U.S. v. Mason

• Decision Date: 09 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-5520,93-5520
• Citation: 52 F.3d 1286
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Eugene MASON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1286

52 F.3d 1286

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Eugene MASON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-5520.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Dec. 9, 1994.

Decided May 9, 1995.

ARGUED: Robert Thomas Vaughn, Nashville, TN; William D. McNaull, Jr., Charlotte, NC, for appellant. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charlotte, NC, for appellee. ON BRIEF: Jerry W. Miller, U.S. Atty., Charlotte, NC, for appellee.

Before RUSSELL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Reversed by published opinion. Senior Judge LAY wrote the opinion, in which Judge RUSSELL and Judge MOTZ joined.

OPINION

LAY, Senior Circuit Judge:

Paul Eugene Mason was convicted of importation and sale of drug paraphernalia and participation in drug distribution conspiracies in violation of federal law. ¹ After his conviction, Mason was released pending the completion of the forfeiture phase of his trial, scheduled for the following morning. Before the commencement of the forfeiture proceedings, Mason attempted suicide in his parked van outside the courthouse by plunging a ten-inch butcher knife into his chest. He survived two major surgeries.

Following motions filed by both the defense and the Government for a competency hearing, the district court ordered a psychological examination of Mason pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4244(b), which authorizes an evaluation to determine a convicted defendant's competency to be sentenced. This examination was conducted at the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North Carolina ("FCI Butner"). By letter filed with the court, on February 16, 1993, the warden informed the court that the psychological evaluation showed that Mason was suffering from a mental disease or defect for which he required care and treatment. Although the defendant's original motion did not specify whether a hearing should be held on Mason's competency to stand trial during the first phase of the trial, the Government's motion requested a hearing to determine whether Mason was competent to proceed with the forfeiture trial as well as a specific request for an evaluation to determine whether Mason was insane at the time of the commission of the offenses with which he was charged. On the same date that the warden's letter was filed with the court, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on his alleged incompetence during the first phase of the trial and requested a hearing to present evidence on this motion.

On February 22, 1993, the district court held a hearing to determine Mason's competence to proceed to the forfeiture phase of the trial and to sentencing. At that time, defense counsel orally moved for a competency hearing to determine Mason's competence during the first phase of the trial. The court denied that motion, as well as the defendant's motion for a new trial. The court ordered Mason be placed in the custody of the Attorney General to determine his present mental condition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4244. ²

Defense counsel filed a renewed motion for a new trial or for a hearing to determine Mason's competence during the first phase of the trial on April 9, 1993, and submitted an affidavit in support of that motion. ³ The district court denied the motion for substantive reasons, although it found the motion untimely. On April 20, 1993, defense counsel filed a third motion for a new trial or for a retrospective competency hearing, which was similarly denied. In its final order denying the motions, the court threatened defense counsel with sanctions if they raised the issue again.

By letter dated April 27, 1993, the warden at FCI Butner informed the court that Mason no longer suffered from a mental disease or defect that would prevent him from proceeding to the forfeiture phase of the trial and to sentencing. A hearing was held on May 20, 1993, and the court determined Mason was competent to continue. The forfeiture and sentencing proceedings took place on June 28, 1993. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the defendant raises three issues: (1) the sufficiency of the indictment; (2) the authority of the United States Customs Service to search his place of business; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide him with an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was competent during the first phase of his trial. We find no merit to the first ⁴ or second ⁵ claim raised by the defendant. We now more fully address Mason's challenge to the district court's refusal to grant a competency hearing to determine his competence during the first phase of the trial.

The conviction of a defendant when he is legally incompetent is a violation of due process. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903-04, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). The test for mental competence is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).

Congress has safeguarded this right by providing that trial courts conduct competency hearings under the following circumstances:

At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241(a). The district court must sua sponte order a competency hearing if reasonable cause is demonstrated. United States v. Fuller, 15 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2689, 129 L.Ed.2d 820 (1994); Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 760 (1st Cir.1990). Whether reasonable cause exists under Sec. 4241 is a question left to the discretion of the trial court. United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 285 n. 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1989); Streetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (5th Cir.1988). This case thus requires us to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in determining no reasonable cause existed to order a Sec. 4241 competency hearing. Under the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the district court; rather, we must determine whether the court's exercise of discretion, considering the law and the facts, was arbitrary or capricious. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.1993). One of the ways in which a district court may abuse its discretion is in applying erroneous legal principles to the case. Id.

The district court found that the rule of law governing its determination of whether to grant a competency hearing was the standard outlined in United States v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427 (7th Cir.1992). In Teague, the defendant's trial counsel never raised the issue of competency in the trial court and appellate counsel raised the issue for the first time on appeal. The Seventh Circuit held that "where the issue of the defendant's mental competency to stand trial was not raised in the trial court, in order to justify a retrospective competency hearing, the appellant 'must present facts "sufficient to positively, unequivocally and clearly generate a real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to [his] mental competence." ' " Id. at 1431-32 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 927 (7th Cir.1991)). With all due respect to the court below, we find that the application of this strict standard rather than the reasonable cause standard in Sec. 4241, was a fundamental error of law. Teague is inapposite here because Mason's trial counsel did raise the issue of competency in the trial court, albeit after the first phase of the trial. The terms of Sec. 4241 indicate that the defendant's competence may be raised "[a]t any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant...." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4241(a). Thus, the standard in Sec. 4241 governs whether the competency issue is raised before or after trial. See United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 766-67 (3d Cir.1987) (applying Sec. 4241 "reasonable cause" standard even though facts calling into question the defendant's competence to stand trial were not discovered until post-trial proceedings).

In determining whether there is reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a trial court must consider all evidence before it, including evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant's demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning the defendant's competence. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908; Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir.1987); Thompson v. Blackburn, 776 F.2d 118, 123 (5th Cir.1985). "[E]ven one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient." Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908. Medical opinions are "usually persuasive evidence on the question of whether a sufficient doubt exists" as to the defendant's competence. Griffin v. Lockhart, 935 F.2d 926, 930 (8th Cir.1991). The trial court must "look at the record as a whole and accept as true all evidence of possible incompetence" in determining whether to order a competency hearing. Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir.198...