Straub v. Reed

• Decision Date: 01 November 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-0996,16-0996
• Citation: 806 S.E.2d 768
• Parties: Jerry S. STRAUB, Petitioner v. Pat S. REED, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

806 S.E.2d 768

Jerry S. STRAUB, Petitioner

v.Pat S. REED, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Respondent

No. 16-0996

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: October 11, 2017

Filed: November 1, 2017

R. Lee Booten, II, Esq., Huntington, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Janet E. James, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for Respondent

WORKMAN, Justice:

Nearly two years after Petitioner Jerry S. Straub was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"), Respondent Pat S. Reed, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the "DMV"), issued an order revoking his driver's license. On appeal, the Office of Administrative Hearings (the "OAH"), affirmed the license revocation. The circuit court upheld that decision.

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Straub's primary contention is that the procedural delays were so unreasonably excessive they violated his constitutional due process rights. Based upon our review of the briefs, legal authorities, appendix record, and upon consideration of arguments of counsel, this Court finds no merit to his arguments. Therefore, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A police officer with the Ceredo, West Virginia, Police Department arrested Mr. Straub for DUI on January 9, 2011. The officer initiated the traffic stop at approximately 3:00 a.m., after he observed Mr. Straub backing his vehicle into oncoming traffic and almost striking another vehicle. The officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Straub's breath and noticed his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Mr. Straub admitted to drinking; he told the officer that he had consumed six to eight beers that evening. Mr. Straub failed a preliminary breath test, and the results of the secondary chemical test showed his blood alcohol concentration level was 0.107%.

Mr. Straub appeared, pro se, before the City of Ceredo Municipal Court on March 10, 2011, and his misdemeanor DUI charge was dismissed.

For reasons not explained in the record, the DMV maintains that it did not receive the DUI Information Sheet from the arresting officer until November 27, 2012. The DMV issued an order revoking Mr. Straub's driving privileges on December 18, 2012. Thereafter, Mr. Straub requested a hearing with the OAH to challenge the revocation.

Following several continuances for various reasons, the administrative hearing eventually took place before a hearing examiner on March 10, 2015.¹ The police officer testified about the events surrounding the arrest. When he testified, Mr. Straub did not dispute the fact that he was driving while intoxicated. Rather, Mr. Straub testified that he felt prejudiced by the delay of the revocation order being issued over twenty-three months from the time of his arrest, and the incident then being over four years old. Mr. Straub testified that he was employed as a pharmaceutical sales representative, and his employer issued notices of potential layoffs regularly. He further testified that during the time frame between his arrest for DUI and the administrative hearing, he attempted to secure other employment. Mr. Straub claimed that he was interviewed by recruiters, but once they learned that his driver's license could possibly be revoked, the recruiters would no longer continue his job search. Fortunately, Mr. Straub's employer did not lay him off and he continued working while the matter was pending. At the administrative hearing, Mr. Straub's counsel moved to dismiss the case based on the procedural delays.

On February 22, 2016, the OAH issued the decision of the hearing examiner which was adopted by the final order of the chief hearing examiner. The OAH found that Mr. Straub drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol on January 9, 2011. It ordered Mr. Straub's driver's license revoked under West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(j) (2013). The OAH did not address Mr. Straub's arguments regarding procedural delays; it noted the OAH "does not have jurisdiction to deal with issues of timing and delay."

Mr. Straub appealed the OAH order to the circuit court and requested a stay of the revocation order pending that appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(s) (2013). The circuit court held a hearing on the matter and granted Mr. Straub's motion for stay.² By order entered October 21, 2016, the circuit court affirmed the OAH order, finding no merit to Mr. Straub's arguments.

