Strickland v. MICA Information Systems

• Decision Date: 28 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. C-89-924-WS.,C-89-924-WS.
• Citation: 800 F. Supp. 1320
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Patricia L. STRICKLAND, Plaintiff, v. MICA INFORMATION SYSTEMS, David Anderson, and Harriet Anderson, Defendants.

800 F. Supp. 1320

Patricia L. STRICKLAND, Plaintiff, v. MICA INFORMATION SYSTEMS, David Anderson, and Harriet Anderson, Defendants.

No. C-89-924-WS.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina, Winston-Salem Division.

February 28, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Katherine A. Mewhinney, B. Ervin Brown, II, Winston-Salem, N.C., for plaintiff.

Robin E. Shea, Winston-Salem, N.C., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TILLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Patricia L. Strickland ("Strickland") filed this lawsuit against Defendants MICA Information Systems, David Anderson and Harriet Anderson (collectively "MICA"). The complaint alleges that: (1) MICA violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) § 215 by discharging her in retaliation for her pursuit of a complaint with the Department of Labor; (2) MICA violated the FLSA § 207 by not compensating her for overtime; (3) MICA violated N.C.Gen.Stat. § 95-25.8 (1989) by deducting money from her salary for absences; (4) MICA wrongfully discharged her in violation of North Carolina law; and (5) MICA breached the employment contract between MICA and Strickland, in violation of North Carolina law. MICA has moved for summary judgment on the action, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons stated herein, MICA's motion is PARTLY GRANTED AND PARTLY DENIED.

I.

MICA has moved for summary judgment on each of Strickland's claims. A motion for summary judgment should be granted when, after reviewing all of the record, it is found that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the case should be decided as a matter of law. See Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is the Court's obligation to view the facts in the light most favorable to the adverse party and to allow the adverse party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Strickland's claims will withstand a summary judgment motion if evidence, properly forecast, would be sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. See Herold v. Hajoca Corp., 864 F.2d 317, 319 (4th Cir.1988), cert. den. 490 U.S. 1107, 109 S.Ct. 3159, 104 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1989).

The facts, viewed most favorably to Ms. Strickland, may be stated as follows:

Defendant MICA Information Systems sells computer packages to physicians. Defendants David and Harriet Anderson, husband and wife, own MICA. Plaintiff Strickland was employed by MICA as manager of customer services from August 17, 1989 to October 4, 1989, when she was discharged. Two days prior to Strickland's termination, as a follow-up to a memorandum drafted previously by Strickland, Strickland told David Anderson either that she was requesting information from the Department of Labor or had already filed a complaint with the Department of Labor on the issue of questionable pay deductions. The next day, Strickland and Harriet Anderson had a heated exchange. That evening the Andersons decided to discharge Strickland, which they did the next day.

II.

A. FEDERAL RETALIATION CLAIM

MICA first seeks summary judgment on Strickland's federal claim of discharge based on retaliation in violation of the FLSA, particularly 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Section 215(a)(3) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person

to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.

29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).

"Where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employee's assertion of statutory rights, the discharge is discriminatory under § 215(a)(3), whether or not other grounds for discharge exist." Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir.1975). See also Love v. RE/MAX of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir.1984).

Courts have determined that the order of proof for retaliation claims made under FLSA is the same as that made under Title VII. See e.g. Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 123, n. 1 (3d Cir.1987) (Third Circuit held that the order of proof is the same with FLSA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act which is governed by the three part division set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) for Title VII cases. (citing Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co., 801 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir.1986))); Caryk v. Coupe, 663 F.Supp. 1243, 1253 (D.D.C.1987); Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 580 F.Supp. 593, 595 (S.D.N.Y.1984); Donovan v. Schoolhouse Four, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 185, 189 (W.D.Va.1983); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 936, 948 (D.Colo.1979). A plaintiff may show retaliation by direct evidence or indirectly through a McDonnell Douglas type proof scheme. In order to establish, indirectly, a prima facie case of retaliatory action under the FLSA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the employer was aware of plaintiff's participation in protected activity; (2) that an adverse employment action was taken against the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity; and (3) that the two elements are related causally. Caryk, 663 F.Supp. at 1253. If a prima facie case is shown, the employer has the opportunity to state legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for taking the adverse action. Id. If the employer gives legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff can still prevail if she can demonstrate that the employer's reasons are mere pretext for discrimination taken in retaliation for participation in protected activities. Id.

MICA argues that Strickland cannot meet the legal elements for a prima facie case of retaliation under § 215(a)(3) because she cannot show any causal connection between the protected activity and her discharge.¹ A causal connection may be demonstrated by evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action. Burrus v. United Telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982). According to the evidence forecast in this case, dismissal followed within two days after MICA received notice that plaintiff was engaged in protected activity. Deciding whether that alone is sufficient to create a genuine issue (i.e. sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict) on the motivation for Strickland's dismissal is unnecessary. The extremely short time period coupled with a factfinder's negative assessment of the credibility of witnesses who would deny that motivation would be sufficient to support a jury's verdict. This is why courts have cautioned against granting motions for summary judgment and directed verdicts in discrimination cases where motive and causation are at issue. See Herold v. Hajoca, 864 F.2d at 319 (citing Taylor v. Home Insurance Company, 777 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir.1985), cert. den. 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2249, 90 L.Ed.2d 695 (1986)).

Although Strickland has met the prima facie case threshold, MICA has articulated a legitimate reason for her discharge. MICA states that Strickland had a confrontational, belligerent attitude towards customers and co-workers and that it was for this reason that she was terminated. With the exception of one instance, however, Strickland has presented affidavits and deposition testimony which contradicts MICA's assertions. Strickland concedes that she was once rude to a customer; however, when she attempted to resign following that incident, MICA persuaded her to remain if she agreed to make some changes in her attitude. This is sufficient to create a genuine issue of pretext.

MICA's motion for summary judgment on this claim will be DENIED.

III. FEDERAL OVERTIME PROVISION VIOLATION CLAIM

MICA next argues that it should be granted summary judgment on the claim that MICA violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Strickland claims that she was an employee who was covered under the maximum hours provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, which requires that, for any work done in excess of forty hours per week, she be compensated at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which she employed. Citing § 213 of the FLSA, MICA argues that Strickland was not entitled to overtime pay. In § 213 the Secretary of Labor has identified certain classifications of individuals, including those paid on a salary basis, who are not covered by § 207. MICA argues that because Strickland was paid on a salary basis, within the meaning of a regulation established by the Secretary pursuant to § 213, namely 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a), Strickland is exempt from § 207.² Section 541.118(a) defines "salary basis" as follows:

An employee will be considered to be paid "on a salary basis" within the meaning of the regulations if under his employment agreement he regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. Subject to the exceptions provided below, the employee must receive his full salary for any week in which he performs any work without regard to the number of days or hours worked.

Section 541.118(a). (Emphasis added)

The forecast of evidence shows that MICA routinely docked Strickland's pay for time spent away from the office. Therefore, Strickland did not receive her full salary some weeks in which she performed some work. § 541.118(a) is not applicable to...