Strickland v. Dir., TDCJ-CID

• Decision Date: 28 November 2022
• Docket Number: 3:20-cv-3260-L (BT)
• Parties: JASON STRICKLAND, #2180409, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

JASON STRICKLAND, #2180409, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.

No. 3:20-cv-3260-L (BT)

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

November 28, 2022

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REBECCA RUTHERFORD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jason Strickland, a Texas prisoner, filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court referred the petition to the United States magistrate judge for findings and a recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b) and a standing order of reference. For the following reasons, the Court should DENY Strickland's petition.

Background

A jury found Strickland guilty of child sex trafficking and child sexual assault, Strickland v. State, Nos 05-18-00170-CR, 05-18-00171-CR, and the state trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment in each cause. See ECF No 10-7 at 399; ECF No. 10-9 at 324. The Texas Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed Strickland's convictions and life sentences. See Strickland v. State, 2019 WL 2402983 (Tex. App-Dallas 2019, no pet.). He did not file a petition for discretionary review (PDR) with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). See ECF No. 2 at 2-3. He did however, file state habeas applications challenging his convictions. ECF No. 2 at 3.

The CCA denied both applications without written order. ECF No. 10-23 at 1; ECF No. 10-25 at 1; Ex parte Strickland WR-91,596-01,02 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2020).

Strickland then filed his federal habeas petition, in which he argues:

1. Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 38.37) is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause;

2. The Texas Trafficking Statute, Texas Penal Code Section 20A.02, et seq., is facially unconstitutional for being overbroad and vague; and

3. His appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the Texas Trafficking Statute is overbroad and vague.

ECF No. 2 at 6-9; ECF No. 3. The State filed a response. ECF No. 13. Strickland did not file a reply.

Legal Standards and Analysis

The CCA denied Strickland's claims on the merits. See, e.g. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Under Texas law a denial of relief by the Court of Criminal Appeals serves as a denial of relief on the merits of the claim.”) (citing Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). Therefore, this Court reviews those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides:

(d) An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in a State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ of habeas corpus if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently from the United States Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380-84 (2000). Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the United States Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id.

A determination of a factual issue by a state court is presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The presumption of correctness applies to both express and implied factual findings. Young v. Dretke, 356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004). Absent express factual findings, a federal court may imply fact findings consistent with the state court's disposition. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983).

“A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Id. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has affirmed that this is a difficult standard to meet, and “it was meant to be” so. Id. at 102. Even if “a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).

1. Teague prohibits Strickland's claim that Article 38.37 is unconstitutional, or, alternatively, the CCA's rejection of the claim did not violate clearly established law.

In this case, the State, pursuant to Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, introduced evidence that Strickland was previously convicted of multiple counts of rape in Oklahoma. See, e.g., Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2015, no pet.) (“Article 38.37 as amended now provides for the admission of evidence of other sex crimes committed by the defendant against children other than the victim of the alleged offense ‘for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.'”) (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37 § 2(b)).

Strickland argues that Article 38.37 is unconstitutional because the use of propensity or character-conforming evidence violates the Due Process Clause. See ECF No. 3 at 7, 10-15. The State counters that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) prohibits this claim, or, alternatively, that the CCA's rejection of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court.

In Teague, the Supreme Court held:

That federal courts may not create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure on habeas review. A new rule is one which was not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction became final.” 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060. A new rule is created if the rule is, “in light of this Court's precedent, ‘susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.'” O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, --, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 1974, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415, 100 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)). Accordingly, we must examine existing precedent and determine whether, under that precedent, relief is required. If reasonable minds could differ on whether current law requires relief, we may not grant relief without creating a “new rule” barred by Teague.

Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 1998).

Teague does not, however, bar new substantive rules. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 200 (2016). “A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes”; “[t]his includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish.” Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-53 (2004). “Procedural rules, in contrast, are designed to enhance the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating ‘the manner of determining the defendant's culpability.'” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 201 (emphasis in original) (quoting Schiro, 542 U.S. at 353).

Here, because the rule that Strickland proposes-that the admission of prior sexual offense evidence (or propensity evidence in general) violates the Due Process Clause-is designed to regulate the manner of determining a defendant's guilt, it is procedural. Further, the proposed rule would be new because it is not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.” Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1997)). To the contrary, “the United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to decide whether the introduction of evidence of prior bad acts to show propensity to commit a crime violates due process.” Groen v. Busby, 886 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that Teague precluded a Due Process Clause challenge to California's version of Article 38.37) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n. 5 (1991) (“[W]e express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.”) (Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of whether using evidence of the defendant's past crimes to show that he has a propensity for criminal activity could ever violate due process.”)).

It does not appear that the Fifth Circuit has addressed whether the admission of propensity or character evidence can violate the Due Process Clause; nor has Strickland pointed to any such authority. Although on the one hand he admits that “[a]t present, there is no direct guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue,” he also argues that Supreme Court cases show that it would find Article 38.37 unconstitutional if presented with the issue. ECF No. 3 at 12-14. But the cases he relies upon are inapposite. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892), held that it was error to admit evidence of uncharged...