Streetman v. Lynaugh
| Decision Date | 06 January 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-2004,88-2004 |
| Citation | 835 F.2d 1521 |
| Parties | Robert L. STREETMAN, Petitioner-Appellant v. James A. LYNAUGH, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent- Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Robert L. McGlasson, Austin, Tex., Will Gray, Houston, Tex., Michael S. McNeely, Richmond, Tex., for petitioner-appellant.
Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., William C. Zapalac, Paula Offenhauser, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before RUBIN, JOHNSON, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Robert L. Streetman alleges that his sentence of death is scheduled for execution on Thursday, January 7, 1988, at 12:01 a.m. On Wednesday, January 6, 1988, Streetman moved this Court to enforce an allegedly outstanding order of this Court staying execution of his death sentence. At the same time, Streetman applied in the alternative for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, and for a stay of execution. For the reasons assigned below, we deny the motion for enforcement. Further, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and deny the application for a certificate of probable cause and new stay of execution.
The State of Texas has convicted Streetman of capital murder and sentenced him to death. After pursuing habeas corpus remedies in Texas state courts, Streetman unsuccessfully applied to federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution.
On May 6, 1986, this Court granted Streetman's application for a certificate of probable cause and stay of execution. On appeal, Streetman "contend[ed] that his trial attorneys were ineffective in failing to discover that Streetman's statements to authorities were inadmissible and in failing to urge suppression of those statements." 1 On March 9, 1987, this Court reversed the district court's judgment denying habeas corpus relief and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On May 8, 1987, this Court received a letter purportedly from Streetman expressing his desire to have a new date for execution of his death sentence and explaining that the hearing ordered by this Court "would be a great waste of time and money because I would have to lie on the stand under oath if a hearing is held to prove coercement [sic] of my statement's [sic]." On May 21, 1987, the federal district court nonetheless conducted an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, Streetman's counsel Will Gray moved to withdraw. The court carried the motion with the case. Gray nonetheless stated that he would not represent Streetman at the hearing.
The court and the State then questioned Streetman generally about the letter received by this Court and his willingness to proceed with the hearing. Attorney Gray moved the court to appoint a psychiatrist to determine Streetman's mental competence to forgo the legal processes available to him. The court carried the motion with the case.
The State was then permitted to call witnesses for testimony bearing upon the voluntariness of Streetman's confessions. Neither Streetman nor Gray questioned the State's witnesses. Neither Streetman nor Gray presented evidence on the voluntariness issue, although Streetman did state that the State's witnesses had been truthful.
On November 7, 1987, the federal district court issued an opinion (1) denying Attorney Gray's motion to withdraw, (2) denying Gray's motion to appoint a psychiatrist, (3) determining Streetman mentally competent to choose to forgo further litigation, and (4) determining that Streetman's trial attorneys had not rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to urge suppression of his confessions. Accordingly, on that same day, the federal district court entered a judgment denying habeas corpus relief. Streetman has not appealed from this judgment.
On January 4, 1988, Streetman moved the federal district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the November 7 judgment denying habeas corpus relief. On this date, January 6, 1988, the district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion.
Streetman now moves this Court for enforcement of this Court's stay of execution granted May 6, 1986. In the alternative, Streetman applies for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the federal district court denial of the Rule 60(b) motion and for a new stay of execution.
This Court's stay order of May 6, 1986, states that Streetman's "application for a stay of execution pending appeal is GRANTED pending further order by this Court." Streetman contends that "no further order by this Court" has issued and that the stay order is therefore still in effect. We disagree.
The operative language of the stay order grants an application for "a stay of execution pending appeal." That appeal was heard and disposed of. The judgment of this Court disposing of the appeal by reversing and remanding did not retain jurisdiction. The appeal is therefore no longer pending. Once the appeal was no longer pending, the stay order by its own terms dissolved. Under these circumstances, the phrase pending further order by this Court in the stay order must be taken to refer to a possible further order between the time of the May 6 grant of the stay order and dissolution of that stay order by its terms upon final disposition of the appeal then pending.
The stay order of May 6, 1986, has already dissolved, and we therefore deny Streetman's motion to enforce a dissolved order.
The standard governing the application for a certificate of probable cause requires this Court to determine whether Streetman has made " 'a "substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right." ' " 2
Under this standard, the movant in a capital case " 'need not always show the probability of success on the merits [so long as] he ... present[s] a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show[s] that the balance of the equities (i.e. the other three factors) weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay.' " 4
Streetman's application represents that his appeal, if permitted, would principally present for review whether the federal district court erred in denying the Rule 60(b) motion on the grounds (1) that the court should have appointed a psychiatrist to determine Streetman's mental competence to forgo further litigation, (2) that the federal district court's determination of mental competence is erroneous, (3) that the federal district court should have appointed another attorney to represent Streetman, and (4) that the evidentiary hearing conducted by the federal district court on May 21, 1987, did not satisfy this Court's mandate remanding for a hearing.
A motion under Rule 60(b) is " 'directed to the sound discretion of the district court' "; consequently, the appellate court reviews a denial " 'only for abuse of that discretion.' " 5 If the federal district court's denial of relief from its refusal to appoint a psychiatrist and its determination of Streetman's mental competence would be sustainable under this standard then the other issues presented by Streetman's application need not be considered because they concern asserted errors in legal proceedings Streetman would have chosen to forgo. 6
In Rees v. Peyton, 7 a state criminal defendant under a death sentence filed a petition for certiorari to review a court of appeals decision affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief. Before the Supreme Court had acted upon the certiorari petition, the defendant Rees withdrew the petition and decided to "forgo any further legal proceedings." 8 In "aid of the proper exercise of [its] certiorari jurisdiction," the Supreme Court directed the federal district court to "make a judicial determination as to Rees' mental competence," that is, "whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises." 9 In the margin, we set forth the elaboration of the Rees test this Circuit undertook in Rumbaugh v. Procunier. 10
The Supreme Court also observed that it would "be appropriate for the District Court to subject Rees to psychiatric and other appropriate medical examinations," citing for support by analogy the federal statutory provisions presently codified at 18 U.S.C. Secs. 4241-4247 11 that authorize a federal district court in a federal criminal prosecution to order "psychiatric or psychological examination" 12 of a defendant whose mental competency to stand trial is in issue.
The dimensions of the federal district court power recognized in Rees to order psychiatric examination have yet to be spelled out. We are nevertheless confident that the district court, if it can be required to exercise this power, is so required only once a certain threshold showing has been made, just as the district court is not required to exercise its power under the statutes cited by the Rees Court until a certain showing has been made. We turn then to the case law concerning those statutes for guidance.
An order under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241 requiring psychiatric or psychological examination calls for " 'an exercise of judicial discretion to determine if...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Whitley
...unsettled, compare, e.g., Reyes, 945 F.2d at 864, with, e.g., May v. Collins, 961 F.2d 74, 75-76 (5th Cir.1992); Streetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521, 1527 (5th Cir.1988), we are inclined to agree with the state that Fulford's motion for reconsideration is best viewed as yet another habeas p......
-
U.S. v. Garrett
...--- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 195, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1989); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877-78 (2d Cir.1988); Streetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036, 107 S.Ct. 888, 93 L.Ed.2d 841......
-
U.S. v. Mason
...v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 285 n. 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1989); Streetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (5th Cir.1988). This case thus requires us to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in determining no reasonable c......
-
King v. Lynaugh
...record is equally bereft of evidence of intoxication. Thus, we reject this claim as unsupported by the record. See Streetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521, 1527 (5th Cir.1988) (trial court's finding on competency to forego further legal proceedings is a factual determination that is reviewed un......