Strickland v. Calancorporation, Limited

• Decision Date: 31 December 1957
• Citation: 156 Cal.App.2d 488,319 P.2d 737
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lawrence STRICKLAND and William Parr, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALANCORPORATION, Ltd., a California corporation, W. J. Haryett, Barton J. A. Wander, San Joaquin Savings and Loan Association, a California corporation, San Joaquin Building and Loan Association, a California corporation, Defendants. Barton J. A. Wander, Respondent. Civ. 22233.

Page 737

319 P.2d 737

156 Cal.App.2d 488

Lawrence STRICKLAND and William Parr, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CALANCORPORATION, Ltd., a California corporation, W. J. Haryett, Barton J. A. Wander, San Joaquin Savings and Loan Association, a California corporation, San Joaquin Building and Loan Association, a California corporation, Defendants Barton J. A. Wander, Respondent.

Civ. 22233.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Dec. 31, 1957.

Edward H. Blixt, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Henry A. Fox, Los Angeles, for respondent.

PARKER WOOD, Justice.

Appeal by plaintiffs from a summary judgment for defendant Wander in an action for declaratory relief, to quiet title to real property, and for a mandatory injunction. The defendants named in the action were Calancorporation, Ltd., W. J. Haryett, Barton J. A. Wander, San Joaquin Savings and Loan Association and San Joaquin Building and Loan Association. The record does not show that any defendant other than Wander appeared in the action. The second amended complaint will be referred to as the complaint.

The allegations of the first cause of action are, in part, as follows: About July 31, 1951, plaintiff Lawrence Strickland herein, his wife Ruth, and Luther Strickland and Amos Bunting, made a promissory note for $3,250 payable to San Joaquin Building and Loan Association, and as security for the note they executed a trust deed wherein defendant Calancorporation, Ltd., was named trustee. A default occurred under the note and trust deed, and the San Joaquin Savings and Loan Association requested the trustee to record a notice of default. Thereafter, on November 23, 30 and December 7, 1955, the trustee published a notice of trustee's sale to be held on December 20, 1955, at 10:30 a. m., at the east entrance of the Hall of Justice in Los Angeles, and stated therein that the property would be sold for cash to the highest bidder. At all times mentioned in the complaint, plaintiff Parr was the agent of plaintiff Strickland and was acting within the scope of his authority. On December 20, 1955, (at the time and place stated in the notice) defendant Haryett, who purported to be an employee of the trustee, purportedly conducted a trustee's sale of the property. At said sale plaintiff Strickland appeared as a bidder through his agent Parr. Plaintiff Parr bid $3,000 for the property and showed defendant Haryett 'said cash.' Defendant Wander and others bid on the property. Wander made the final bid which was $5,200. On many occasions during said bidding, plaintiff Parr, his attorney, and Haryett requested Wander and the other bidders to display cash to support their bids. Wander and the other bidders refused to display any cash. After the final bid by Wander, Parr and his attorney requested Wander to display his cash. Wander refused to display his cash 'to both the plaintiff and his attorney.' 'Plaintiff' alleges upon information and belief that Wander did not have the cash and did not give the trustee cash. Wander 'had and gave the said trustee only $100.00 cash, a $2500.00 check, and secured his trust deed and promissory note for $2600.00.' 'Plaintiff' alleges upon information and belief that the trustee has issued a trustee's deed to Wander, and that Wander has recorded said deed as a cloud on 'plaintiff's' title to the property. At all times mentioned in the complaint plaintiff Strickland was the owner of the property.

Further allegations of the first cause of action are: An actual controversy exists between the plaintiffs and defendants as to the interest 'created' by the trustee's sale and deed. Plaintiffs contend that the trustee did not comply with the statutes 'requiring notice'; that Haryett had no authority to conduct the sale; and that plaintiffs were the successful bidders at the sale which was advertised for cash, and plaintiffs were the only persons who had and displayed cash for the purchase price of the property. Defendants contend that all the code sections governing the sale were complied with and that Haryett had authority to conduct the sale; that the defendants did not have to display cash, or buy the property for cash, but could use checks; and that their checks and trust deed are comparable to cash.

Further allegations of the first cause of action are: The property was purportedly sold for $5,200. There is a second trust deed for $5,000 against the property, and the obligation thereunder 'was presently due' and unsatisfied. On December 20, 1954, the unpaid balance on the first trust deed (the one under which the sale was held) was $2,600.

The second cause of action incorporated, by reference, all the allegations of the first cause of action, and alleged further: At all times mentioned in the complaint, plaintiff Strickland was the owner of the property. The trustee has issued its grant deed purportedly conveying said property to Wander. Wander has recorded the deed in the Los Angeles County Recorder's office. The deed creates a cloud on plaintiffs' title to the property. Wander has no title to or interest in the property.

A further cause of action incorporated, by reference, all the allegations of the first and second causes of action, and alleged further: At all times mentioned in the complaint, plaintiff Strickland 'is the owner' of the property and 'was' in actual possession thereof. Wander has served plaintiff Strickland with a three-day notice to vacate said property 'claiming that the said defendant was the owner of the property.' Wander does not own the property. The property is owned by plaintiff Strickland. It is necessary for the court to determine who is entitled to possession of the property; that is, whether plaintiff Strickland or defendant Wander is entitled to the possession.

The prayer is for a judgment: (1) declaring that the trustee's sale and deed are void, and that plaintiffs Strickland and Parr, 'principal and agent, were the legal and successive parties to said property'; (2) declaring that plaintiff Strickland is the owner of the property; (3) declaring whether plaintiff Strickland or defendant Wander has the right to possession; and (4) ordering the trustee to issue its deed to plaintiff Strickland 'claiming' title to the property to him for $3,000 cash or for such other sum as the court deems proper.

Defendant Wander filed a verified answer in which he denied the allegations that plaintiff Strickland is the owner of the property and that the trustee's sale was a 'purported' sale. He alleged, as follows: There was a trustee's sale of the property. The property was sold for $5,200. He (Wander) paid said sum. He 'gave' the trustee the sum of $100 cash, a cashier's check for $2,500, and the note 'securing' the first trust deed on the property, the unpaid balance on the note 'being' $2,600. At all times mentioned (in his answer) he was, and he now is, the owner of a second trust deed against the property, which trust deed is in the sum of $5,500. He is the owner of the property. A three-day notice to vacate the property was served on Strickland, and Strickland vacated the property.

As an affirmative defense, Wander alleged that about January 21, 1956, he filed an action in the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District for unlawful detainer of the property. The parties to the present action are the same as the parties in the municipal court action. Strickland set up as a defense in his answer in the municipal court action that the trustee's sale was improperly conducted. The court in that action found that the trustee's sale on December 20, 1955, was regularly conducted and valid 'and in connection therewith the Court entered its judgment and order finding Lawrence Strickland guilty of unlawful detainer of the premises described in the complaint on file herein and ordered execution issued thereon. * * * By reason of the premises all matters in connection with the possession, regularity of foreclosure proceedings and title to the real property herein have been fully adjudicated and determined.' The judgment rendered in the municipal court action remains in full force and effect and no appeal was taken therefrom.

Subsequent to filing his answer, Wander made a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary judgment. In support of his motion for a summary judgment, he filed an affidavit of Henry A. Fox, his attorney. That affidavit set forth substantially the same statements as are alleged in the affirmative defense (regarding the municipal court action). Certified copies of the findings, conclusions of law, and judgment in the municipal court action were attached to the affidavit. Those documents show that Wander was the plaintiff, and Strickland and one Brown were the defendants in the municipal court action and that the action was tried on February 17, 1956. The findings in that...