Strawn Mercantile Co. v. First Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 23 October 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 22.)
• Citation: 279 S.W. 473
• Parties: STRAWN MERCANTILE CO. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF STRAWN et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

279 S.W. 473

STRAWN MERCANTILE CO. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF STRAWN et al.

(No. 22.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

October 23, 1925.

Rehearing Denied January 15, 1926.

Appeal from Palo Pinto County Court; E. L. Pitts, Judge.

In an action by the Strawn Mercantile Company against W. W. Munford and wife judgment was rendered for plaintiff. The First National Bank of Strawn was made garnishee as to a lump-sum settlement fund awarded said W. W. Munford by the Industrial Commission of Illinois. From the judgment against it, in said garnishment proceeding, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Ritchie & Ranspot, of Mineral Wells, for appellant.

P. C. Sanders, of Strawn, for appellees.

PANNILL, C. J.

W. W. Munford, a citizen of Texas, while working in a mine in Illinois, was injured and was awarded a lump sum settlement by the Industrial Commission of the latter state. Munford returned to Texas and deposited a portion of said money so received in the First National Bank of Strawn, which was garnished on a judgment in favor of appellant against Munford and wife. Judgment was against the appellant; hence this appeal. The sole question raised by this appeal is whether the exemption provided for by the Illinois statute can be applied here under the rule of "comity." It is not contended that the money would be subject to garnishment if either of above statutes are applied.

The Illinois statute (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1925, c. 48, § 158) introduced in evidence recites:

"No payment, claim, award or decision under this act shall be assignable or subject to any lien, attachment or garnishment, or be held liable in any way for any lien, debt, penalty or damages."

That part of the Texas statute (Rev. St. 1925, art. 8306, § 3) relating to the exemption claim provides:

"All compensation allowed under the succeeding sections herein, shall be exempt from garnishment, attachment, judgment and all other suits or claims, and no such right of action and no such compensation and no part thereof or of either shall be assignable, except as otherwise herein provided and any attempt to assign the same shall be void."

The doctrine of comity is permitted and accepted in all civilized states from mutual interest and convenience and a sense of the inconvenience which would otherwise result, and from moral necessity, to do justice in order that justice may be done in return.

The recognition of the laws of other states on this ground is not a matter of right, but the rule is, for convenience and of necessity, applied when justice demands that such laws of other jurisdictions be given effect. It is not applied when to do so would be contrary to the statutory law or contravene the public policy of the state of the forum.

It is generally held that the rule of comity extends to rights only and does not in general apply to remedies. Mexican Nat. Ry. Co. v. Jackson (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. 230; M., K & T. Ry. Co. v. Swartz, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 115 S. W. 275; C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 S. Ct. 797, 43 L. Ed. 1144.

It is likewise uniformly declared by the authorities that exemption laws have no extraterritorial effect; hence the question as to whether exemption laws of another state can be applied has been found by the courts to be a question of great difficulty and concerning which there is in the decisions a manifest contrariety of opinion. In order that the rule referred to may find application in any case, it is generally necessary that the laws of the state, where the application of the rule is sought to be made, must have a general public policy in conformity to the foreign law sought to be applied. Most of the authorities cited by appellant denying exemptions under the laws of other states are based upon the ground that no such exemption law is found in the state of the forum, and hence to apply the rule would be to give the exemption laws extraterritorial effect, such as Railway v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 S. Ct. 797, 43 L. Ed. 1144. In other cases where the application of the rule contended for in this case is denied, the person seeking exemption was shown not to be entitled thereto under the law invoked, as Carson v. Memphis & Charleston Railway Co., 88 Tenn. 646, 13 S. W. 588, 8 L. R. A. 412, 17 Am. St. Rep. 921; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Swartz, supra.

There are a number of cases, however, which deny the application of the rule where the exemption laws of both states are practically the same, and where the party seeking it would be entitled thereto under the laws of either state. Goodwin v. Claytor, 137 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 173, 67 L. R. A. 209, 107 Am. St. Rep. 479; Rogers v. Raisor, 60 Iowa, 355, 14 N. W. 317; Dalton v. Webb, 83 Iowa, 478, 50 N. W. 58, 32 Am. St. Rep. 314; State Bank of Eagle Grove v. Dougherty, 167 Mo. 1, 66 S. W. 932, 90 Am. St. Rep. 422; Wickwire v. Zeller (Ky.) 68 S. W. 630; Steele v. Reid, 284 Mo. 269, 223 S. W. 882.

A number of cases apply the rule where the exemption laws of both states are similar. Pierce v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 283; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Maltby, 34 Kan. 125, 8 P. 235; Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gough, 35 Kan. 1, 10 P. 89; K. C., F. S. & M. Ry. Co. v....