to find a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence. On principle it is a good cause of challenge to a juror in a capital case that he has conscientious scruples on the subject of punishment by death, that will prevent him from agreeing to a verdict of guilty. * * * It would be a mockery to go through the forms of a trial with such a person on the jury. The prisoner would not be convicted, however conclusive the proof of his guilt.'

In the case of the State v. Ward, 39 Vt. 233, the answer of the juror left it, in the language of the coury, 'uncertain whether he would have been governed by the proofs in the case, or by his conscientious scruples, as to the right to punish with death,' and it was held that the juror was rightfully excluded.

It will be observed that in all these cases the conscientious scriples of the juror were such as would preclude him from finding a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence, or, as in the last case, to leave it in doubt.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 298, the juror answered that 'he was opposed to capital punishment, but that he did not think that his opinions would interfere with his doing his duty as a juror; that as a legislator he should be in favor of altering...