Strawn v. Sokoloff

• Decision Date: 31 March 2023
• Docket Number: 1:22-CV-1245 AWI EPG
• Parties: RAE DEAN STRAWN, Plaintiff v. BRUCE SOKOLOFF, J. ANAYA, CITY OF PORTERVIILLE, and DOES 1-25 inclusive, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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RAE DEAN STRAWN, Plaintiff v. BRUCE SOKOLOFF, J. ANAYA, CITY OF PORTERVIILLE, and DOES 1-25 inclusive, Defendants

No. 1:22-CV-1245 AWI EPG

United States District Court, E.D. California

March 31, 2023

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 10)

This is s civil rights lawsuit that arises from an encounter between Plaintiff Rae Strawn (“Strawn”) and two officers of the Porterville Police Department (“PPD”) Defendants Bruce Sokoloff (“Sokoloff') and J. Anaya (“Anaya”). Strawn brings claims against Sokoloff Anaya, and City of Porterville (“the City”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment and Monell liability, and California common law tort theories (assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (‘TIED” and “NIED” respectively), negligent supervision, negligent retention, negligent hiring, negligent training, gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence). Currently before the Court is Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and alternative Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted in part and denied in part and the Rule 12(e) motion will be denied.

RULE 12(b)(6) FRAMEWORK

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 41 F.4th 1109 1114 (9th Cir. 2022). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021). However, complaints that offer no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1145. The Court is “not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2022). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Miller v. Sawant, 18 F.4th 328, 336 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs cannot “rely on anticipated discovery to satisfy Rules 8 and 12(b)(6); rather, pleadings must assert well-pleaded factual allegations to advance to discovery.” Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2021); see Mujica v. AirScan, Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 593 (9th Cir. 2014). If a motion to dismiss is granted, “[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made . . . .” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

From the Complaint, on January 18, 2022, Strawn was attending a public City council meeting. Prior to the beginning of the meeting, Sokoloff approached Strawn and ordered her to put on a facemask. The California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) had reinstated an indoor masking mandate from December 15, 2021 to February 15, 2022. See Doc. No. 10-2 at Ex. A.^[1] Facemasks were available to the public at a table near the entrance of the council building. Strawn got facemask from the table and put the mask on.

A few minutes later, Sokoloff approached Strawn and ordered her to pull the facemask over her nose. Strawn replied that she was wearing her mask in the exact same manner as Sokoloff. At that point, Sokoloff ordered Strawn to stand up because she was now under arrest. Strawn asked Sokoloff what law she had violated, but Sokoloff did not answer.

Sokoloff and Anaya then allegedly assaulted, battered, and arrested Strawn with handcuffs. Sokoloff and Anaya forcefibly removed Strawn from the City council chambers and took Strawn to their patrol vehicle, where they searched Strawn. Sokoloff and Anaya forced Strawn into their patrol vehicle and transported her to PPD for booking. Sokoloff and Anaya allegedly had no probable cause to arrest or search Strawn.

DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS

Defendants' Arguments

Defendants argues that Strawn's second, third, fourth and fifth claims should be dismissed.

With respect to the second cause of action for Monell liability, Defendants argue that the Complaint is devoid of any facts that plausibly show that the City had a custom or practice of depriving people of their constitutional rights. Further, the Complaint fails to identify a final policymaker who either created a policy or ratified unconstitutional conduct. While the Complaint alleges a failure to discipline, that alone does not demonstrate ratification.

With respect to the assault and battery claims, the Complaint is conclusory and contains no plausible facts that support the elements of these torts. In particular, there are no facts alleged that the officers acted with an intent to harm or that Strawn did not consent to the touching.

With respect to the false arrest/false imprisonment claim, the Complaint contains no allegations that address the necessary elements of the absence of consent and the absence of lawful privilege. Further, the arrest occurred during a time in which the CDPH had an indoor mask mandate in place. Therefore, the arrest of Strawn was lawful.

With respect to the claims of IIED, NIED, gross negligence, and willful and wanton negligence, the Complaint fails to identify a statutory provision that would make the City liable. Without a statute that makes the City liable, no plausible claim is stated.

With respect to the negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training claims, the Complaint fails to identify a statute for purposes of direct liability that would make the City liable. Further, there is no vicarious liability through Gov. Code § 815.2(a) against the City for these because there was no special relationship between Defendants and Strawn. Therefore, no plausible claims can be stated.

Finally, Defendants argue that the request for punitive damages must be dismissed. Punitive damages against the City cannot be recovered under either state or federal law, and the Complaint does not reveal an adequate factual basis to support punitive damages against Sokoloff and Anaya.

Plaintiff's Opposition

Strawn argues that dismissal is not appropriate.

With respect to the second cause of action, Strawn argues that she was arrested without probable cause and that the CDPH mandate was a recommendation, not a law. She was not told what laws she was violating and was never formally charged with anything. The City deficiently trained its officers with respect to searches, seizures, and excessive force because Strawn was arrested without probable cause, was handcuffed too tightly (which resulted in the cuffs cutting into her skin), was forcibly placed in a patrol car even though she could not bend her knee due to multiple surgeries, and had her complaints of physical injury ignored. This demonstrates an obvious need to train about constitutional limitations. Further, the City ratified Sokoloff's and Anaya's unconstitutional actions because the City approved of their actions and the bases for them. Because the Complaint demonstrates a need to train and ratification, dismissal is improper.

With respect to assault and battery, the Complaint alleges that Sokoloff intended to place Strawn under arrest for allegedly failing to comply with a facemask requirement, forcefully removed her from the council meeting, placed her in handcuffs, and forcibly put her in the patrol vehicle. All this caused fear, pain, and physical injuries. These allegations support plausible claims.

With respect to false arrest/false imprisonment, the Complaint alleges that Sokoloff and Anaya did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest or place her in the patrol vehicle or to take her to the PPD for processing. Sokoloff and Anaya's actions constituted an arbitrary detention and they are the basis for liability against the City through Gov. Code § 815.2(a).

With respect to IIED, NIED, and gross negligence, the allegations demonstrate that Sokoloff and Anaya acted without any legal basis when they arrested, physically harmed, and transported Strawn to the PPD, all because she did not have her nose covered by a facemask, just like Sokoloff. Sokoloff and Anaya's actions were outrageous and caused Strawn physical injury, pain, fear, humiliation, and emotional distress. Therefore, plausible claims have been stated.

With respect to the claims for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, the officers owed Strawn a duty of care under Rowlandv. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108 (1968) and the City is liable through Gov. Code § 815.2(a).

With respect to willful and wanton negligence, the Complaint shows that...