Mr. Straub filed this appeal, and presented a motion to stay the circuit court's order pending our appeal. On November 1, 2016, this Court granted this motion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has held that

[o]n appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W.Va. Code § 29A-5-4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

Syl. Pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). With these standards in mind, we proceed to the merits of this appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Straub raises four separate, but largely interconnected, assignments of error on the subject of procedural delays. In the interest of brevity, we address the related issues in the context of his core argument. Mr. Straub asserts that the delays in the administrative proceedings violated his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, section 10 and section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution.³

Delays and Procedural Due Process

The Legislature has imposed no time limitations on the DMV's statutory authority to issue a revocation order following a driver's DUI arrest.⁴ Similarly, the OAH has no statutory or regulatory time limitations within which to issue its decision following an administrative hearing.⁵ Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that "[a] driver's license is a property interest and such interest is entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause of the West Virginia Constitution." Syl. Pt. 1, Abshire v. Cline, 193 W.Va. 180, 455 S.E.2d 549 (1995). Thus, "due process concerns are raised when there are excessive and unreasonable delays in [driver's] license suspension cases." Holland v. Miller, 230 W.Va. 35, 39, 736 S.E.2d 35, 39 (2012).

[T]his Court has long recognized the constitutional mandate that " ‘justice shall be administered without ... delay.’ W.Va. Const. Art. III, § 17." Frantz v. Palmer, 211 W.Va. 188, 192, 564 S.E.2d 398, 402 (2001). See Petry v. Stump, 219 W.Va. 197, 200, 632 S.E.2d 353, 356 (2006) ; and Allen v. State, Human Rts. Comm'n, 174 W.Va. 139, 157, 324 S.E.2d 99, 118 (1984). We have further declared that "[j]ust as circuit court judges ‘have an affirmative duty to render timely decisions on matters properly submitted within a reasonable time following their submission,’ Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State exrel. Patterson v. Aldredge, 173 W.Va. 446, 317 S.E.2d 805 (1984), the obligation to act in a timely fashion is similarly imposed upon administrative bodies[.]" Frantz, 211 W.Va. at 192, 564 S.E.2d at 402. Indeed, as we held in syllabus point 2 of Frantz ," ‘[A]dministrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions have an affirmative duty to dispose promptly of matters properly submitted.’ Syl. Pt. 7, in part, Allen v. State, Human Rights Comm'n, 174 W.Va. 139, 324 S.E.2d 99 (1984)."

Miller v. Moredock, 229 W.Va. 66, 70, 726 S.E.2d 34, 38 (2011).⁶

In the present case, Mr. Straub complains about two delays. First, the DMV issued its order revoking his driver's license twenty-three months after his arrest for DUI. And second, the OAH issued its decision affirming that revocation eleven months following the administrative hearing. Mr. Straub asserts these delays were grossly excessive, unreasonable, and violated his procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, sec. 10 and sec. 17 of the West Virginia Constitution.

With regard to the first delay, the DMV counters that the lag in receipt of the arresting officer's DUI Information Sheet following the arrest did not relieve the DMV of its statutory duty to revoke Mr. Straub's driver's license. We agree. As this Court held in syllabus point three of Carpenter v. Cicchirillo, 222 W.Va. 66, 662 S.E.2d 508 (2008) :

"A law enforcement officer's failure to strictly comply with the DUI arrest reporting time requirements of W.Va. Code, 17C-5A-l(b) [1994] is not a bar or impediment to the commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles taking administrative action based on the arrest report, unless there is actual prejudice to the driver as a result of such failure." Syllabus point 1, In re Burks, 206 W.Va. 429, 525 S.E.2d 310 (1999).

When a driver asserts constitutional error due to a substantial delay in holding the administrative license revocation hearing, the pivotal issue is whether he or she can demonstrate prejudice. That is, whether the driver's ability to present his or her defense was affected by the delay. In Meadows v. Reed, No. 14-0138, 2015 WL 1588462 (W.Va. Mar. 16, 2015) (memorandum decision), this Court granted the driver relief after we determined that the four-year delay before the matter went to administrative hearing was prejudicial to the driver's ability to defend himself. Significantly, that delay encompassed the death of the investigating officer, whose conclusions in the DUI information sheet were hotly contested by the driver. In contrast, we declined to grant the driver relief in Reed v. Conniff, 236 W.Va. 300, 779 S.E.2d 568 (2015), when there was a four-year delay before the matter went to administrative hearing; in Coniff, the delay did not prejudice the driver's ability to mount a defense to the charge.

Turning to the instant case, we agree with Mr. Straub's...