Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family, L. L.C., S-16-664.
| Citation | 901 N.W.2d 284,297 Neb. 773 |
| Decision Date | 15 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. S-16-664.,S-16-664. |
| Parties | STRECK, INC., a Nebraska corporation, appellee, v. RYAN FAMILY, L.L.C., appellee, and Stacy Ryan, individually and derivatively on behalf of Ryan Family, L.L.C., appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
Paul Heimann, Bonnie M. Boryca, and Karen M. Keeler, of Erickson & Sederstrom, P.C., Omaha, for appellant.
John D. Stalnaker and Aimee K. Cizek, of Stalnaker, Becker & Buresh, P.C., Omaha, for appellee Ryan Family, L.L.C.
Thomas H. Dahlk and Victoria H. Buter, of Kutak Rock, L.L.P., Omaha, and Ronald E. Reagan, of Reagan, Melton & Delaney, L.L.P., La Vista, for appellee Streck, Inc.
In January 2016, Streck, Inc., filed a complaint against the Ryan Family, L.L.C. (L.L.C.), in the district court for Sarpy County. Streck's complaint alleged the L.L.C. breached a lease agreement containing an option to purchase real property and sought specific performance. The L.L.C. responded and defended the action. In June, a member of the L.L.C. moved to intervene in her own behalf and on behalf of the L.L.C. She appeals from the district court's order denying her motion. We affirm.
Streck is a Nebraska corporation with its principal place of business in La Vista, Sarpy County, Nebraska. The L.L.C. is a Nebraska limited liability company composed of six members of the Ryan family, including Stacy Ryan (Ryan). The L.L.C.'s only asset is real property located in La Vista, which it leases to Streck, and the cash generated from the rental of that property.
The L.L.C. leased the property to Streck pursuant to an agreement dated December 1999 and subsequently amended. The lease gave Streck an option to purchase the property from the L.L.C. based on certain conditions. Streck claims it met the conditions and properly exercised the option. Based on the date Streck exercised the option, closing should have occurred no later than January 3, 2016. When no closing occurred, Streck filed suit against the L.L.C.
Streck filed its complaint January 13, 2016, in the district court. It sought an order declaring the L.L.C. in breach of the lease and ordering specific performance of the option to purchase.
The L.L.C. operating agreement vests all management duties in a management board consisting of comanagers Wayne Ryan and Connie Ryan. After being served with the complaint, the comanagers of the L.L.C. filed an application for appointment of a receiver to represent the L.L.C., citing a conflict which they described as follows:
No party opposed the comanagers' request, and the court appointed a receiver to represent the L.L.C.'s interest in the lawsuit.
On March 3, 2016, the receiver, on behalf of the L.L.C., filed an answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim alleged that Streck was in default of the lease agreement when it attempted to exercise the option and that the default voided Streck's right to exercise the option.
On June 15, 2016, Streck moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to find as a matter of law that it was not in default at the time it exercised the option to purchase. At the hearing on the partial summary judgment motion, the parties offered a joint stipulation, which the court received. Posthearing briefing was permitted, and the matter was set for further proceedings on July 5.
On June 22, 2016, Ryan filed a "Complaint in Intervention" seeking to intervene "on her own behalf and derivatively on behalf of the [L.L.C.]" On June 27, she moved to continue the summary judgment hearing scheduled for July 5. On June 29, Ryan filed a "Motion for Order Permitting Complaint in Intervention" asking for "an order permitting her to intervene [and] allowing her Complaint in Intervention, filed and served on June 22, 2016."
All of Ryan's motions were taken up at a hearing on July 1, 2016. On July 5, the court entered two orders. One order overruled Ryan's motion to intervene, and the other overruled her motion to continue the summary judgment hearing.
Neither order set forth the court's reasoning. Ryan appeals from both orders. We moved the appeal to our docket on our own motion.1
Ryan assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1) disallowing her complaint in intervention; (2) denying her motion to intervene, including her request for access to the parties' prior discovery and her request to conduct additional discovery; and (3) failing to continue the hearing on Stack's motion for summary judgment or to reopen the summary judgment record to allow her an opportunity to conduct necessary discovery and to participate in the summary judgment proceedings.
Whether a party has the right to intervene in a proceeding is a question of law.2 On a question of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the court below.3
Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.4 Since at least 1985, we have held that an order denying intervention is a final order for purposes of appeal.5 Streck acknowledges this, but contends that our final order jurisprudence has failed to consider the effect of the Legislature's adoption in 2000 of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315 (Reissue 2016). Section 25-1315(1) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Streck argues that the order denying Ryan's motion to intervene did not meet the requirements of § 25-1315, because it did not contain an express determination that there was no just reason for delay and it did not expressly direct entry of judgment.
We conclude § 25-1315 does not modify our final order jurisprudence as it regards orders denying intervention. The plain language of the statute references claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims, but does not mention complaints in intervention. Moreover, even after § 25-1315 was enacted, we continued to apply our existing final order jurisprudence to orders denying intervention,6 and we see no principled basis to depart from that precedent. For these reasons, we conclude that our final order jurisprudence regarding orders denying intervention was not superseded by § 25-1315and that the order denying Ryan's motion to intervene is a final, appealable order. We have jurisdiction over this appeal, and Streck's arguments to the contrary are without merit.
The right to intervene is granted by statute in Nebraska. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-328 (Reissue 2016) provides:
Any person who has or claims an interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties to an action, or against both, in any action pending or to be brought in any of the courts of the State of Nebraska, may become a party to an action between any other persons or corporations, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendants in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and defendant, either before or after issue has been joined in the action, and before the trial commences.
Ryan bases her intervention rights solely on § 25-328, so we begin by reviewing the legal propositions governing such intervention.
As a prerequisite to intervention under § 25-328, the intervenor must have a direct and legal interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action.7 An indirect, remote, or conjectural interest in the result of a suit is not enough to establish intervention as a matter of right.8 Simply having a claim that arises out of the same facts as the claims at issue in the litigation does not constitute having a sufficient interest to support intervention.9 Therefore, a person seeking to intervene must allege facts showing that he or she possesses the requisite legal interest in the subject matter of the action.10 For purposes of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Transcanada Keystone Pipeline, LP v. Dunavan (In re Application No. Op-0003)
...Motor Vehicles , 273 Neb. 178, 728 N.W.2d 570 (2007).80 In re Grand Jury of Douglas Cty. , supra note 21.81 Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family , 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017) ; Basin Elec. Power Co-op v. Little Blue N.R.D. , 219 Neb. 372, 363 N.W.2d 500 (1985). See, Wayne L. Ryan Revocable T......
-
Mann v. Mann
......").57 See cases cited supra note 5.58 See State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K., supra note 27, citing Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family , 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017) ; State v. Harris , 267 Neb. 771, 677 N.W.2d 147 (2004) ; Guardian Tax Partners, supra note...
-
Jennifer T. v. Lindsay P.
...Klein v. Klein , supra note 18.45 See In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al. , supra note 33.46 See id.47 See Streck, Inc. v . Ryan Family , 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017). Compare In re Adoption of Amea R. , supra note 3.48 See Smith v. Smith, supra note 19.49 In re Interest of L.W, 241 ......
-
Mann v. Mann
...... & Rycki K., supra note 27, citing Streck... & Rycki K., supra note 27, citing Streck, Inc...v. Ryan...v. Ryan Family......