Street v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
| Decision Date | 13 February 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,245 - (87) |
| Citation | 145 N.W. 746,124 Minn. 517 |
| Parties | JOHN STREET v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Goodhue county to recover $3,000 for personal injuries. The amended complaint, among other matters, alleged that defendant and its servants negligently failed to warn plaintiff that it would not be safe for him to enter the car to assist his sister or to warn him that it was not safe for him to attempt to alight from the car after it was started, but on the contrary represented that it was safe and proper for him to do so and that he would have sufficient time to do so and alight from the car before it would start to leave the station, in accordance with law and the usual custom of defendant company in the operation of its passenger trains. The answer admitted that plaintiff's sister became a passenger upon one of defendant's trains; that plaintiff accompanied her upon the train, but not for the purpose of becoming a passenger; that he stayed upon the train until it had left the station and that in alighting from the train while it was in motion he sustained some personal injury and denied the other allegations of the complaint, and alleged that the injury was the result of plaintiff's want of due care. The reply expressly denied that plaintiff remained upon the passenger train until it had left the station, and alleged that when he alighted the train was still at the station, being at the platform or pavement maintained by the company for the discharge and reception of passengers and about opposite the north end of the station building, and denied that his injury was caused by any lack of care on his part. The case was tried before Johnson, J who when plaintiff rested granted defendant's motion to dismiss the action. From the order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial, he appealed. Reversed.
Passenger -- duty of carrier to companion.
1. One entering a railway train for the purpose of assisting an outgoing passenger, but himself not intending to take passage, is neither a passenger nor trespasser; and the extent of the company's duty, when without notice of his presence, is, in the absence of statute, to exercise ordinary care not to injure him while there or when attempting to alight, which does not include any duty to hold the train to enable him to alight safely.
Statutory stop of passenger train.
2. Such a person, however, is within the protection of G.S. 1913 § 4399, requiring passenger trains to stop "a sufficient time, not less than one minute, to safely discharge and receive passengers."
Statute inapplicable.
3. Nor is he within the inhibition of G.S. 1913, § 9010, making it unlawful "for any person other than a passenger or employee to get on or off, or attempt to get on or off * * * any engine or car" while in motion.
Questions for the jury.
4. Whether defendant violated the duty prescribed by section 4399, and whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to alight from the train while it was in motion, held, under the evidence, questions for the jury.
C. P. Carpenter, for appellant.
F. W. Root, Nelson J. Wilcox and F. M. Wilson, for respondent.
Plaintiff's action to recover damages for personal injuries was dismissed at the close of his evidence, and this is an appeal from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff entered defendant's passenger train at a station in this state, for the purpose of assisting a lady passenger, himself, however, not intending to take passage, but to leave the car as soon as his errand thereon was accomplished. Entering the front end of the car, they proceeded to a seat near the middle, when, observing the train was in motion, he hastily passed to the rear vestibule, intending to alight, but finding this closed hurried back through the car to the front end, attempted to alight, fell and was injured.
1. Plaintiff was neither a passenger nor trespasser. One entering a car for the purpose of assisting an outgoing passenger, while there so engaged, is under implied invitation from the company; the extent of its duty, if without notice of his presence, being, in the absence of statute, to exercise ordinary care not to injure him while there or when attempting to alight. The train crew were without notice of plaintiff's presence on the train; hence defendant owed him no common-law duty to hold the train either a sufficient or reasonable time to enable him to alight safely.
Plaintiff's case, however, is not grounded on common-law negligence, but depends upon defendant's failure to comply with the statutory duty -- which under the evidence was for the jury -- to stop "a sufficient time, not less than one minute, to safely discharge and receive passengers," prescribed by G.S. 1913, § 4399; while defendant's contention, adopted by the trial court, is that plaintiff's right of recovery, if otherwise sustainable, is defeated by section 9010, which reads as follows:
It may be conceded that, if plaintiff is without the former statute or the exception of the latter, he cannot recover; (for defendant's duty, if any, lay in the first, and the second would constitute a bar under the doctrine that where one's violation of law contributes directly and proximately to his injury he is remediless). The question, then, turns upon the inclusiveness of the term "passengers," employed in both sections, as indicative of their scope and intended operation. The ordinary rules governing construction of civil statutes should be applied to the first, while the second, being penal, must be strictly construed. We think it clear that plaintiff was within the protection of the provision first quoted. It would violate ordinary rules of construction and be an unwarrantable assumption of legislative intent to hold -- especially in view of the universal practice of persons assisting passengers in boarding trains, acquiesced in by carriers and for their benefit -- that one not technically a passenger could not found a claim of negligence upon violation of this statute. On the other hand, under the established rule of construction, it is equally clear that the legislature did not intend thus to restrict the exception of the latter section. The evident purpose was to prohibit trespasses upon engines and cars while in motion, a dangerous practice annoying to the companies, indulged in particularly in towns and villages. Were the purpose protection of persons lawfully on trains, passengers as well as others undoubtedly would have been included in the prohibition; for the same likelihood of injury exists as to both. We do not question the power of the legislature to exempt passengers from the inhibition of the statute; but the construction given must be reasonable and practical, and the intent should control though contrary to the letter, thus preventing absurd and unjust results, to be avoided unless the language used will reasonably bear no other interpretation. 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. §§ 8939, 8940, 8947. In the early case of United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 226 (292), it was held that a criminal offense should not be created by an uncertain and doubtful construction; and this rule has since been adhered to. See State v. Small, 29 Minn. 216, 218, 12 N.W. 703; State v. Finch, 37 Minn. 433, 34 N.W. 904.
In this connection we cannot be oblivious of the fact that, if this statute is to be read literally, it is openly and hourly violated. In East v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 195 N.Y. 409, 88 N.E. 751, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 513, it was held that a statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to get "on any car or train while in motion for the purpose of obtaining transportation thereon as a passenger," did not apply to persons in good faith intending to take passage, but only to those endeavoring to obtain transportation contrary to the rules of the company.
"It is contended," said Mr. Justice Gray, at pages 411, 412 ] ...
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